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1 Introduction 
This project is a study of the expertise in the design of 
chemical plants which handle hazardous materials. It has been 
approached by studying various topics in hazardous plant 
design together with the methods employed in expert systems. 
In this opening chapter we give an introduction to design, 
particularly for hazardous plants, safety and loss prevention, 
computer problem solving, expert knowledge and expert systems. 
In the final section, the objectives of the work are outlined. 
There are various works which deal with engineering 
design as a subject in its own right. These include Simon 
(1975) and Turner (1984), and Rudd and Watson (1968) who deal 
with design with particular reference to Chemical Engineering. 
In this chapter design is considered generally, and more 
specific details are given in Chapter 7. 
1.1 Plant Design 
The design of a large plant or plant extension is a 
complex task which takes some time to complete and involves a 
number of stages and experts of different disciplines. 
Design evolves from research and development which de- 
fines, the requirements and constraints of the system. Also 
considered at this early stage is the economic viability of 
the project in terms of production costs and sales returns. 
The decisions taken early on are crucial and will leave little 
scope for alteration later on, as these may be expensive and 
time consuming. Also to consider in the first stages is the 
safety of the plant with the concept that it is better to 
eliminate a hazard rather than devise a means of controlling 
it in mind. The safety of the plant is therefore determined 
largely-by the quality of the design from the outset. 
The design-process can be generalized in terms of 
knowledge of the characteristics of particular chemicals, 
operations, and processes etc. This kind of knowledge is 
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essential for process design and for hazard identification. 
The design team should be properly organized, since the 
team will be made up from various different disciplines, such 
as chemistry, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering 
as well as chemical-engineering. Individual responsibility 
should therefore be well defined and the nature of each aspect 
of the design that one person is concerned with should not 
take them outside of their domain of expertise. 
Stages in the design will be outlined in detail later in 
this work, but as a broad indication, they are :- 
Research and development 
Process design - 
process flowsheet 
detailed process design 
Engineering design and equipment selection 
Lees (1980) states that design is an iterative process 
since as more information-becomes available and as constraints 
and opportunities are recognized, modifications to the design 
may be needed. Further, the project must be scheduled and 
coordinated properly, and for this, use is made of the techni- 
ques of Critical Path Scheduling (CPS) and of Project Evalua- 
tion and Review Technique (PERT). 
Other general aspects to the design of a plant are listed 
below :- 
Design experience 
Design information 
Design standards and codes 
Design communication and documentation 
Hazard identification - 
Reliability assessment 
Design modification 
Computer aided design 
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1.1.1 The Design of Plants Handling Hazardous Materials 
It is useful at this stage to describe design from a 
hazards viewpoint. We mentioned above that it is better to 
eliminate the hazard rather than try to control it using a 
special device. This concept is known as inherently safer 
design. However, some hazards cannot be avoided, particularly 
if we consider that some chemicals are more flammable than 
others, or more toxic and some unit operations are more hazar- 
dous than others. Therefore the degree of hazard is a function 
of the process chosen and the inventory present on the site, 
since by limiting the inventory, the process can be made 
inherently safer. The disaster at Flixborough illustrates this 
well. The scale of the explosions was due to the holdup of 
large quantities of flammable -liquid at' high temperature and 
pressure. The subsequent enquiry recommended that considera- 
tion be given to reducing the inventories on process plants. 
Other aspects which will make a plant inherently safer 
include the selection of the process, since some processes are 
inherently more operable than others, and fail safe design, 
which refers to the design of control and solenoid valves 
etc., in the event of a utility failure such as electricity or 
instrument air. Another aspect is so-called 'second chance 
design'. This means that there is a second line of defence. 
Features here include plant layout, pressure system design and 
alarms and trips. It can be illustrated by normal features of 
plant design. For example, bunding and drainage facilities, 
pressure relief and blowdown systems on pressure vessels, 
isolation of loss of containment, the use of double mechanical 
seals on pumps and by strict following of maintenance and 
operation procedures, such as purging again after a delay, in 
lighting a furnace. 
The design of engineering equipment such as reactors, 
. 
distillation columns and furnaces together with an awareness 
of the operating conditions and the utilities available all go 
toward the successful completion of a plant design. 
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1.2 Safety and Loss Prevention 
The phrase 'Safety and Loss Prevention' has taken on a 
new meaning in the chemical and process industries in the last 
20 or so years, and particularly since the Flixborough 
incident of 1974. Traditionally, safety was often only consi- 
dered on a plant as a remedial action, i. e. the fault was put 
right once an accident had occurred. In recent years, the 
action has tended towards the reverse of this. The emphasis 
now is on making plants safe from the moment they start opera- 
tions and on designing plants which are intrinsically safe, 
i. e. safe by their very nature. There are many reasons for the 
change in attitude, namely that plants have got larger, with 
more quantity of-dangerous materials in operation, Government 
legislation, companies own moral regard to safety for their 
workers, the environment and the public, and the heavy finan- 
cial losses that are incurred when a catastrophe occurs. This 
is where the term 'loss prevention' derives from. It is an 
insurance term meaning the financial loss caused by accidents. 
It is a forward looking process - one that anticipates hazards 
and their effects before they occur. It is an all-embracing 
term that includes all areas of the plant - from first designs 
to operations, all personnel - from the designers to operators 
and maintenance workers, and to all departments - from Safety 
to Research and Development. Because chemical and process 
plants are bigger today than ever before, the need for loss 
prevention is reater than ever before. - C. 
Safety and loss prevention should be of prime considera- 
tion in plant design and should be considered at the earliest 
possible time in the designing of a plant. The reasons for 
this have been outlined above, but-also under the Health and 
Safety at Work Act (1974), company management is under legal 
obligation for the safeguarding, as far as is reasonably 
practicable of the health and welfare of employees and the 
public where they are-affected. The safeguarding of the plant 
itself is not only the responsibilty of the management, but 
also the employees. 
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Lees (1980), has characterized loss prevention under the 
following headings : - 
1) A concern with depth of technology and associated 
major hazards 
2) An emphasis on management 
3) A systems rather than trial and error approach 
4) A concern to avoid loss of containment resulting in major 
fire, explosion or toxic release 
5) The development of techniques for the quantification of 
hazards - 
6) The principle of risk criteria-. and the quantification of 
hazards 
7) The development of techniques for the quantification of 
hazards 
8) The use of the techniques of reliability engineering 
9) The principle of independence in critical assessment and 
inspections -- 
10) The planning of emergencies' 
11) A critique of traditional practices or existing codes or 
regulations where these appear out-dated by technological 
change 
1.2.1 Loss Prevention and Plant Design 
Loss prevention in plant design comes under the following 
general headings (Coulson and Richardson, 1985) :- 
1) Identification and assessment of hazards 
2) Process control - prevention of deviations 
3) Hazard control - containment -° 
4) Loss limitation - pressure relief 
Many aspects of safety-on process plant can be considered 
at the design stage. Equipment has to be specified and 
selected. Designers consult relevant British Standards or 
codes of practice. Other appropriate codes relevant to petro- 
leum plant. are published by the American Petroleum Institute 
and the Institute of Petroleum, in the Refinery Safety Codes. 
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Also, each individual company will produce its own codes, 
although these will generally be confidential. 
The hazards met in design must be effectively dealt with. 
This is also the stage where expert design can reduce the need 
for complex and costly control and protective devices. 
Kletz (1984) makes this point in his book published by the 
IChemE on Cheaper, Safer Plants. The point is made that 
simplifying the design can lead to increased safety. 
Important aspects of safety in plant design are listed 
generally by the IChemE (1984). These are :- 
1) Hazard and Operability Studies - an effective technique for 
examining plant and identifying hazards at an early stage in 
the design. All aspects of the plant-can be considered by 
questioning the process under key headings such as "more-of" 
(flow, temperature, pressure), "none" (flow, temperature, 
pressure), etc. A detailed study of HAZOP is given also by 
Kletz (1983). More on -HAZOP is discussed in Chapter 8. 
2) Reactor Design - potentially a major source of hazard 
particularly when exothermic reactions and reactions contai- 
ning large amounts of flammable material occur. 
3) Plant Layout -a very important aspect, where it is neces- 
sary to provide adequate space between items of plant, storage 
etc., and good roadways for-fire-fighting appliances. Also to 
consider here is the danger to the public of a plant situated 
in a densely populated area. A comprehensive discussion of 
plant layout is given by Mecklenburgh (1985). 
The above aspects are just a"small selection of safety 
and loss prevention in plant design. We will go into more 
detail later, but extensive discussions can be found in 
Lees (1980). 
This section has emphasised the need for forward planning 
when designing process plant. This is a fundamental aspect in 
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this project and one of the prime aims is to make the 
designing of safety into a process easier from an earlier 
stage. If the engineering design team can use a computer 
containing expert knowledge before going into the calcula- 
tions, then the team will be all the more aware of the hazards 
inherent in the process. 
1.3 Computer Problem Solving 
To solve any kind of problem, either manually or by using 
a computer, the solver needs to have a clear idea and 
statement of the problem to be solved. This is particularly 
true of computers which are programmed in the conventional 
sense using such languages-as FORTRAN and BASIC. Traditional- 
ly, computers were very large number-crunching devices able to 
solve mathematical problems of increasing complexity as time 
has gone by. Today, computers are able to solve very complex 
mathematical problems very quickly indeed. However, computers 
are now able to solve text oriented problems, where calcula- 
tions are not an inherent part of solving the problem. Here, 
yes/no type answers are needed in answering relevant questions 
in order to work through to a solution to the problem. These 
kinds of problems are about the environment in which we live 
such as medicine, engineering design classification and diag- 
nosis, problems that computers traditionally have not been 
able to solve. The so called 'creative computer' is still 
unable to, solve our economic and social problems, but some 
would argue that this is not such a bad thing. 
The level of difficulty of a problem must also be consi- 
dered. Getting a-robot to guide a spacecraft to the moon is a 
relatively straightforward operation, but to get the robot to 
go to the shop and buy a newspaper is a difficult problem. 
Some would argue that for a computer to solve such problems of- 
the real world, then it would have to be intelligent. This is 
not quite true, because a computer will only do what the 
programmer asks it to. However, for a human to solve some 
arithmetic, that person will use his intelligence. If a mac- 
hine does the same problem, in a fraction of the time, 'then it 
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too is intelligent. The argument appears never-ending, but the 
point we are making is that for a computer to solve problems 
that it normally requires specialists to solve, it has to be 
able to appear to mimic the expert in its line of reasoning. 
The computer will still need to be programmed, but by using 
specialist people, and not in the conventional sense. 
Programs generally need a clear problem definition and a 
start and an end to the program in order to find a solution. 
Steps are set out in a clear and logical order for the 
computer to follow. Fifth Generation programs, and particular- 
ly expert systems (see section 1.5) are not written in this 
way. This is because the types of problems are different. They 
are not clear-cut in both definition and solution. Languages 
(such as Lisp and Prolog) are designed in order to solve such 
problems. Using these languages, it is possible to write one 
line of program code and get the compiler to make sense of it. 
Also lines of program can be inserted at any point in the 
program without upsetting the way the program will solve the 
problem. A logical start or end to the program is also not 
necessary in the conventional sense. 
The types of problems that Fifth Generation programs 
solve, then, are quite different in nature from what we are used 
to. Such problems are often not fully defined have many diffe- 
rent solutions, are difficult to solve for a non-expert and 
are characterized by uncertainty. In order to solve such 
problems, large amounts of knowledge are needed, making struc- 
tured languages inappropriate for problem solution. 
Problem selection becomes very important in this field. 
Feigenbaum (1984) states :- 
"... problem selection - the selection of a domain in 
which to attempt the building of an expert system 
- is an art. " 
Feigenbaum goes on to say that the problems must be chosen so 
that they, reflect the state of the art in knowledge enginee- 
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ring. If the problems fit precisely then there are no 
difficulties, but if they are slightly beyond present capabi- 
lities, then the art is pushed. If they are well beyond what 
other people are doing then time and effort are wasted and 
little is accomplished. 
1.4 Expert Knowledge 
1.4.1 Expertise 
An expert in one particular field is considered as a 
specialist, one who will be at the top of his profession and 
one who is recognised as having much specialised knowledge 
about his domain. For example, a medical doctor is considered 
an expert, particularly if he specialises in one particular 
area of medical science. Expertise consists of knowledge, 
understanding problems in the domain, and skill at solving 
these domain problems. Because experts are knowledgeable, they 
achieve outstanding performances that few people could 
emulate. However if computer programs could embody an expert's 
knowledge, then they too will achieve outstanding performan- 
ces. If such programs are going to achieve success and appear 
to 'think' like the expert, then not only do they have to 
contain the knowledge, but also the problem-solving methodolo- 
gy. Added to this, difficult and interesting problems general- 
ly do not have tractable and algorithmic solutions, since 
important tasks originate in complex physical or social do- 
mains. 
1.4.2 Knowledge 
Knowledge can be divided into two parts - that of the 
facts of the domain and that of heuristic knowledge. Facts 
domain knowledge consists of facts and theories that can be 
found in textbooks, literature, papers or in the classroom. 
Equally important is heuristic knowledge which is the knowled- 
ge of good practice and good judgement, and is central to the 
task of solving expert problems. Hayes-Roth et. al. (1983) 
refer to this as 'hidden knowledge', since it is rarely 
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written down, and is knowledge acquired by the expert after 
years of experience. It is usually unique to one particular 
expert, and is in the form of 'rules-of-thumb' or heuristics. 
Heuristics enable the human expert to make judgements and 
educated guesses. They are used for recognising promising 
approaches to problems and to deal effectively with incomplete 
or errorful data. 
Heuristics are a very important aspect of expert knowled- 
ge, and are central to the theme of this study. Interpreting 
and copying this kind of knowledge from the human expert is 
recognised as one of the biggest bottlenecks in the designing 
of expert systems (Feigenbaum, -1984). The reasons for this are 
that heuristics are by nature vague, unexplainable, and diffi- 
cult to extract from the expert. Experts often use heuristics 
without even realising it, and their basis for using them is 
often because it worked the last timetheýtackled such a 
problem. Another problem with the use of heuristics is repre- 
sentation in the computer program. The two problems of acquis- 
tion and representation are dealt with in more detail later. 
Lenat (1983) has presented work on the nature and use of 
heuristics. 
1.5 Expert Systems 
Expert systems are a branch of the general area of arti- 
ficial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is about making 
machines behave in a way similar to that of humans. Winston 
(1984) has given the following definition of artificial 
intelligence :- 
"Artificial intelligence is the study of ideas that 
enable computers to be intelligent". 
Applied artificial intelligence has applications in natural 
language processing, robotics and expert systems, along with 01 
computer chess playing and puzzle-solving. Artificial 
intlligence has its background in the 1940s when a prominent 
British scientist, Alan Turing, stated that there was a need 
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for a machine which was based on logical operators such as 
'and', 'or' and 'not' (Harmon and King, 1985). Today, many 
countries are concerned with A. I. development, and particular- 
ly expert systems work. Notably, the United States, Britain, 
the E. E. C. and Japan with their Fifth Generation Program are 
concerned with work in this and related fields. 
Knowledge-based expert systems provide the means for 
computers to aid people with analysing problems and making 
decisions. There are many commercial applications undergoing 
development and many in existence already, notably MYCIN, 
DENDRAL and PROSPECTOR. Typically, expert systems are helping 
doctors diagnose-diseases, geologists locate ore deposits and 
general trouble-shooting in many different fields. 
An expert system has been defined as :- 
"... an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge 
and inference procedures to'solve problems that are 
difficult enough to require significant human expertise 
for their solution. " 
Feigenbaum 
(in Harmon and King, 1985) 
Traditionally, an expert-system was built by debriefing a 
recognized human expert so that his expert knowledge could be 
captured and coded into computer programs. This is termed 
knowledge engineering, and knowledge engineers are usually 
employed for this task. Also, other knowledge acquisition 
techniques are used. Such techniques involve 'teaching' a 
system expertise by feeding in rules or examples of any domain 
into an existing structure. Such systems are called shells. ' 
Other systems contain knowledge of a difficult decision-making 
situation that is quite useful, but not equivalent to that of 
a human expert. Machine learning is another-promising method 
of expert system development, in which the program acquires 
knowledge from past experiences. Aspects of machine learning 
include classification systems and learning systems,,, and these 
receive attention in this work. 
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Expert systems are usually built using specialist 
artificial intelligence languages, such as Prolog or Lisp, or 
by using a shell, which meets the requirements of the particu- 
lar domain. As explained in the previous section, these lan- 
guages do not run in the same way as languages such as FORTRAN 
or BASIC. Artificial intelligence languages are symbolic, are 
highly interactive and are capable of being programmed to give 
mid-run explanations. 
Expert systems are generally made up of a knowledge-base, 
in the form of rules together with an inference engine, which 
is a program which works out the logical sequences of all the 
rules taken together. Rules can be unambiguous, such as 'IF 
this AND that THEN some result', or they can be more vague 
involving probabilities, such as 'IF (to some degree) this AND 
(to some degree) that THEN (to some degree) result'. The 
machine works through the rules, asks the user'for information 
and then gives its conclusions. 
Expert systems and inference procedures will be discussed 
in more detail in later chapters. 
1.6 Project Objectives 
The main objective of this project is to gain a better 
understanding of the expertise involved in the design of 
plants handling hazardous materials. Our aim is to develop 
methodologies in certain aspects of safety in the process 
industries with a view to improved methods of computer aided 
design, including expert systems. 
There are already a number-of large computer aided design 
packages commercially available, but these tend to deal with 
the detailed design calculations. involved for plant equipment, 
such as reactors, heat exchangers and distillation columns. 
There is little available which specifically deals with 
hazards work, apart from reliability and availabilty programs 
and fault tree programs. Since the key element in hazard 
identification is to identify the key problems before the 
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detailed design, there is obviously a need for computer aided 
design programs in this area. These could be used as front-end 
programs, using existing packages as back-end programs. 
Another point to note is that generally speaking we are 
not dealing with new plants built on green-field sites, but 
existing plants where modifications and extensions are taking 
place. 
1.6.1 Problem Identification 
It is indicated above that the most beneficial contribu- 
tion to this field is to aid the identification of hazards 
early on in a design project. This involves a coarse scale 
hazard identification technique. This is what happens in ma- 
nual plant design, so a complete computer aided design 
approach would have to have an equivalent of this function. 
There are a number of ways bf approaching this problem. 
One is to try to list the generic hazards that always tend to 
occur. We could also investigate case histories, one in which 
the hazard was found during the design, one where accidents 
were reported. A third approach is to look at the index-based 
methods such as the Dow and Mond indices and try to develop 
generic features on which these are based. Also, we have tried 
to concentrate an approach to specific design tasks. 
An important point to note is that the work reported here 
is concerned with various aspects of the design problem. The 
expertise is therefore from literature sources. If the project 
was concerned with the development of a single expert system, 
then the work would have probably proceeded in a different 
way. We are concerned with the type of knowledge used by 
designers, and on its representation, rather than knowledge 
elicitation. 
Earlier sections of the introduction have emphasised the 
characteristics of the design process, design solutions and of 
expert systems. It is at this point that we should bring the 
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subjects together and justify the potential for design heuris- 
tics for plants handling hazardous materials. Such design is 
not about lengthy calculations involving iterations and conve- 
rgences, but about encapsulating expertise from the 
literature, texts, examples and the experts. The characteris- 
tics of this knowledge seem to show that one of the most 
promising approaches to problem solving is in the development 
of methodologies with the idea of building expert systems. 
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2 Expert System Fundamentals 
In Chapter 1, expert systems were introduced. In this 
chapter, the components of an expert system are explained, 
including the method of solving problems, the knowledge base, 
and facilities characteristic of most 'classical' existing 
systems, such as explanations. The first section deals with 
fields of application of expert systems today together with 
applications in chemical engineering. 
2.1 Applications of Expert Systems 
When experts are in great demand, but in short supply, a 
computer based consultant can help to amplify and disseminate 
the needed expert. Expert systems capture practical knowledge, 
hard to pin down and rarely found in text books. Below are 
three areas where expert systems have been proven and are 
advantageous, as given by Wiess and Kulikowski (1984). 
a) Medicine - Here, expert systems are generally used for a 
second opinion or to qualify a doctor's suspicions. As specia- 
lizations grow and problems become more complex, expert 
systems are playing an ever increasing role. 
b) Oil Exploration - There has long been a shortage of expert 
well-log analysts. The idea of capturing the expertise of the 
best analysts in a computer model is an attractive alternative 
to training new specialists and retraining existing ones. 
c) Equipment Repair - Again, there is a shortage of trained 
experts, particularly in the area of computer repair. As 
technology becomes more complex, the problem becomes progres- 
sively worse. The dynamic component of the expertise involved 
is hard to capture in manuals, making expert systems 'v-ery 
attractive. 
Sell (1985) states that there are over 50 expert systems 
in existence, although there is some doubt as to whether some 
of them can be thought of as expert systems (Andow, 1985). 
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There are, however, four systems that are considered to be 
'classical', and these are described below. 
2.1.1 DENDRAL 
Bramer (1984) states that DENDRAL was the first expert 
system. It is probably still the best known successful system. 
The project as a whole includes three programs, HEURISTIC 
DENDRAL, META-DENDRAL and CONGEN, and was developed at the 
Stanford Heuristic Programming Unit by Feigenbaum, Buchanan 
and others, in association with the Stanford-Mass Spectrometry 
Laboratory from 1965 onwards. The system is in daily use in 
universities and industry (Hayes-Roth, et. al. 1983). 
The purpose of DENDRAL is to derive chemical structures 
from data available to physical chemists. A mass spectrometer 
is used to determine the constituent atoms of a compound and 
their relative frequencies. The physical chemist must then 
determine the arrangement of the atoms in the molecule. No 
algorithm is available to do this. 
The constraints of the spectrograph are fed to the CONGEN 
(CONstrained structure GENerator) part of the program, where 
rules are employed to arrive at a list of possible candidate 
structures. These structures are then compared with the 
original spectrograph. 
The HEURISTIC DENDRAL part eliminates lengthy and error 
prone work by the chemist in order to come up with a final 
structure. META-DENDRAL contains high level rules and is used 
to examine data and discover rules for determining molecular 
structure. Rules are discovered then refined before being 
released as the working set. META-DENDRAL is an example of an 
inductive inference system as described by Quinlan (1982). 
Sell (1985) gives an indication of the success of the 
DENDRAL project: 
"DENDRAL is a success story. The results derived 
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from its use are cited in over 50 scientific 
journals, which attests not only to its usefulness 
but also to its scientific credentials... The number 
of its users was expanding so rapidly that in 1983 
a seperate company was set up for its distribution 
and continued enhancement. " 
2.1.2 MYCIN 
Developed from 1975 onwards by Edward Short4liffe and ot- 
hers, the MYCIN project, like DENDRAL was based at the 
Stanford Heuristic Programming Project in collaboration with 
the Stanford Medical School. MYCIN is a medical diagnostic 
program for blood and meningitis infections, and also recom- 
mends effective drug treatment on the basis of interactive 
dialogue with the physician. It contains more than 400 rules 
of the IF <situation> THEN <action> type. Associated with 
these is a degree of certainty indicating the level of confi- 
dence in the rule. Bramer (1982) gives the following example 
of a rule: 
RULE 85 
IF: 
1) The site of the culture is blood, and 
2) The'gram-stain of the organism is gramneg, and 
3) The morphology of the organism is rod, and 
4) The patient is a compromised host, 
THEN: 
There is suggestive evidence (0.6) that the identity 
of the organism is pseudo-aeruginosa. 
The certainty factor, 0.6, is a probability-like value in the 
range 0 to 1. 
A physician's task in tackling a -problem of this kind is 
to establish four facts: 
1) Does the patient suffer from bacterial infection? 
2) What organism is responsible? 
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3) Which drugs may be appropriate? 
4) Which drugs do I administer? 
MYCIN is designed to aid all four decisions on the basis of 
patient data and test results, reaching a conclusion about all 
four questions. A line of reasoning can be displayed and 
references to articles and publications relevant to the case. 
MYCIN uses 'backward chaining' (see section 4.2.2) and an 
implicit AND/OR tree. Medical diagnoses ('goals') are linked 
with user-supplied data ('leaf-nodes') to make sure that the 
questions are "focussed" towards a particular hypothesis. A 
model of inexact reasoning is-used to propagate certainty 
factors through the tree. Bramer (19B2) gives an example 
session with MYCIN. 
MYCIN has shown to be as good as specialists in the field 
of blood disease diagnosis. However, it has not found regular 
use in the medical fields. There are various reasons for this, 
(Sell, 1985) but it, is thought that experts do not want to use 
a machine for tasks that they are well capable of performing 
themselves. Other reasons may be that MYCIN requires a large 
machine, takes 20-30 minutes per consultation and it is igno- 
rant of a patient's case history. MYCIN has, however, had 
favourable attention as a teaching aid, mainly due to its 
explanation facilities and its use of references related to 
the field. 
2.1.3 PROSPECTOR 
This was developed by Duda, Hart and others and is an aid 
to geologists searching for ore deposits and for the evalua- 
tion of the mineral-potential of large geographic areas. It 
was developed at the Stanford Research Institute from 1978 
onwards (Duda, 1979). Like MYCIN it is a conversational system 
and uses several geological models. These include three 
different sandstone models, uranium deposit models and porphy- 
ry copper models. 
18 
The knowledge in PROSPECTOR is in the form of an inferen- 
ce network of relations between field evidence and geological 
hypotheses. Users are able to give a certainty factor about 
evidence on the scale -5 (indicating evidence is certainly ab- 
sent) to +5 (indicating evidence is certainly present). Three 
kinds of evidence are present in the inference network: 
1) Logical Relations - Uses standard Boolean connectives of 
AND, OR and NOT. They indicate that the truth value of a 
hypothesis depends totally on those assertions that define it. 
2) Plausible Relations - Bayesian probability theory is used 
to determine changes in the probabilities of a number of 
related hypotheses. Plausible relations are used for general 
cases where the proving or otherwise of a relation provides 
evidence to support the change. 
3) Contextual Relations - Used to express necessary conditions 
that are needed to be established before assertions can be ut- 
lized in the reasoning process. 
PROSPECTOR is said to be a very accurate system. Sell 
(1985) quotes an example when the models were submitted to 
tests against known sites of exploration and against the 
judgement of experts. PROSPECTOR was found to be in agreement 
to within 7%. It is a remarkably cheap system, with one consu- 
latation costing only a few dollars. 
2.1.4 Ri 
R1 (also known as XCON) is said to be a very successful 
expert system (Sell, 1985). It was developed by McDermot and 
workers at the Carnegie-Mellon University with funding from 
the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). R1 is a knowledge 
based VAX configuration system, and is used for aiding DEC 
staff to work out customer requirements when buying a VAX 
computer system. When the VAX was first marketed, the customer 
had a great choice of equipment, depending on his particular 
requirements. The orders had to be translated into configura- 
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tions which were plausible. Some equipment needed to be added, 
such as cables, power supplies and cabinets, other equipment 
needed greater specification such as translating disc storage 
requirements into disc units and controllers. Thus, much 
detail was required, along with an extensive knowledge of the 
equipment available with the constraints that it had to obser- 
ve. R1 is able to deal with this kind of problem. At first the 
system had 400 rules, although this has now grown to 4000. DEC 
believes that R1 is capable of out-performing people, and 80 
more staff would be required if R1 was not available. 
R1 is interesting in the context of this work, and it is 
worth noting some of its features. Out of the systems 
described above, R1 is the only one that has a, design element. 
The system is a forward chaining one which uses production 
rules of the 'if-then' format. Conflict resolution plays a 
part when two rules fire at the same time. In searching for a 
complete solution, Rl forges ahead and hardly ever backs up. 
The reason for this is that the rules generally embody enough 
constraint to prevent going into blind alleys. 
Summary 
The four systems described above are all very important 
in expert system research and development. They have shown 
that expert systems, and the techniques that they employ, are 
capable of solving real world problems, and they have also 
given models for other applications to follow. Many systems 
are based on them, including the so-called 'shells', i. e. the 
toolsets which make expert system development easier (see 
section 5.3). 
2.1.5 Applications in Chemical Engineering 
Expert systems-applications in chemical engineering cover 
a wide range of problems (Banares, 1985a), from pure deriva- 
tion types to production types. Most problems of the real 
world lie somewhere between these two extremes. In derivation 
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problems, the solution is found by a search, whereas in produ- 
ction problems, the constraints of the solution are provided, 
and the solution generated. Banares feels that'as chemical 
engineers, we normally come across problems of the derivation 
side, although this is not the case with design problems. 
Control, diagnosis, monitoring, and repair are all derivation 
type problems. The section below gives examples of working 
systems in chemical engineering, and is biased towards the 
derivation type of problem. 
FALCON - Described by Banares (1985a), FALCON is a knowledge 
based system under development to help diagnose faults on 
process plants. Observed effects of the plant are input to 
FALCON, and the output is a series of faults that could be to 
blame, with associated probabilities. Both causal and 
production rule methods are used. 
CONPHYDE - Described by Banares et. al. (1985b), CONPHYDE is a 
system for physical property, prediction. Data such as composi- 
tion, concentration and physical conditions of a chemical 
mixture are used. The system has about 37 heuristic rules, 
involving six different'equations of state and nine activity 
coefficients. 
PICON - Described by Moore et. al. (1984), PICON is a system 
for monitoring and controlling industrial processes. Knowledge 
comes from the expert plant operator and the expert process 
engineer. PICON is one of the few systems which uses heuristic 
knowledge together with 'deep' knowledge (in the form of 
mathematical models). 
Work by Niida et. al. (1985) has shown some of the appli- 
cations of expert systems in process engineering. They state 
that the main problem in process engineering is to synthesize 
and analyse process systems and related sub-systems by taking 
consideration of various criteria, such as annual costs, 
operability, safety and maintenance. Specific applications of 
their work include a cause-effect analysis of a pressure 
relief system. By answering, yes/no questions,., the user can 
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establish whether or not there is a possiblity of overpressure 
occuring on a plant item. The system uses backtracking in 
order to reach a conclusion. This particular application 
appears to be a fairly straightforward and simple one. 
Other work on applications in chemical engineering comes 
from a variety of sources and workers. They are discussed 
briefly below. Sachs et. al. (1986) have developed a system for 
relieving the cognitive 'load on users of information systems 
generating large amounts of dynamic data, called ESCORT. The 
system, which is in real time, provides advice to process 
plant operators to help them handle and avoid crises. Also 
relevant here is the work of Nelson and Jenkins (1985). They 
are concerned with an expert system for operator problem 
solving in process control. Reference is made to the Three 
Mile island incident, and they explain how their Response Tree 
expert system could help reactor operators select a response 
for an emergency condition. Further, Mills (1984), Haspel 
(1984) and Donoghue (1984) have described work on control and 
fault diagnosis in plant engineering. 
Lu and Motard (1985) describe an expert system which uses 
heuristic and evolutionary rules to find an optimal solution 
for computer aided flowsheeting, and AIDES (Siirola et. al. 
1971) is a system for process design synthesis. Finally, two 
other systems which are worthy of mention are REACT (Govind 
and Powers, 1981) which generates synthetic routes to indus- 
trial chemicals and HEATEX (Banares, 1985a) which is a network 
for reducing energy requirements in process streams. 
2.2 Architecture of Expert Systems 
The section above shows that there are many kinds of 
expert systems available in a wide variety of fields. They 
vary in terms of system design and capabilities. Bramer (1982) 
has said that the reason for this is partly because the term 
'expert system' is not yet precisely defined. However, most 
important systems have many features in common. Figure 2.1 
shows the general anatomy of an expert system. 
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Figure 2.1 Anatomy of an Expert System 
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A computer program, written in the more conventional 
types of languages such as BASIC or FORTRAN has been described 
by Forsyth (1984) as having :- 
a) Data 
b) Algorithm 
which together make up the program. The two key features of an 
expert system can be compared :- 
a) Knowledge Base 
b) Inference Engine 
The two kinds of architecture are clearly similar, but diffe- 
rent enough to have significant consequences. Together with 
the knowledge base and inference engine, expert systems also 
have other desirable characteristics which make the use and 
interpretation of such programs straightforward :-- 
a) Limited to one area of expertise 
b) Ability to give explanations 
c) Able to acquire new rules and update old rules 
d) Use of certainty factors 
If it was not for these qualities, then computer systems using 
expert knowledge could not be called expert systems. 
2.2.1 The Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base is typically made up of facts, rules 
and assertions. The facts are described as short-term knowled- 
ge, and they may change during the course of a consultation. 
Rules are more permanent and are`used to generate new facts, 
hypotheses and reach conclusions or assertions based on facts 
provided by the interactive user. One of the great advantages 
of this kind of user interaction is the fact that it-is 
possible to. add to the rule set or update and refine existing 
rules. The knowledge base is creative and flexible, and 
directly affects the program performance in reaching decisions 
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and conclusions. The so-called inference engine is the method 
by which the knowledge is controlled, and is therefore, a 
very important aspect of an expert system. This receives 
attention later on in this chapter. 
There are various ways of representing knowledge in 
expert systems. The most straightforward method of encapsula- 
ting rule-of-thumb knowledge is in production rules. These 
have the IF-THEN format. Other knowledge representation 
schemes include decision trees, semantic nets and predicate 
calculus. These are described in detail in Chapter 3, along 
with the acquisition of expert knowledge. 
2.2.2 User Interface 
The third main component of an expert system is the user 
interface. Michie (1962) points out that this should not be 
regarded as an optional extra. Michie has warned about possib- 
le'dire consequences of systems which do not operate within 
the 'human cognitive window', i. e., whose actions are vague 
and inexplicable. 
The ease of providing a user interface is a point in 
favour of rule-based programming, and the classical systems 
such as MYCIN show this well. At any point the user can quiz 
the system as to why the system made a given deduction or 
asked a certain question. Explanation is usually enabled by 
the system retracing the reasoning steps that led to the 
question or deduction. Forsyth (1984) sums up the importance 
of a user interface :- 
"If we are to avoid a succession of Three-Mile-Island 
type disasters or worse, then our expert systems must 
be open to interrogation and inspection. In short, a' 
reasoning method that cannot be explained to a person 
is unsatisfactory, even if, it performs better than 
a human expert. " 
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2.3 Facilities 
2.3.1 Control 
The control of an expert system is divided into two parts 
Inference - 
Modus Ponens 
Reasoning about uncertainty 
Search - 
Backward and forward chaining 
Depth first and breadth first search 
In this section, we will concentrate on the inference mecha- 
nism. Search is dealt with in Chapter 4. 
There are two reasons why an inference mechanism is 
needed. They are :- 
1. A rule-based system needs a method of deciding where to 
start. The rule base can be very large, and there is little 
point in scanning all the rules in every consultation. 
2. Conflicts may arise in the rule base when alternative lines 
of reasoning come up with the same results. It may be that 
more than one rule will satisfy the user's requirements. The 
inference system must-be able to-decide on which one is best. 
A common rule for deriving new facts from rules and known 
facts is, called modus-ponens. This means that if a rule states 
"if A then B" then it is valid to conclude that if A is true 
then B is true. This means that in most cases, if the rule is 
simple then reasoning on it is easily understood. Also, when B 
is known to be false then it is valid to conclude that A is 
also false. 
Another task of the inference mechanism is to deal with 
uncertain or incomplete information. When an expert works, he 
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frequently deals with cases for which some information is 
missing or is uncertain. If an expert system is to act like an 
expert, then the inference mechanism must be able to deal with 
such information. There are a number of ways of achieving 
this, two of which are described below. 
In most cases a rule will fail if all its antecedents 
cannot be proved true. If the clauses in the rule are connec- 
ted by 'and', and if one or more of the clauses are unknown 
then the rule will fail. Alternatively, if the clauses are, 
connected by 'or', then a piece of unknown information need 
not stop the rule from succeeding. 
Another way to overcome unknowns is to provide knowledge 
in the knowledge base about unknown information. Experts are 
familiar with providing advice with incomplete information so 
this expertise can be extracted from the knowledge engineer. 
This can be done using certainty factors, and uncertain facts 
will lead to uncertain conclusions. 
2.3.2 Questions 
The following question types have been found to be most 
useful in existing expert systems :- 
a) Yes/No - It has been found (Sell, 1985) that users of 
expert systems prefer not to encode answers if it can be 
avoided. Users prefer to answer with 'y' or 'n' rather than 
'1' or '2'. 
b) Free Answer - Any answer is accepted. This may be useful 
for accepting a clients personal details. 
c) Multiple Choice - This is the kind of question that expert 
system shells ask, with a choice of answers shown to the user, 
the user then selecting the answer that he wants. 
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2.3.3 Explanations 
Sell (1985) lists two items that are present in every 
explanation :- 
a) the explicandum - that to be explained 
b) the explicans - the explanation 
There are three types of explanation :- 
a) Interpretive - gives and expands on the meaning of terms. 
b) Descriptive - gives an explanation of a process or struc- 
ture, by stating facts, relations, criteria etc. 
c) Reason-giving - explains by stating laws, codes of prac- 
tice, causes etc. 
An expert system should be able to provide all three 
types of explanation. It is believed that, at the moment, no 
expert system can provide explanations as good as those of the 
expert. The expert and the system differ in that a system 
cannot take into account the background of the inquirer, and 
therefore cannot adjust its explanations accordingly. 
2.4 Validation 
One of the most important aspects of all expert systems 
is validation. In this respect, expert systems are similar to 
conventional programs. All programs need to be validated and 
have the question 'does it work ?' asked. Sell (1985) states 
that the need for validation is more important than in coven- 
tional programs, since expert systems are based on inexact 
reasoning and heuristics. Another reason for validation is the 
fact that expert systems are often judgemental, and it is 
difficult to pronounce when a judgement is correct or not. 
An expert system can be regarded as valid if it is free 
from contradiction, can approach any problem within its do- 
main, if it can reach the correct answer and if it can be used 
with relative ease. In summary, the five basic requirements of 
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any expert system are :- 
Consistency 
Soundness 
Precision 
Completeness 
Usability 
Each of these will be dealt with in turn in the following 
sections. 
2.4.1 Consistency 
Consistency for an expert system demands that it should 
produce similar answers to similar questions regardless of the 
circumstances. One of the great assets of expert systems, or 
computer systems in general, is that they never get tired, or 
function better according to the day of the week. Consistency 
is certainly reasonable to expect from an-expert system, since 
if it were inconsistent it would be unusable. Validating a 
system for consistency is a difficult task. There is no estab- 
lished method of achieving this, although tests can be perfor- 
med that will increase the confidence in a system. One such 
test would be to ensure that no two rules arrive at different 
conclusions given the same conditions. 
2.4.2 Completeness 
Here, the- requirementis that the knowledge base is 
sufficiently knowledgeable to cover any problem in the domain. 
Whether this requirement is reasonable will depend on the 
system. In classification, we would expect all the problems to 
be solved, but in the case where hundreds of solutions may 
exist, e. g. chess end games, -the requirement is unreasonable. 
2.4.3 Soundness 
A ,, system is sound if it comes to the right conclusions, 
or, the conclusions with which the expert agrees. This is a 
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reasonable requirement and is simple to test for. 
2.4.4 Precision 
For a system to be precise, the conclusion produced 
should have a certainty appropriate to the particular problem. 
This is again a reasonable requirement, since a system should 
neither be too confident nor too pessimistic. After all, the 
system might be dealing with the health of a patient, or the 
financial position of a company. Testing for precision is 
similar to testing for soundness, with the expert providing 
test cases, but it must also be practical, e. g. how inaccurate 
can an answer be and still remain acceptable ? 
2.4.5 Usability 
If expert systems are to make an impact, then they have 
to be user friendly, just as conventional software must be. 
However, with expert systems, there is far more scope for 
ambiguities to creep in, especially if the user is asked to 
give a degree of certainty in answer to a question, e. g. 
"How certain are you that chemical 'X' is toxic 
(-5. ... +5)? " 
The answer to this might not in fact reflect the toxicity of 
material 'X'. A better way might be :- 
"How toxic is chemical 'X'? " 
1. Non-toxic 
2. Toxic - (but can be handled in a confined space 
with adequate ventilation) 
3. Very toxic (could injure in a confined space) 
4. Highly toxic (not to be handled without adequate 
protection) 
So, usability is reasonable and could be critical to the 
outcome of the system. Testing for usability would take the 
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form of trainees using the system while being observed by the 
system builders, before the system goes onto the market. 
2.5 Building an Expert System 
In this chapter, we have outlined the main features of 
expert systems. The next chapter describes how the knowledge 
for such a system is acquired and represented. Acquisition and 
representation of knowledge, along with validation are the key 
to building an expert system. As yet, there does not appear to 
be a specific methodology for building expert systems, 
although Attarwala and Basden (1985) have produced work on a 
methodology for constructing an expert system. Their opening 
paragraph begins :- 
"Construction, of expert systems has so far been seen 
as a craft or an art, not a science. " 
They question the traditional method - that of extracting 
problem solving rules from the expert and encoding them, 
saying that two experts in the same field may well have a 
different set of rules of 'thumb for solving the same problem. 
Attarwala and Basden propose constructing expert systems from 
causal models. Their reason is that when experts are asked to 
give a line of explanation, they do so in terms of cause and 
effect. 
Waterman (1986) gives a more formal approach to expert 
system construction, although the headings he uses still leave 
much to the designer's whim. He states that expert system 
development can be viewed as five phases :- 
Identification 
Conceptualization 
Formalization 
Implementation 
Testing 
Identification involves both the knowledge engineer and the 
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expert determining the type and scope of the problem, and how 
the problem can be characterized. Conceptualization involves 
deciding what concepts, relations and control mechanisms are 
needed. Formalization involves deciding in what form the rules 
are to be represented and what environment to use, and 
implementation is the knowledge engineer turning the forma- 
lized knowledge into a computer program. Testing of the system 
was dealt with in section 2.4. 
Although there is no formalized method of constructing 
expert systems, there are certain procedures that are common 
to all such developments. It is a very important area if 
expert systems are to have any impact, in that if the knowled- 
ge is not represented in a suitable form, or the type of 
control strategy is wrong, then the expert system will not 
perform efficiently, and will not emulate the expert. Some 
would argue that there is a need for an expert system to build 
an expert system, but that, at the present time that is a 
"catch twenty two" situation. With the present state of the 
art, the steps in expert system development are: - 
Problem definition 
Knowledge acquisition 
Knowledge representation 
Implementation 
Validation 
This is a general procedure, but one involving all aspects of 
development. One danger with the technique of Attarwala and 
Basden is that, if taken too far, the causal model might take 
over from an expert's rules of thumb, which would not benefit 
the system. 
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3 Knowledge Representation and Acquisition 
In this chapter the techniques of repesenting knowledge 
in expert systems are described in turn, followed by an 
account of the rather more complex process of knowledge acqui- 
sition. 
3.1 Knowledge Representation. 
There are two different methods of representing knowled- 
ge. As a program, knowledge is represented procedurally and as 
data, knowledge is represented declaratively. Early represen- 
tation schemes were dominated by procedural representation 
techniques, notably GPS (General Problem Solver) by Newell and 
Simon (1972). They were a natural off-shot of conventional 
programs, and were highly efficient. However, as computer 
power increased, the emphasis shifted to declarative represen- 
tation for artificial intelligence programs. These procedures 
have the advantage of ease of understanding, ease of 
modification and significant clarity, even though they are 
slower than procedural techniques. For expert systems, the 
advantages of declarative representation far outweigh that of 
procedural. The list below outlines the principal declarative 
methods :- 
Semantic Nets 
Logical Expressions- 
Frames 
Production Systems 
Object-attribute-value-triplets 
Of these, semantic networks and production systems have found 
favour with expert system workers. More comprehensive accounts 
can be found in Harmon and King (1985), Barr and Feigenbaum 
(1981) and Sell (1985). 
3.1.1 Semantic Nets 
Semantic nets were developed by Quillian in 1968, -and are 
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said to be the most general of representation techniques, and 
the oldest in artificial intelligence. The method is used. in 
the system PROSPECTOR. 
A semantic net is a series of objects called nodes conne- 
cted by arcs or links. The nodes represent objects, concepts 
or situations of the domain, and the arcs represent the 
relations between them. There are no absolute constraints to 
apply to semantic network systems, or to show how nodes and 
links are named. There are however some conventions used :- 
Nodes - are used to represent objects and descriptors. Objects 
can represent physical or conceptual items and descriptors 
provide additional information about the objects, such as 
their present state. 
Links - may represent any relationship. Links commonly used 
are :- 
Is-a - used for class/instance relationships, such as the 
name of an object. 
Has-a - used for identifying nodes that are properties of 
other nodes. 
Some links define the state of objects in nodes, called 
definitional links, others capture heuristic knowledge and 
provide reasons. 
Advantages semantic nets offer are their flexibility to 
define new nodes and links, and inheritance such that one node 
can inherit the properties of other nodes. Harmon and King 
(1985) point out that the concepts of semantic nets, links, 
nodes and inheritance are all related to research into how 
humans store information. 
Semantic nets are very popular in artificial intelligence 
for representing knowledge. However, most work in this area 
now involves an extension of the idea in the form of frames. 
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It is stated by Barr and Feigenbaum (1981) that the simple 
idea of having nodes that represent objects in the world and 
links that represent the relations between the objects cannot 
be pushed too far. Problems may arise when the network data- 
bases become too large, and there is argument as to what a 
node really means, how the passage of time may be represented 
and the way to represent an idea. Current research in this 
area is attempting to deal with these and other issues. 
3.1.2 Logical Expressions 
Logic has been used by philosophers to represent knowled- 
ge since the time of the ancient Greeks. Logic is to do with 
the formal treatment of knowledge, and it has now developed 
into the application of computer programs that can reason. 
Here, we deal with formal logic - that of propositional logic 
and predicate calculus. 
Propositional Logic 
Propositions are statements of fact that are either true 
or false, and, when linked by connectives such as 'AND', 'OR' 
and 'NOT' are called compound statements. Propositional logic 
is concerned with whether these statements are true or false. 
The five connectives are represented as (Barr and Feigenbaum, 
1981) :- 
AND A or & 
OR V 
NOT 
IMPLIES 
EQUIVALENT 
An example of their use is :- 
XAYX is TRUE and Y is TRUE; otherwise XAY 
is FALSE 
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-, X is TRUE if X is FALSE and FALSE if X is TRUE 
etc. 
Rules of inference are also used in propositional logic. 
Inference rules allow the deduction of a new sentence from 
previously given sentences, and if true, then the new sentence 
will be true. This means that if the sentences X and XAY are 
true, then we can infer that Y is true. 
Predicate Calculus 
As it stands, predicate logic is not very useful for 
artificial intelligence work. In order to express knowledge, 
we need to be able to say whether propositions are true or 
false, and also to be able to say something about objects and 
the relation between objects. Predicate calculus is an 
extension of propositional logic, and uses predicates to write 
assertions which describe objects, e. g. the assertion 
"is red(fire engine)", meaning that the fire engine is red. A 
predicate is either true or false and more than one argument 
is possible, e. g. "is-smaller than(2,3500)", meaning that 2 is 
smaller than 3500. 
Functions are also used in order to make predicate calcu- 
lus more understandable. Functions may have a fixed number of 
arguments and they can also be true or false, and can also 
return objects related to their arguments, e. g. uncle of(mary) 
would return a name such as john. Another useful addition is 
the predicate equals. In logic, X and Y are equal if and only 
if they are indistinguishable under all predicates and fun- 
ctions. In symbolic form :- 
X=Y iff for all predicates, P P(X)=P(Y), 
and also for all functions, F F(X)=F(Y). 
where''iff' means 'if and only if'. 
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This is a form of first-order logic, and plays an important 
role in the artificial intelligence language Prolog. 
Logic provides a method of asserting facts, taking the 
form of logical statements consisting of predicates and 
values. Harmon and King (1985) state that the use of logic in 
artificial intelligence is more popular in Europe and Japan, 
but is becoming more popular in the United States. It is a 
very powerful technique of representing logic. 
3.1.3 Object-Attribute-Value-Triplets 
Object-attribute-value-triplets are used in the expert 
system MYCIN. Objects can be physical or conceptual entities, 
attributes are properties associated with the objects, and the 
values describe the size, colour, shape or quantity of a 
particular object. This is a specialization of the semantic 
network approach described previously, in which only two sim- 
ple relationships are used as -links. The 'has-a' link is used 
for the object->attribute, and the 'is-a' link for the attri- 
bute->value link, e. g. a bank loan 'has-a' rate of interest, 
and 12% 'is-a' rate of interest. 
There are two types of knowledge that can be represented 
in object-attribute-value-triplets. Static knowledge has 
generic attributes and is unchanging, and dynamic knowledge 
changes from case to case. Objects are ordered in a type of 
graph called a tree with the most valuable attribute at the 
root which is used as a starting point for reasoning and for 
obtaining information. For dynamic trees, the root is the main 
object with attributes and values further down the tree. 
Object-attribute-value-triplets can also handle uncertai- 
nty. Certainty factors represent the confidence that we have 
in a fact, a piece of evidence or a conclusion. In MYCIN, 
certainty factors range from -1.0 to +1.0, with -1.0 indica- 
ting that the fact is false, and +1 true. More on uncertain 
information will be described in section 3.3" 
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3.1.4 Production Systems 
Production systems were first proposed by Post in 1943, 
and an excellent review of production systems is given by 
Davis and King (1977). The systems used by today's artificial 
intelligence programs bear little relation, however, to the 
original formulation. The term production system is used to 
describe several different systems based on one general under- 
lying idea - the notion of condition-action pairs, called 
production rules, or just productions. 
Production systems are seen by some (Newell, 1972) not 
as simply a convenient paradigm for approaching psychological 
modelling, but rather as a methodology whose power arises out 
of its close similarity to the fundamental mechanisms of human 
cognition. In this way- human problem solving behaviour can be 
modelled easily and successfully by a production system 
because it is in fact being generated by one :- 
"We confess to a strong premonition that the actual 
organization of human programs closely resembles 
the production systems organization... We cannot 
yet prove the correctness of this judgement, and 
we suspect that the ultimate verification may 
depend on this organization's proving relatively 
satisfactory in many different small ways, no one 
of them decisive. " 
Newell, 1972 
Components 
Production systems consist of three main parts :- 
1. Rule Base - of-production rules 
2. Data Structure - called the context 
3. Interpreter - controls the systems activity 
In the simplest form, a rule is an ordered pair of symbol 
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strings, with a left hand side (LHS) and a right hand side 
(RHS). The rule set has a predetermined total ordering. The 
context is simply a collection of symbols, and the interpreter 
operates by scanning the LHS of each rule until one is found 
that can be successfully matched against the database. At that 
point, symbols matched in the database are replaced with those 
found in the RHS of the rule, and scanning either continues 
with the next rule or begins again with the first. 
Productions 
A production rule is a statement cast in the form "if 
this CONDITION holds, then this ACTION is appropriate". The IF 
part is called the condition part and states the conditions or 
constraints that must be present for the production to be 
applicable. The THEN part, called the action part, is the 
appropriate action to take. -A production system whose condi- 
tion part is satisfied can 'fire', i. e. have it's action part 
executed by the interpreter. 
Winston (1984), states the five primitive operations that 
are allowed in production systems : 
1. Write -A production can write a new item into a short term 
memory. 
2. Note -A production can note by moving items from their 
exsisting place to the front. 
3. Mark - Used to prevent a goal description from re-activa- 
ting the same production-over and, over again. 
4. Send -A production can request new information 
5. Receive -A production can place a message at the front of 
the short-term memory. 
Typically, production systems consist of many hundreds of 
productions in their rule bases. 
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The Context 
The context, or data/short-term memory buffer, is the 
focus of attention of the production rules. It may be a simple 
list, a very large array, or, more typically, a medium-sized 
buffer with some internal structure of its own. 
For systems designed to be knowledge-based experts, the 
context contains facts and assertions about the world. For 
example, the MYCIN system uses a collection of four tuples, 
consisting of an associative triple and a certainty factor. In 
the DENDRAL system, the context consists of complex graph 
structures which represent molecules and molecular fragments. 
Structures are built up by assigning numbers to each atom of a 
molecule and by describing chemical bonds by a pair of numbers 
indicating the atoms they join. A further example is the 
LISP70 system, which is a "token stream" approach. The context 
is a linear stream of tokens which are accessed in sequence. 
Each production is matched against the beginning of the 
stream, and if the, rule is invoked, characters are either 
added, deleted or modified. This is said to be a very effi- 
cient type of system. 
The context is the sole storage medium of all state 
variables of the system. This is very different from procedu- 
rally-oriented languages, where there is no provision for 
separate storage of control state information. 
Interpreter 
There are many different types of interpreters in existe- 
nce. They are basically select-execute loops, in which a rule 
applicable-to the state of the context, is selected and exe- 
cuted. The action the rule performs results in a modified 
database, and the selection phase begins again. Since the 
first rule that matches the context is chosen, this cycle is 
often referred to' as the 'recognize-act'. A complete re- 
evaluation of the context is made every time a rule- is 
selected because a new rule is chosen based on the current 
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state of the context. 
Production systems operate in cycles. Each cycle examines 
the productions in a manner specified by the interpreter to 
see which are appropriate and could fire. If more than one is 
found appropriate, a single production must be selected from 
among them (called the conflict set), and one is fired. This 
process of selecting from the conflict set is called conflict 
resolution. The three phases of the cycle are :- 
1. Matching 
2. Conflict Resolution 
3. Action 
Conflict Resolution 
As stated above, it is possible for more than one produc- 
tion to fire in each cycle of operation. The system needs to 
choose from the conflict set. This is where the basic cogni- 
tive traits such as action-sequencing, attention-focussing, 
interruptibility and control are realised. There are several 
approaches to conflict resolution, all tried and tested :- 
1. Specificity Ordering -Suppose the conditions of one 
triggering rule area superset of the, conditions of another. 
Use the rule with the superset on the ground that it is more 
specialized to the current situation. 
2. Rule Ordering - Arrange rules in one long priority list. 
The triggered rule appearing earliest in the list has the 
highest priority. Others are ignored. 
3. Data Ordering - Arrange all possible data items in one long 
priority list. The triggering rule is that of the highest 
priority data. 
4. Size Ordering, - Assign the highest priority to the'- 
triggering rule with the toughest requirements - where toug- 
hest means the longest list of constrainting" conditicns so 
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that such a rule will always fire first. 
5. Recency Ordering - Consider the most recently used rule to 
have the highest priority or consider the least recent to have 
the highest priority - at the designers discretion. 
6. Context Limiting - Reduce the likelihood of conflict by 
separating the rules into groups - only some of which are 
active at any one time. Have a procedure that activates and 
deactivates the groups. 
It is believed that no simple conflict resolution 
strategy can be completely satisfactory. Also, such strategies 
affect two important characteristics of production system - 
sensitivity, the ability to react quickly to changes, and 
stability, the ability to carry out relatively long sequences 
of actions. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Production Systems 
Production systems have been used in a wide variety of 
problems, and are probably the most widely used of all know- 
ledge representation techniques. Examples of applications 
include medical diagnosis, speech understanding, and mineral 
exploration. Even though these represent a large and diverse 
subject area, there are features of them, that are both good 
and bad that-can be generalized : -- 
Advantages 
1. Modularity - One obvious quality of production systems 
is that individual productions in the rule base can be manipu- 
lated in several ways. They can be added, deleted or changed 
independently without altering the method and. working of the 
inference system, or affecting any of the other rules. Rules 
only communicate via the context data structure, which means 
only the performance of the system will change. This makes the 
creation of the data base much easier even for very large 
systems, since it will be known what a proposed rule will mean 
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in whatever situation. This quality is also a recognized 
necessity of an expert system. 
2. Uniformity - The knowledge used in production rules 
has to be by nature very uniform in structure. This is to the 
advantage of production systems. All the information must be 
encoded into the rigid structure of the productions. This 
means that the knowledge can be easily understood by other 
users, or by another part of. the system, compared to the free 
form of semantic net or procedural representation schemes, for 
example. 
3. Naturalness - Important kinds of knowledge are expres- 
sed very easily in production systems. By this, -we mean state- 
ments about what to do in certain situations are ideally and 
naturally encoded into productions. Further, these kinds of 
statements are used most often by experts when explaining how 
to do their job. 
Disadvantages 
1. Inefficiency - Good modularity and uniformity are 
gained by production systems at the expense of efficiency. 
Problem-solving by this method results in high overheads, 
since the match-action sequence conveys all its information 
via the data-structure after every cycle. It is also difficult 
for production systems to take larger steps in their reasoning 
or to make them more responsive to predetermined situations. 
2. Opacity'- It is hard to follow the flow of control in 
solving a problem. The reasons for this are the isolation of 
each production, and the uniform size of productions - there 
is no subroutine hierarchy. Function calls and subroutines 
would help to make the flow of control easier. 
Domains for Production Systems 
The following is a list of areas which production 'systems 
can and have been used. 
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1. Domains in which the knowledge is diffuse as opposed to 
domains consisting of concise unified theory. 
2. Domains in which processes can be represented as a set of 
independent actions as opposed to domains with dependent sub- 
processes. 
3. Domains in which knowledge can be easily separated from the 
manner in which it is to be used (e. g. a classification taxo- 
nomy), as opposed to cases in which representation and control 
are merged. 
4. If the task can be viewed as a sequence of transitions from 
one state to another in a'problem space we can model this 
behaviour with production systems. Each transition can be 
represented by one or more production firings. 
Production systems are very good at capturing certain 
kinds of knowledge for problem-solving. This is knowledge 
about what to do in a specific situation, and is held in a 
manageable representation scheme. The production system has 
advantages over declarative knowledge representation schemes, 
mainly in the modularity of the rules. Also, the way produc- 
tions are structured is similar to the way we, as humans, 
would talk about how to solve certain kinds of problem. 
3.1.5 Frame Systems 
A frame system is a knowledge representation method which 
associates features with nodes representing concepts or 
objects. The features are described in terms of attributes 
(called slots), and their values. 
In artificial intelligence, frames refer to the special 
way of representing common concepts and situations. Minsky 
(1975), originated the frame concept :- 
"A frame is a data structure for representing a stereotyped 
situation, like being in a certain kind of living room or 
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going to a child's party. Attached to each frame are 
several kinds of information. Some of this information is 
about how we use the frame. Some is about what can happen 
next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are 
not confirmed. " 
Frames are organized in much the same way as a semantic 
net. In fact both semantic nets and frames are considered to 
be frame-based systems. Frames are networks of nodes and 
relations organized in a hierachy, where the top-most nodes 
represent general concepts and the lower nodes more specific 
instances of the concepts. 
In frame systems, the concept at each node is defined by 
a collection of attributes (e. g. name, colour, size), and - 
values of those attributes (e. g. smith, red, small), where 
attributes are called slots. Each slot can have procedures 
(arbitrary pieces of computer code) attached to it, which are 
executed when theiinformation"in the, slot (the value of the 
attribute) is changed. Each slot can have any number of-proce- 
dures attached to it. Three useful ones often used are :- 
1. if - added-procedure - executes when new information is 
placed in the slot. 
2. if - removed procedure - executes when 
information is de- 
leted from the slot. 
3. if - needed procedure - executes when information is needed 
from the slot, but the slot is empty. 
Attached procedures can monitor the assignment of infor- 
mation-to the node, making sure that appropriate action is 
taken when values change. As their structure suggests, frame 
systems are useful for problem domains where expectations 
about the form and content of the data play an important role 
in problem solving, such-as understanding visual scenes or 
understanding speech. 
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Using a Frame System 
The user types in a title which is inserted into the 
topic slot of the next empty node. Things then start automati- 
cally. 
1. The if-needed procedure attached to the topic slot executes 
since a value was inserted into the slot. This procedure 
searches a database associated with the system to find the 
associated fact which is inserted as a value into the next 
slot of the frame. 
2. The if-added procedure attached to this slot name executes 
since a value was just inserted. A message is needed, but a 
value for this message is not there. 
3. The if-added procedure having looked in the next-slot for 
this information activates the if-needed procedure attached to 
that slot. The if-needed procedure finds the relevant informa- 
tion in the database, this value is then inserted into the 
slot. 
4. The if-added procedure attached to the slot from (2) then 
finds that another piece of information is needed. This could 
be a default value. 
And so on. 
Organizing Knowledge and Expectations 
Frames, then provide a structure or framework, in which 
new data are interpreted in terms of concepts acquired through 
previous experiences. The organization of this knowledge faci- 
litates expectation-driven processing, i. e. looking for things 
that are expected based on the context one thinks one is in. 
e. g. A simple frame for the generic concept of a chair might 
have slots for number of legs and style of back. A frame for a 
particular chair has the same slots, but the contents of the 
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slots are more fully specified :- 
CHAIR Frame 
Specialization-of: FURNITURE 
Number-of-legs: an integer(default=4) 
Style-of-back: straight, cushioned.... 
Number-of-arms: 0,1, or 2 
JOHN'S-CHAIR Frame 
Specialization-of: CHAIR 
Number-of-legs: 4 
Style-of-back: cushioned 
Number-of-arms: -0 
By supplying a place for knowledge, and therefore creating the 
possiblity of missing or incomplete knowledge, the slot mecha- 
nism permits reasoning based on seeking confirmation of 
expectations - "filling in the slots". 
Some Frame Applications 
Application of frame driven systems have been described 
by Bobrow et-al. (1977), and by Goldstein and Roberts (1977). 
Bobrow describes a system called GUS (Genial Understander 
System) which is a frame driven dialog system. It is one of a 
series of experimental computer systems intended as part of a 
program of research on language understanding, written in 
Lisp. It's first role was that of a travel agent, giving 
details of possible-flights to or from a particular place. 
It's components are a morphological analyzer, a syntactic 
analyzer, a frame reasoner and the language generator. Most of 
the frames in GUS are created during the process of reasoning, 
although some do exist in the initial database. Bobrow gives 
the following example of a frame for a date of the year :- 
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[DATE 
MONTH NAME 
DAY (BOUNDED INTEGER 1 31) 
YEAR INTEGER 
WEEKDAY (MEMBER (SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY 
THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY) 
An instance frame for November 14th would be :- 
[ISA DATE 
MONTH NOVEMBER 
DAY 14 
The slot labelled MONTH specifies that only a NAME can be used 
as a value, as with all the other slot names. Hence GUS can 
only interpret a standard set of type terms such as names, 
integer, list and string. 
GUS consists of other procedures, but only the reasoning 
system, i. e. that of frames, is relevant here. 
NUDGE (Goldstein-and Roberts, 1977) is a frame system 
developed for the office scheduling domain, although it does 
have wider applications. It is written in a knowledge represe- 
ntation environment called FRL-O, which evolved from generali- 
zations of the property list representation. NUDGE contains a 
hierarchy for practices concerning information transfer for 
people in various roles involved in the transfer, plans 
governing the transfer, and demands on time, space and person- 
nel. The hierarchy is about 5 levels deep and includes about 
100 objects. An extensive description of NUDGE is given by 
Goldstein and Roberts. 
3.2 Knowledge Acquisition 
Before knowledge can be represented for an expert system 
in one 'of the methods outlined above, the knowledge engineer 
must acquire the knowledge from the expert. It is recognized 
throughout the artificial intelligence field that knowledge 
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acq^sition is one of the bottlenecks of expert systems develo- 
pment (Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1984). The problem is how to 
acquire the knowledge so important for automatic problem 
solving in a way in which the computer eases the transfer of 
expertise from experts to the symbolic data structure that 
makes up knowledge representation. Currently, knowledge is 
acquired in a slow and painstaking way, generally with the 
knowledge engineer working with the expert. Feigenbaum and 
McCorduck go on to say :- 
"Right now (and it can't be emphasised often 
enough) the problem of knowledge acquisition 
is the critical bottleneck in Al. " 
Knowledge is essential to the workings of an expert 
system. The knowledge must be complete and free from errors 
and must be continually updated if the system is to be useful 
for some years to come. Sell (1985) describes knowledge as a 
"slippery concept". Indeed, philosophers have been trying to 
define it for thosands of years. In practice, knowledge is 
treated as rules, facts, reasons, heuristics, and truths that 
experts find useful in solving problems of a particular 
domain. The power of an expert system lies in its knowledge 
base, the rest of the system being a manipulation program in 
order to find the particular requirements of the problem to be 
solved. 
3.2.1 Elicitation 
Sell (1985) lists the following as important operations 
of elicitation :- 
Extracting knowledge and making it easy to manipulate 
and scrutinize 
Making the knowledge explicit and giving detail to make 
it clear 
Recording it in symbolic form 
Verification - checking the symbolic form with the original 
knowledge 
49 
The process of elicitation identifies small packets of knowle- 
dge which must be organized into a form which is unified. This 
will depend on how the knowledge is used in the system. The 
order of the rules could also be important, especially if 
conflict is likely to arise. 
Once the knowledge is obtained and organized it must be 
made available *to the system. Knowledge bases are usually 
encoded into two different forms - one external and one inter- 
nal. The external knowledge base is for human needs and is 
readable. The internal one is in code form, suitable for the 
machine. 
3.2.2 Sources of Knowledge 
There are three main sources of knowledge - namely lite- 
rature, experts and examples. Additionally, there are three 
main bases of scientific knowledge - scientific laws, 
experience and models. The knowledge we require is knowledge 
of the domain that will help to solve the problem. Typically, 
knowledge that allows us to predict what will happen next or 
why something has happened. For this, some expression of order 
of the knowledge is required, and the most useful base for 
this is probably scientific laws. These can be obtained from 
either literature or experts, but more commonly from 
literature. However, the majority-of expert systems built to 
date have been built in areas that are not as well defined as 
those based on scientific law. The laws in these areas are not 
codified or found in any written form, so the expert has to be 
quizzed by the knowledge engineer for his own personal laws. 
As as been pointed out before, the expert may find it 
difficult to verbalise his knowledge, making acquisition very 
difficult. 
This type of, acquisition has come in for some criticism 
(Sell, 1985), mainly because the knowledge engineer is not 
using the expert to his full capabilities. The expert may not 
be aware that rules exist, and the knowledge and heuristics 
that he uses is at a more subconcious level. Another approach 
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is to get the expert to produce and clarify examples of situa- 
tions in the domain. This technique has been used to some 
degree of success in the tool 'Expert-Ease', in which exam- 
ples are fed into the system and, through a process of 
induction, rules generalising those examples are produced. 
This area comes under the heading of machine intelligence. 
3.3 Representing Knowledge 
One of the features of expert systems is their ability to 
handle knowledge which is of an imprecise nature. This could 
be an inherent part, of the knowledge base or of the answers 
given by the user, e. g. "don't know", or answers with a 
probability attached to them, e. g. "How certain are you 
that...? ". This is uncertain knowledge, and the inference 
engine of the system must have a mechanism for dealing with 
uncertainty. There are a number of methods for doing this, 
including fuzzy logic, Bayesian logic, multi-valued logic and 
certainty factors. Many schemes have been tried, and all 
appear to work to some degree. Here, we outline Bayesian 
logic, fuzzy logic and certainty factors. 
3.3.1 Bayesian Logic 
Bayes theory has been widely used in expert systems, and 
is used in the mineral exploration program, PROSPECTOR and its 
subsequent shell, Micro-Expert. The theory is based on the 
conviction that for any event, irrespective of how unlikely it 
might be there is an a priori probability that it could be 
true. So, even if the event is totally untrue, its prior 
probabilty would be zero, thus giving the basis of a 
calculation as, if there was a probability there. In terms of 
probability, let P(H) be the prior probability of some hypot- 
hesis. Given an item of relevant evidence, E. then-P(H: E) is 
the following probability of the same hypothesis. By defini- 
tion :- 
P(H: E) = P(H&E) and P(E: H) = P(E&H) 
P(E) P(H) 
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Rearranging, 
P(H: E) = P(E: H) P(H) 
P(E) 
Detailed discussions of Bayes' Theroem in expert systems 
have been written by Naylor (in Forsyth, 1984) and by Townsend 
and Feucht (1986). A point worthy of note here is that to find 
the probability of a conclusion, the probabilities of the 
given facts must be independent of each other. It is almost 
impossible to establish a knowledge base in which the certain- 
ty of all the rules is independent. 
3.3.2 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic was derived by Lotfi Zadeh in 1965. His basic 
idea was to extend classical Boolean logic into real numbers. 
In Boolean logic, 0 represents falsity and 1 truth. This is 
the case in fuzzy logic too, although fractions between 0 and 
1 are used to represent partial truths. e. g. 
p(blond hair(X)) = 0.5 
indicates that the proposition that X has blond hair is 50% 
false- and 50% true. Fuzzy logic also has notation for the AND, 
OR and NOT operators for combining non-integer truth values. 
p1 AND p2 = MIN(pl, p2) (smaller) 
p1 OR p2 = MAX(pl, p2) (greater) 
NOT pl =1- p1 (inverse) 
A shortcoming of fuzzy logic, as indicated by Forsyth (1984), 
is the mapping or membership function. Suppose that a man is 
35. How true is the statement that he is old ? It could be 
40%, 50% or 60%. It is up to the user of fuzzy logic to decide 
on such matters and there will be many such functions in which 
an arbitrary decision is required. Another failing of fuzzy 
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logic is its inability to weigh up disparate or possibly 
conflicting sources of evidence. 
Fuzzy logic has found some applications in expert 
systems. The system Reveal is a decision support system, and 
overcomes some of the disadvantages by allowing the user to 
modify various mapping functions so as to find out if the 
variations are critical or not. The shell that is the succes- 
sor to Micro-Expert, Savoir, also uses fuzzy logic in order to 
handle facts with values such as 'unlikely' or 'very 
probably'. 
3.3.3 Certainty Factors 
Certainty factors were used in the MYCIN system so that 
some of the failings of standard statistics could be overcome. 
Each rule has a certainty factor associated with it. To calcu- 
late the certainty factor of a deduced fact, the certainty 
factor of the fact, X. and that of the rule, Y. are combined 
in the relation :- 
X+Y- XY 
Certainty factors can then be carried through a series of 
deductions, and as more rules are used with success the 
certainty factor will increase, approaching 1, i. e. certainty. 
The formula above is used because some of its properties 
appear to reflect how an expert handles evidence. 
This chapter has reviewed the 'classical' methods of 
representing knowledge and some of the techniques of knowledge 
acquisition. Not all the techniques are used in practice in 
this work, but it is useful to be aware of other techniques 
for comparison purposes. 
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4 Problem Solving and Search 
4.1 Problem Solving 
One of the most powerful parts of an expert system is in 
the methods used for searching a large space consisting of 
many alternatives. This is a characteristic feature of artifi- 
cial intelligence work, which is in contrast to large numeri- 
cal calculations where a well defined solution path exists, 
and where large amounts of data can be processed. 
Problem solving in artificial intelligence involves the 
search for a solution through a state space by the application 
of operators. The state space is the possible states in the 
problem solution and consists of an initial state, a goal 
state and intermediate states. The solution path is the path 
consisting of all states that lead from the initial state to 
the goal state. Problem solving strategies that are domain 
independent are referred to as-weak methods, whereas expert 
systems are considered to be strong problem solvers, since 
they employ domain knowledge in the solution strategy. 
Basic search methods can be considered under two headings 
- those of direction of search, and search procedures. 
An 
important issue in the design of knowledge based systems is 
the type of search procedure used, i. e. the order in which the 
rules are scanned for triggering. The decisions involved for 
designing an expert system are the direction of search and the 
search method. Control procedures such as these are normally 
part of the inference engine of an expert system. 
There are two other aspects that must also be considered. 
In- starting a search through a problem -space, the knowledge 
system must have have some way of deciding a starting point. 
This will determine whether the search uses forward or bac- 
kward chaining. The efficiency, of a search can be improved 
using heuristics to resolve conflicts if multiple conflicts 
arise and for eliminating paths that are not useful. 
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4.2 Direction of Search 
There are two kinds of search that are used in knowledge 
based system; forward chaining and backward chaining. The type 
of search that a system uses will depend on what type of 
problems the system is solving. 
4.2.1 Forward Chaining 
Forward chaining is also referred to as forward search, 
bottom up, data driven or antecedent driven. A system is a 
forward chainer if it works from an initial state of known 
facts to a goal state, i. e. a goal is concluded by considering 
the data available. All the facts are input into the system 
and the system works out the most appropriate hypothesis or 
goal state that fits the facts. The main disadvantage of this 
type of search is that it requires all input data as possible 
facts for all the conditions, and hence can be wasteful of 
both human time and computer time. Often, not all the facts 
are known or are relevant. Forward chaining is useful in 
situations where there are a large number of hypotheses and 
few input data. It is believed that the forward chainer has 
its best use as part of an embedded, or larger system, rather 
than as a conversational system. The system DENDRAL uses 
forward chaining to very good effect. 
4.2.2 Backward Chaining 
Backward' chaining is also known as backward search, 
consequence driven, top down, goal driven or hypothesis driven 
and can be considered to be aývalidation process. The backward 
chainer tries to support a goal state or hypothesis by chec- 
king known facts in the context. If the facts in the context 
do not support the hypothesis, then the preconditions needed 
for the hypothesis are set up as subgoals. It is effectively a 
search in the state space going from the goal state to the 
initial state by the application of inverse operators, and is 
effectively a depth first search (see section 4.3.1). The 
system MYCIN uses backward chaining very effectively. 
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Searching in both directions has some attractions. In 
many real world problems, two way search is combined with 
heuristics to reduce the branching factor at each level of the 
search. The result could be a situation where the two 
solutions "pass" in the search space, because one of the 
heuristics has not worked as intended, and has eliminated the 
required path. Also worthy of note is that we are unlikely to 
know how many steps are involved in a solution path and thus 
we may not know that the passing problem is occurring. The 
result would be a deeper and deeper search whilst the best 
solution has been missed. 
It is evident that the direction of search chosen for a 
particular problem must be appropriate to that problem. 
DENDRAL, which uses forward search, works forwards thus 
generating many possible solutions for identifying an unknown 
compound starting with mass-spectroscopy data. MYCIN's star- 
ting point is the symptoms and the results of tests performed 
on the patient. It then works backwards to generate possible 
causes of the infection. In both cases, the mechanism chosen 
is appropriate. Andow (1984) gives the effects on each system 
if the opposing search direction were applied. If DENDRAL used 
a backward search, then it would guess one of the many possib- 
le compounds and check to see if the spectrogram was consis- 
tent. If MYCIN used forward chaining, it would choose one of 
the many possible infections and compare it with the symptoms. 
Both would be wasteful of time and resources. 
Thus, the choice of search direction is problem depen- 
dent. Andow (1984) states that in practice most expert systems 
of repute use forward chaining and he questions whether this 
is a random choice, research workers bias or whether this 
reflects the type of problem that we regard as "expert". 
We should, in this project consider how experts handle 
design problems and decide which procedure is best - whether 
it is either forward or backward chaining, a combination of 
both, and whether we can solve all design problems using these 
methods. 
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4.3 Search Mechanisms 
Search problems are one of the main areas of artificial 
intelligence work, and deal with situations in which one 
choice leads to another. There are many types of search proce- 
dure, from simple, basic methods to more complicated methods 
such as problem reduction and theorem proving. Search proce- 
dures are used to find paths from starting positions to goal 
positions and can be used under forward or backward chaining. 
If the search path is thought of as a tree, then the points in 
the tree are called nodes and the connections between the 
nodes are called branches. One node is the ancestor of another 
or the descendant if there is a chain of branches between the 
two. 
We can demonstrate the principles and concepts of strate- 
gies for exploring alternatives with the following example 
given by Bratko (1986). Consider the diagram in Figure 4.1. 
The problem is to find a plan for rearranging a stack of 
blocks. The rules of the game are :- 
Move only one block at a time 
Move when there is no block on top 
A block can be put down 'or put on top of another block 
FIGURE 4.1 -Transformation of -CAB to ABC by Search 
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A sequence of moves must be established in order to accomplish 
the given transformation. It is a choice of alternatives. Our 
first move is to put block C down, then the choice is :- 
Put A down, or 
Put A on C, or 
Put C on A. 
This illustrates two types of concept - that of problem situa- 
tions and that of legal actions transforming the problem 
situation into other situations. These lead on to form a 
graph, or a state space. The nodes of the graph correspond to 
problem situations, and the arcs correspond to legal transi- 
tions between states. The problem of finding a solution plan 
is equivalent to finding a path between the initial situation 
and some' specified final situation (the goal node). 
In this section, ' we deal with simple procedures that 
have been used extensively in artificial intelligence. They 
include depth-first search, together with hill-climbing, 
breadth-first search, and best-first search. These are used to 
find paths from starting positions to goal positions when the 
length of the discovered paths is not important. Procedures 
which find the shortest path are more complex and include the 
British Museum procedure, branch and bound and discrete dyna- 
mic programming. Useful work has been published in this field 
by Winston (1984) and Hayes-Roth (1983) and in the specific 
area of applications in engineering design, by Maher, et. al. 
(1984). 
4.3.1 Depth-First Search 
This method is one which dives deeply into the search 
tree. It works on the assumption that one path is as good as 
any other. Depth-first search picks an alternative at every 
node in the search space and works forward from that alterna- 
tive. Other alternatives at the same level are ignored provi- 
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FIGURE 42 DEPTH FIRST SEARCH 
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ding that there is a possiblity of reaching the goal state 
using the original choice. 
Consider Figure 4.2. The first action would be to go to 
the bottom of the tree along the left-most branches (assuming 
a left-to-right order in choosing alternatives). This leads to 
terminal node C without encountering a goal node G. So, the 
next step is to backup to the nearest ancestor node with an 
unexplored alternative. This is B, which leads to eventual 
success at G, despite another dead-end goal at D. 
4.3.2 Hill-Climbing 
One disadvantage of depth-first search is that it can go 
off on the wrong trail and waste a lot of time, e. g. if node C 
had been the gateway to a vast subnetwork then depth-first 
search would have exhaustively searched this before finding 
the right solution. This performance can be improved by 
ordering the choices so that the most promising is explored 
first. This is called hill-climbing, and involves quality 
measurements that turn depth-first search into a more effi- 
cient procedure. A heuristic measure, or objective function is 
used to order the choices. This is shown in Figure 4.3. Search 
efficiency is improved spectacularly by ordering the choices 
so that the most promising are explored first. The procedure 
is as described above, but each node has a number assigned to 
it which indicates straight line distances to the goal node. 
The better the heuristic measure is, the better the hill- 
climbing will be. 
Winston gives some examples of hill-climbing in parameter 
optimization :- 
The picture on a television set has deteriorated over a 
period of time. The tuning, colour, tint and brightness con- 
trols must be adjusted for a better picture. In this example 
there are various knobs, each of which interacts with the 
others to determine the overall picture quality. Winston also 
describes the various problems associated with parameter opti- 
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FIGURE 4.3 HILL CLIMBING 
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mization via hill-climbing. 
4.3.3 Breadth-first Search 
As we have seen in depth-first search, the tree is trave- 
rsed downward until success or failure occur. Instead of 
moving downward through the levels, all the alternative 
clauses are tried first in breadth-first search. The result is 
that control flow scans across each level, moving to the next 
lower level only after trying all the nodes at that level, 
i. e. all alternative solutions are tried concurrently rather 
than one at a time. Breadth-first search pushes uniformly into 
the tree, and eliminates back-tracking. Breadth-first search 
places a substantially greater demand on memory usage than 
depth-first search because it carries so many parallel paths. 
Breadth-first search is shown in Figure 4.4. This shows 
that downward motion proceeds level by level until a goal is 
reached. Node D is checked after A. The procedure then moves 
on, level by level, discovering the goal node G on the fourth 
level down from the root level. 
4.3.4 'Best-first Search 
Best-first search is a modified form of breadth-first 
search. Here, all solutions found by breadth-first are 
evaluated and ordered so that more "promising" ones are consi- 
dered first. This can only work if a reliable evaluator is 
available. The least likely paths are either explored later in 
the search or are discarded completely if exhaustive search is 
not needed. 
Best-first search expands the best partial path in the 
search space. Motion towards a goal is from the best open node 
so far, no matter where it is in the partially developed tree. 
The path found by best-first search is likely to be shorter 
than with other search methods because the search always moves 
forwards from the node that seems closest to the goal node. 
So, best-first search works by expanding the best partial 
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path. Winston (1984) draws the following analogy. Suppose a 
team of mountaineers are seeking the highest point in a moun- 
tain range. They maintain radio contact, move the highest 
subteam forward at all times, and divide subteams into sub- 
subteams at path junctions. 
This method combines the advantages of depth-first and 
breadth-first in that easy solutions are not missed and the 
method can get deep into the search space quite quickly. 
4.3.5 Branch-and-Bound Search 
One way to find optimal paths with less work is by using 
branch-and-bound search. During a search there are many 
incomplete paths contending for further consideration. The 
shortest one is extended one level, creating as many new 
incomplete paths as there are branches. These new paths are 
then considered along with the remaining old ones, and again, 
the shortest is extended. This-repeats until the destination 
is reached along some path. Since the shortest path was always 
chosen for extension, the path first reaching the destination 
is certain to be optimal. Consider figure 4.5. Suppose an 
optimal solution is desired for the net shown in Figure 4.5a. 
Looking at the first level, in Figure 4.5b, the distance from 
S to node A is clearly less than the distance to B. Following 
A to the destination at the next level reveals that the total 
path length is 4, as shown in Figure 4.5c. This means that 
there is no point in calculating the path length for the 
alternative path through node B since at B the incomplete 
path's length is already 5 and hence longer than the path for 
the known solution through A. 
4.3.6 Generate and Test 
The state space search may sometimes be formulated as 
generate and test. Here, the search is divided into two parts, 
that of a generator of possible solutions, and that of a 
tester, which prunes solutions that fail to meet some con- 
sraints. A generator is complete if it is capable of genera- -1. 
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Figure 4.5 Branch and Bound Search 
In branch-and-bound search, the node expanded is the one at the 
end of the shortest path leading to an open node. Expansion 
continues until there is a path reaching the goal that is of a 
length equal or shorter than all incomplete paths ter: inating at 
open nodes. A sarp le net is shown in (a), along with partially 
developed search trees in (b) and (c). The numbers beneath the 
nodes in the trees are accumulated distances. In (b), node A 
might just as well be expanded, for even if a satisfactory path 
through B is found, there may be a shorter one through A. In (c), 
however, it makes no sense to expand node B, because there is an 
incomplete path to the goal that is shorter than the path ending 
at B. 
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ting all possible solutions. It is nonredundant if throughout 
the generation, it produces each solution only once. 
The distribution of knowledge between the generator and 
the tester is important, since putting as much knowledge as 
possible in the generator can lead to a more efficient search 
path. Hierarchical generate and test does this, and allows 
pruning of possible solutions that are only partially speci- 
fied. When a partial description is pruned, an entire class of 
solutions corresponding to the description is eliminated from 
the generation process. Pruning rules are applied early in the 
generation process. 
This strategy is only applicable if appropriate tests can 
be formulated. Typically, in design there is no unique 
solution, so there is therefore no absolute test for a solu- 
tion. It may be applicable in the preliminary design phase if 
the testing is changed to a ranking stage, so that the rela- 
tive value of possible solutions is determined., 
4.3.7 Heuristic Search 
The amount of time and storage space available for a 
search may place a restriction on the search mechanism used. 
Both depth-first and breadth-first searches are exhaustive of 
these facilities (although hill-climbing does help in the 
former), because although a solution may eventually be reac- 
hed, too many nodes may have been visited to make it practi- 
cal, particularly with large problems. 
Often, it is possible to extract domain specific knowled- 
ge in-order to guide the search and thus reduce the demands on 
time and space. This knowledge is referred to as heuristic 
information and search procedures using it are called heuris- 
tic search methods. The advantage is that as soon as a satis- 
factory solution is reached, the search will stop. 
One method of executing a heuristic search is in a "best- 
first" order, in which a domain dependent function is used to 
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determine which branch of the search tree to expand. An exam- 
ple has been suggested by Nilsson (1980) for the 'eight- 
puzzle'. This contains eight numbered tiles with space for a 
ninth. The object is to move the tiles up, down, left or right 
(i. e. 'operators') until the goal state is reached which has 
the numbers in the correct numeric order. Nilsson suggests the 
following evaluation function for this puzzle :- 
f(n) = d(n) + w(n) 
in which d(n) is the depth of the node n in the tree and w(n) 
counts the number of misplaced tiles. The function is intended 
to give an estimate of the computational effort required in 
pursuing a path. Nodes are tried in increasing order of their 
f values. Generally, evaluation functions are difficult to 
characterize, as described by Hayes-Roth (1983) :- 
"To be useful, evaluation functions must characterize 
the solution space adequately, which generally requires 
a substantial amount of knowledge... " 
Evaluation functions are said to behave well if they reliably 
and monotonically indicate an optimal path to a goal. In many 
real problems, well-behaved evaluation functions are elusive. 
Often, one must seem to move away from a goal in order to 
achieve it. 
Important aspects of expert problem solving include the 
direction and the method of search, both being highly problem 
dependent. The direction of search will generally be dependent 
upon the number of possibilities that need to be considered. 
The search procedure will depend on whether all solutions are 
required, the effects of missing solutions and the availabili- 
ty of an intermediate evaluator. 
4.4 Backtracking 
Backtracking is also an important aspect of problem sol- 
ving in artificial intelligence. The need for backtracking 
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cannot be ignored in engineering design, as it is unusual that 
the first solution considered will satisfy all the applicable 
conditions. Some kind of backtracking must be incorporated in 
a knowledge based expert system. The degree of backtracking 
will depend on the particular application. Backtracking is 
conceptually simple, but provides a very powerful search mec- 
hanism that can be useful in expert system problems. 
Backtracking is a. type of problem reduction that is 
applicable to problems that can be subdivided into a tree of 
fixed subproblems. In a number of practical problems, however, 
it may not be possible to decompose problems into a fixed set 
of subproblems. A number of alternate subproblems may exist. 
In backtracking, the problem solver backs up to other nodes, 
at the same level as the starting node, if no solution is 
found along the current path. So, backtracking consists of 
reviewing what has been done and attempting to resatisfy the 
goals by finding alternative ways to satisfy them. 
Backtracking is an inherent part of the programming 
language Prolog. In other languages, the user would need to 
construct the loops himself in order to achieve similar 
results. In Prolog, backtracking can be initiated 
automatically, or manually if the user is not satisfied with 
the solution that Prolog has found. It can also be controlled, 
by using the 'cut-fail' combination, which is important, as 
uncontrolled backtracking could lead to unecessary useage of 
computer time. 
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5 Languages, Environments and Shells 
This chapter describes some of the facilities available 
for building expert systems. They come in three forms - 
languages, environments and expert system shells. Examples of 
each are given in this chapter. In the languages section, we 
have concentrated on the 'official' languages of artificial 
intelligence, i. e. Prolog and Lisp. It should not be forgot- 
ten, however, that the more conventional languages of compu- 
ting can also be used for building knowledge-based systems and 
expert systems. Such languages include BASIC, FORTRAN and 
PASCAL, with PASCAL probably the one which is used more often. 
Some of the early expert systems were written in such conven- 
tional languages, and work by James (1984) has shown artifi- 
cial intelligence applications in BASIC. 
5.1 Languages 
5.1.1 Prolog 
Prolog is very much the European language of artificial 
intelligence, as opposed to Lisp, which is that of the United 
States. Prolog is also the language that the Japanese have 
chosen for their ICOT (Institute for New Generation Computer 
Technology) project. 
Schlobolm (1984) states that Prolog is gaining in popula- 
rity over Lisp for symbolic computation, and artificial intel- 
ligence programming. The argument over which is better rages 
on, and takes up a disproportionate amount of space in 
computing journals. In this project, we have concentrated on 
Prolog, since the properties of Prolog appear to be more 
suited to the kinds of problem-solving being tackled. 
Prolog was developed in around 1970 by Alain Colmerauer 
in Marseilles, France (1983), and was brought to Edinburgh 
University-where a DEC10 compiler/interpreter was developed. 
Edinburgh was instrumental in spreading Prolog to other insti- 
tutions and now there are various implementations available. 
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It has since been used in such areas as natural language 
understanding, expert systems and symbolic mathematics. 
Prolog stands for PROgrammimg in LOGic and uses a series 
of logic constructs in order to solve problems and can be 
described as a descriptive language as opposed to a prescrip- 
tive language such as BASIC, FORTRAN or PASCAL. These, so- 
called 'conventional' languages use algorithms in order to 
solve tiresome calculations that would take humans many hours 
to solve. Prolog solves problems involving objects and rela- 
tionships using facts and rules. As described by Clocksin and 
Mellish (1984), Prolog is about :- 
-declaring facts about objects and their relationships 
-defining some rules about objects and their 
relationships 
-asking questions about objects and their relationships 
Clocksin and Mellish describe Prolog as a practical and effi- 
cient implementation of many aspects of "intelligent" program 
execution. Features include recursion, back-tracking and 
built-in predicates. 
Facts, Rules and Questions 
It is possible to declare facts about the world in Prolog 
by defining predicates, e. g. 
lives(house, john). 
Meaning that 'john lives in a house'. Other examples could be 
hydrocarbon(propane) 
atomic number(gold, 79) 
'propane is a hydrocarbon' 
'atomic number of gold is 79' 
A good example which shows questions, rules and facts is that 
of a typical family. e. g. 
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One rule would be :- 
X is the sister of Y if :- 
X is female and 
X has mother M and father F and 
Y has the same mother and father as X 
In Prolog, this is written :- 
sister(X, Y) : - 
female(X), 
parents(X, M, F), 
parents(Y, M, F). 
By declaring a knowledge base of facts concerning a family, it 
is possible to question the system about who the sister of 
someone is and whom the parents are. Note that the variables M 
and F are not matched, which means they are uninstatiated 
variables. They will then match anything when it is necessary 
to satisfy the goal parents(X, M, F). 
We will define the following facts :- 
female(helen). 
female(clare). 
parents(helen, jane, john). 
parents(clare, jane, john). 
Suppose that we now ask the following question :- 
? -s4ster(helen, clare). 
Here, X will become instantiated to helen, and Y to 
Clare. As a result, Prolog attemps to satisfy the goal 'is 
female(clare)? '. This is true from the list of facts, so the 
goal is successful. Next, Prolog searches for the goal 
parents(helen, M, F), where M and F will match any arguments 
since they are uninstantiated. A fact that fulfills the requi- 
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rements is parents(helen, john, clare) and therefore the goal 
succeeds, and M is instantiated to Jane and F to john. The new 
goal is parents(clare, jane, john) which is successful, and 
hence the goal sister(helen, clare) is true. 
Lists 
One of the main features of Prolog is its ability to 
handle lists. A list is a sequence of items that can be writ- 
ten in Prolog as :- 
[peter, football, george, cricket]. 
Lists can be represented as trees which are combined with the 
use of a functor, e. g. 
date 
28 Nov 1986 
This is written in Prolog as :- 
date(28, Nov, 1986) 
functor arguments 
The first element of a list is called the head of the list, 
and the remaining parts the tail of the list. So, in the first 
example, 'peter' is the head of the list, and the tail is :- 
[football, george, cricketl. 
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The tree representation is :- 
pe ter 
football 
george 
cricket 
II 
F IGU RE 5.1 tree representation 
This is a binary tree, and in Prolog, lists are handled as a 
special case of binary trees. The (1 notation signifies the 
empty list. It is possible to carry out operations on lists. 
These are :- 
1. Checking whether an object is an element of a list, i. e. 
membership. 
2. Joining together two lists, i. e. concatenation, to obtain a 
third list. 
3. Adding/deleting to and from lists. 
Here, we will describe the membership clause. It can be 
written in two clauses - one a fact, the other a rule. 
member(X, [XITaill). 
member(X, [HeadITaill) : - 
member(X, Tail). 
Which states that, X is a member of the list if X is the head 
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of the list or X is a member of the tail of the list. 
The other main elements of Prolog are matching, backtrac- 
king and arithmetic. Backtracking is possibly the most useful. 
Prolog, in its search for a solution will go through each 
possible path. If a goal cannot be satisfied, backtracking 
will be initiated. This consists of reviewing what has been 
done and attempting to re-satisfy the goals by finding an 
alternative way to satisfy them. Furthermore, if the user is 
not content with an answer, backtracking can be initiated by 
typing a semicolon when Prolog informs the user of a solution. 
Uncontrolled backtracking can be inefficient, so the 'cut' is 
used to control and prevent backtracking were necessary. 
This section is only an introduction to Prolog. Examples 
of it s use can be found in later chapters, and more detailed 
accounts can be found in Clocksin and Mellish (1984), Bratko 
(1986), and Coehlo et. al. (1980). 
5.1.2 Lisp 
The other main language of artificial intelligence is 
Lisp, which takes its name from LISt Processing. It is a much 
more established language than Prolog, having been around 
since the early 1960s. It is similar to Prolog in that it 
models some kind of human cognition, but Lisp is primarily 
concerned with symbols in the form of lists, and their manipu- 
lation. Like Prolog it is highly interactive with the user, in 
that it reads what is typed in, evaluates it and prints the 
result to the terminal. 
The aim of this section is to give a basic introduction 
to Lisp. - More comprehensive discussions can be found in O'Shea 
and Eisenstadt (1984), Winston and Horn (1984), and Hasemer 
(1984). 
Terminology 
Any set of symbols which are legal to Lisp is called a 
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Lisp s-expression, which stands for a Lisp symbolic expres- 
sion. Also used are atoms and expressions, an atom being a 
single word, and an expression being any set of legal symbols 
including two or more brackets. e. g. 
alan 
(jump) 
(+ 2 7) 
To the last expression, Lisp would respond with 9. The '+' 
sign is called a procedure and is the basic entity which 
specifies how something is to be done. It can be defined by 
the user or produced by Lisp itself. Procedures provided 
solely by Lisp are called primitives. 
Suppose we need to remember that certain children are 
friends of someone called Tom. To identify the group, we can 
use the word FRIENDS. If Alan, John and Jane are friends of 
Tom, Lisp can remember this by' the following :- 
(SETQ FRIENDS '(ALAN, JOHN, JANE)) 
SETQ binds (ALAN, JOHN, JANE) with FRIENDS. 
If we now type 
FRIENDS 
Lisp responds with 
(ALAN, JOHN; JANE) 
We could also have a list of enemies 
(SETQ ENEMIES '(NIGEL, PETER, ROBERT) 
If NIGEL then becomes a friend, we can change this by :- 
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(SETQ ENEMIES (REMOVE 'NIGEL ENEMIES)) 
(SETQ FRIENDS (CONS 'NIGEL FRIENDS)) 
The expressions REMOVE and CONS are Lisp for addition and 
subtraction- of expressions. 
Thus, we now have :- 
ENEMIES 
(PETER, ROBERT) 
FRIENDS 
(NIGEL, ALAN, JOHN, JANE) 
In Lisp, we can also create functions, e. g. 
(DEFUN NEVIFRIEND (NAME) ) 
(SETQ ENEMIES (REMOVE NAME ENEMIES)) 
(SETQ FRIENDS (CONS NAME FRIENDS))) 
So that the previous NEWFRIEND status of NIGEL can be effected 
more simply by typing :- 
(NEWFRIEND 'NIGEL) 
List Manipulation 
Suppose we have an expression (sports cars are fast). We 
may like to cut off the first part of the element giving (cars 
are fast), or it may be necessary to add on a new first 
element, such as (small sports cars are fast). In order to 
manipulate expressions in this way, we use the primitives CAR, 
CDR, APPEND, LIST and CONS. 
CAR 
The first element of the list given as its argument is 
returned by using CART :- 
(CAR '(SPORTS CARS ARE FAST)) 
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returns 
SPORTS 
Equally, 
(CAR '(ABC)) 
returns 
A 
and 
(CAR '((AB) C)) 
returns 
(AB) 
CDR 
This primitive returns all but the first element of a list 
(CDR '(SPORTS CARS ARE NICE)) 
returns 
(CARS ARE NICE) 
Equally, 
(CDR '(ABC)) 
returns 
(BC) 
and 
(CDR I (AB) C) ) 
returns 
(C) 
CDR will always return a list - unlike CAR. The diagram in 
Figure 5.2 illustrates this. 
CAR and CDR may be used together. To pick out the second 
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element of a list, CDR is used first, then CAR is used. The 
following might seem plausible :- 
(CAR (CDR (A B C))) 
However, Lisp does not know where the specification of what to 
do leaves off and where the data to be manipulated begins. 
Lisp assumes that A is some sort of procedure. We get over 
this problem by using an evaluation inhibiting signal in the 
form of a single qoute character, Hence 
(CAR (CDR '(A B C))) 
returns B. 
When complicated procedures are involved, and it is nec- 
ssary to dig out some item from deep inside an expression, 
composite primitives can be used, e. g. 
(CADR '(ABC)) ((CAR (CDR '(A B C))) 
Care is needed in the use of A's and D's in the composite 
primitives. The order of appearence is the inverse of the 
order of application. 
A 
(A BC 
(BC) 
FIGURE 5.2 CAR and CDR operation 
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Adding to Lists 
The primitives APPEND, LIST and CONS can be used to 
construct lists, e. g. 
(SETQ L '(A B)) 
returns 
(A B) 
(APPEND L L) 
returns 
(A BA B) 
LIST makes a list out of arguments and each argument becomes 
an element of a new list, e. g. 
(LIST L L) 
returns 
((A B) (A B)) 
and CONS (standing for CONStructor) takes a list and inserts a 
new first element, e. g. 
(CAR (CONS 'A '(B C))) 
returns 
A 
an d 
(CDR (CONS 'A '(B C))) 
returns 
(B C) 
Other significant primitives are :- 
LENGTH - counts the number of top level elements in 
a list 
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REVERSE - turns the top level of a list around 
LAST - returns a list containing only the last element 
of an argument 
Recursion and Iteration 
There are two ways in programming of doing things repea- 
tely, one is recursion, and the other iteration. Recursion and 
iteration are examples of control structures. Recursion can be 
implemented by having a line of Lisp code which makes things 
happen again inside itself. Executing, say, $4Of1EN, involves 
also executing an inner copy of the function, within which 
there occurs another copy and so on. Recursion does not 
involve executing the same copy of the function more than 
once. An example of recursion can be seen with the following 
example :- 
(DEFUN SHORTEN (1) 
(COND H NULL (1) NIL) 
(T (PRINT (1) 
(SHORTEN (CDR 1))))) 
This shortens a list by one until the list is empty. The 
second line sayes 'if the list is empty do nothing'. When the 
third line is reached, a new version of the function is set up 
with different input data to work with. When the evaluator 
reaches the same point in the new shorten, the same happens 
again. This continues until the list is empty, and COND re- 
turns nil. 
An iterative function contains a loop and, unlike recur- 
sion, only one copy of the function is ever executed, i. e. 
iteration occurs all at one level, whereas recursion goes 
progressively deeper. Iteration involves the following steps 
1. Bind some variables 
2. Test the variables to see if the exit condition applies. 
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If so, exit, if not goto ( 3) 
3. Change the values of the variables 
4. Goto (2) 
The above explanation is only a brief introduction to 
Lisp. 'The works mentioned previously should be consulted for a 
more fuller discussion of Lisp. The next section deals with 
some applications of Lisp. 
Applications of Lisp 
Human thinking involves a small amount of resoning using 
a large amount of knowledge. Knowledge representation is, 
therefore, important - using the vocabulary of symbols and 
conventions for arranging them. Lisp has been used extensively 
in representation areas. Lisp has also been used for speech 
and vision understanding. It is very difficult to understand 
how people hear and see. Progress is being made in this area 
using Lisp, despite the fact that much arithmetic is involved. 
Finally, Lisp is very popular for symbol manipulation. This is 
because Lisp is highly interactive and it has become very 
powerful for writing large programs. 
5.2 Environments 
Environments for building expert systems are different 
from shells and languages in that they are more versatile and 
can be used for many different applications. The only true 
environment is that of POPLOG, although more problem specific 
environments exist such as OPS5 (for production systems) are 
in existence. Here we shall concentrate on POPLOG. 
5.2.1 POPLOG 
POPLOG is an integrated, interactive multi-language envi- 
ronment for development of all kinds of artificial intelligen- 
ce programming. It was developed by the Cognitive Studies 
Programme at Sussex 'University, and is a combination of the 
languages POP-11, Prolog and Lisp. The core language is POP- 
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11, which is similar in power to Lisp. POPLOG contains incre- 
mental compilers for Prolog and Lisp. The Prolog and POP-11 
are integrated in POPLOG and can call Prolog procedures and 
vice versa. Also, the same screen editor, VED, can simul- 
taneously be used to manipulate both sorts of files, taking 
appropriate default actions. Thus, in a complex design it is 
possible to implement modules in whichever language is more 
suitable. Combining a conventional artificial intelligence 
language with a logic programming language allows programs to 
have the best of both worlds. The editor also allows for 
mixing different languages such as PASCAL, FORTRAN or C. These 
can be linked dynamically to POPLOG. A useful account of 
POPLOG has been written by Sloman, Hardy, and Gibson (1983). 
5.3 Expert System Shells 
Along with languages and environments, the other way of 
building expert systems, and probably one of the easiest, is 
to use an expert system shell. "Shells are expert systems 
without the knowledge. They contain the control mechanism-in 
which the knowedge' is manipulated, and structure in which to 
hold the knowledge. All the user has to do is provide the 
system with the expert's knowledge in the form of rules. There 
are an increasing number of shells available today, with many 
different ways of representing knowledge and controlling the 
deduction process. It is critical that the user picks the 
right shell for the job. In this section, we describe some of 
the better known shells, and also shells that have had 
relevance in this project. 
5.3.1 EMYCIN 
EMYCIN, as its name implies, derives directly from the 
expert system, MYCIN, and stands for "Empty MYCIN". It ' is 
appropriate therefore for developing a consultation system, 
which can ask for data about a situation and it can give an 
interpretation. Hayes-Roth et. al. (1983) suggest that EMYCIN 
is good for fault diagnosis, where there are many 
input measurements. The MYCIN inference engine is used, 
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and the rules must be represented in the MYCIN rule language. 
This is usually in the form of production rules which can also 
cope with certainty factors. As would be expected, the control 
mechanism is the same as that of MYCIN, i. e. backward 
chaining. It can also give explanations and trace and has 
debugging facilities. 
5.3.2 Micro-Expert/Savoir 
Micro-Expert is a shell based on the expert system PROS- 
PECTOR. It is written in PASCAL, and is available on many 
types of machine from microcomputers through to mainframes. 
Cox (1984) gives a useful account of the development of Micro- 
Expert. The user of the shell does not use PASCAL directly, 
but the Micro-Expert advice language. The knowledge is formu- 
lated in the form of a tree with the goal at the top of the 
tree. At the bottom level of the tree are questions that will 
be asked during a consulation. Rules are in between these two 
levels, which are needed to prove the goal given the user 
responses. When the model is formulated in the tree format, it 
has to be coded into the advice language. The advice language 
has its own compiler, which creates a "rules file" and a "text 
file". 
Micro-Expert has other features including the input of 
numbers, use of Bayesian type calculations, some arithmetic 
capability and the ability to expand on questions asked of the 
user. The system has found extensive use for many 
applications, and is a convenient and rapid way of setting up 
an expert system. 
A direct descendant of the Micro-Expert shell is Savoir, 
which was produced by the same-company as Micro-Expert. It is 
again written in PASCAL and the knowledge base is written in 
the Savoir language. Again, it has its own compiler, which is 
then used by the run-time system. Savoir has many improvements 
on the original Micro-Expert shell, notably the facility for 
explicit control of the'reasoning process via "actions", which 
Savoir call "demons". 
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Since Micro-Expert has been used in this work, a fuller 
explanation of the system is given in section 6.4.1. 
5.3.3 Expert 
Expert is an example of a rule-based language as opposed 
to a true shell. It is a skeletal knowledge engineering lan- 
guage for rule-based representation. Its main characteristics 
include a forward chaining control scheme which can be used 
for diagnosis or classification type problems, a method for 
dealing with uncertainty and an efficient and portable code. 
Support for the user comes in the form of user interface 
facilities such as explanation, acquisition and consistency 
checking. Expert is implemented in FORTRAN and can operate on 
DEC and IBM computers. Its main applications have been in 
medicine. 
5.3.4 ESP/ADVISOR 
ESP/ADVISOR is produced by Expert Systems International 
of Oxford. Its basic function is the controlled output of 
text. It is not a shell in the true sense, rather a text 
animation system, in which expertise already recorded in regu- 
lations or instructions is presented as a knowledge base. The 
knowledge engineer creates a knowledge base source file using 
an editor such as WordStar. The file contains the domain 
knowledge written in the ESP/ADVISOR knowledge representation 
language. The program is checked and a Prolog knowledge base 
file is produced. The "ESP" program is run to perform the 
consultation. A menu of available knowledge bases is displayed 
for the user to choose from. The Prolog knowledge base file is 
accessed, questions are asked of the user, inferences are made 
and conclusions drawn accordingly. Propositional logic is 
used, meaning that the system is entirely deterministic, all 
conditions being evaluated to true or false. The line of 
reasoning for a consultation starts at the top of the knowled- 
ge base and proceeds down attempting, to satisfy conditions as 
it finds them. The system chains backwards through the condi- 
tion's antecedent rules to parameters whose values are known 
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or can be established by asking the user a question. Applica- 
tions of ESP/ADVISOR have included the regulations and 
procedures an employer has to follow when taking on a new 
employer (P. A. Y. E. ). 
5.3.5 Expert-Ease 
Harmon and King (1985) give a useful account of Expert- 
Ease. It is sold by Intelligent Terminals Ltd., and has been 
used extensively in this project. It is an example driven 
system, in which the knowledge is represented in the form of 
examples and a one-rule decision tree algorithm. It was the 
first expert system building tool for a Personal Computer, and 
therefore attracted much attention on its introduction in 
1983. The knowledge is entered by the user in the form of 
attributes and values which represent cases in the domain. The 
attributes are important properties of the domain which repre- 
sent it thoroughly. The attributes are parameters which have 
values of-specific cases. With-each example is a class value, 
which distinguishes the example from others. From the 
examples, Expert-Ease is able to establish the general case 
for the domain, and give a rule which gives a class value for 
any case. Consider, for example, the case where the decision 
is to fit an emergency isolation valve to a piece of process 
plant. These are the classes, and known cases are fed as 
examples to Expert-Ease, giving values to such attributes as 
material, equipment, temperature etc. After induction, the 
user can query the system to see if the item he is designing 
needs an emergency isolation valve or not. 
Expert-Ease uses Quinlan's ID3 algorithm in order to 
induce rules (Quinlan, 1979) in which the most discriminatory 
attribute is established in order to define a class value (see 
section 6.2.2). The 'intelligence' of Expert-Ease is in its 
ability to rearrange attributes in the decision tree in such a 
way that the questions sub-divide the tree in the most effi- 
cient way. Expert-Ease can be used by experts without the 
mediation of a knowledge engineer. 
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5.3.6 EX-TRAN7 
Ex-Tran7 is a FORTRAN77-based expert system builder. 
There are two main components, the "Driver" which is the 
inference engine and "ACL-TRAN" which is a rule induction 
system based on Quinlan's ID3 algorithm. ACL-TRAN is an 
interactive tool for entering examples of decisions from the 
domain, and inducing rules from them, which can be output in 
FORTRAN code. Rules can be entered directly if required. The 
Driver runs the expert system consultation session. It uses an 
overall controlling script, the "problem text file", to deter- 
mine the organization of the complete knowledge base, and 
supply natural language text for the question and answers. The 
expert system makes decisions by accessing the rules induced 
by ACL-TRAN. EX-TRAN7's workings are similar in nature to that 
of Expert-Ease, in that the rules are induced in the same way, 
and are in the form of trees. 
These last two expert system tools have also been used in 
this work and receive further explanation in Chapter 6. 
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6 Problem Solving Tools Used 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the background theory of the prob- 
lem solving tools used in this work. They include the rule 
induction technique used by Expert-Ease and Ex-Tran7, a 
working example of a forward chaining production system writ- 
ten in Prolog, and the theory of Micro-Expert. These systems 
were introduced in Chapter 5, but here we go into more detail, 
and explain how they work. The production system is based on 
an example given by Winston (1984), for bagging groceries in 
the correct order, and is called 'BAGGER'. 
6.2 Classifiers 
Classification is an area of artificial intelligence 
which comes under the general heading of machine intelligence, 
and deals with systems which learn from past experiences. In 
this work, we are interested in an algorithm called Iterative 
Dichotomiser Three (ID3), developed by Quinlan (1979). ID3 is 
a rule induction method, and its background and theory are 
discussed in this section. Rule induction methodologies are 
essentially systems which can be applied to data from a number 
of classes of chemicals, products, situations etc. and which 
induce rules about the domain for differentiating between the 
classes. 
Machine learning is the general term applied to computer 
systems which over time automatically improve their performan- 
ce as a result of experience. The learning process consists of 
the ability to acquire new declarative knowledge easily. The 
computer must then organise this knowledge so that the program 
can induce, i. e. go from the particular to the general. Induc- 
tion is seen as one of the key goals for artificial intellige- 
nce researchers, and is one which is receiving more attention 
as a research topic in its own right. 
The learning process, or algorithm, attempts to achieve one 
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or more of the following: - 
1. Allow a wide range of problems to be tackled 
2. Find accurate solutions 
3. Give answers at less cost 
4. Simplify codified knowledge 
Machine learning can potentiallly be applied to many 
domains, but recent work (Forsyth, 1984) has shown that the 
best results have been obtained from classification systems. 
6.2.1 Induction 
As mentioned above, induction is the process of going from 
the particular to the general, with emphasis on the use of 
examples. The examples are used to infer the structure and 
explanation of the problem. The relevance of induction to 
expert systems lies in the way that the knowledge is acquired. 
At present, most expert systems are built by using the knowle- 
dge obtained from experts after many hours of discussion and 
interviewing. The acquisition of domain specific knowledge is 
one of the main bottlenecks in the building of intelligent 
knowledge based systems. The reason for this is that the 
expert is being called upon to perform a task that he is not 
used to, and as a result, his complete knowledge set may 
suffer from a lack of detail, - particularly heuristics. 
Induction provides us with a technique to assist the know- 
ledge engineer. The expert should still be consulted, since he 
can come up with the basic concepts, new ways of viewing 
objects in the domain, and provide the rules of thumb. This 
kind of knowledge, in the form of examples can then be passed 
to an induction based algorithm. 
6.2.2 ID3 
The knowledge discovered by ID3 is in the form of deci- 
sion trees for differentiating objects of one class from 
another. The basic algorithm on which ID3 is built is related 
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to work done by Hunt et. al. in the mid-1950s, and is called 
the Concept Learning System (Hunt et. al. 1966). The nature of 
Hunt1s work was to find something out about concept learning, 
with the emphasis on what an intelligent device must be able 
to do, i. e. to classify. The idea was that ID3 would develop 
classification rules, given a set of examples. This then gives 
a means of being able to identify examples of the concept, 
which is essentially what a classification rule is. 
ID3 takes examples of a known class (the example set) des- 
cribed in terms of a fixed collection of properties called 
attributes. In a specific example, an attribute has a value 
assigned to it. To illustrate this, we will use an example 
quoted by Quinlan (1982). We can describe a person in terms of 
the attributes height, colour of eyes, and colour of hair. 
Height could have values short or tall, eyes could have values 
blue or brown, and hair values dark, blond or red. 
Typically, an object could be described as :- 
Height = tall, Hair = -blond, Eyes = brown 
With each of these examples is associated a known class, such 
as 'plus' or 'minus'. ID3 creates the decision tree -which maps 
each instance to its correct class. An object is classified by 
starting at the root of the decision tree, finding the value 
of-the given attribute, taking the branch of that value, and 
continuing in the same fashion until a leaf is reached. 
e. g. If we had some more examples of the above instances, in a 
collection of C objects :- 
-- C= 
Short, Blond, Blue + 
Tall, Blond, Brown - 
Tall, Red, Blue + 
Tall, Dark, Brown - 
Short, Blond, Brown - 
Short, Dark, Blue - 
Tall, Dark, Blue - 
Tall, Blond, Blue + 
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These examples can be represented in a decision tree as 
shown in Figure 6.1. As can be seen, it is necessary only to 
know the value of the hair and eyes attribute in order to 
classify an object. This type of rule-former will always work, 
so long as there are not two examples which are the same, but 
classified differently. To make the algorithm more realistic, 
i. e. so that we can classify objects which were not used in 
its construction, we need some way of selecting the most 
useful attribute to form the root of the decision tree, parti- 
cularly if there are many attributes. This is where the work 
by Quinlan (1979) differed from that by Hunt. Quinlan used an 
information theoretic approach, the theory of which can be 
found in standard texts, e. g. Raisbeck (1963). The aim is to 
reduce the expected number of tests needed to classify an 
object, by-finding the attribute with the greatest discrimina- 
tory power. Each example as defined by the most discriminatory 
variable is partitioned by the next most discriminatory and so 
on until the leaf is reached. 
As stated above the theory is used in order to find out the 
value of some message containing information. The next section 
outlines this theory. 
If we flip a coin, there are two possible outcomes. The 
information associated with such an experiment will be defined 
as a measurement of information - 'one bit'. Then, the infor- 
mation associated with 'n' equally likely outcomes is 
precisely :- 
1og2n bits 
If we test this for an experiment whose outcome is certain, 
then the information associated is :- 
let H= log 1=0 
i. e., the outcome is a foregone conclusion. 
If there are 8 equally likely outcomes, then 
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HAIR 
tiarK 
short, dark, blue, - 
tall, dark, blue, - 
tall, dark, brown, - 
red 
tall, red, brown, + 
blue 
short, blond, blue, + 
tall, blond, blue, + 
blond 
EYES 
\ brown 
tall , blond, brown, - 
short. blond , brown, - 
Figure 6.1 Decision Tree for ID3 Example 
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H= log 8=3 
i. e., there is 3 times as much information that can be gained 
as that associated with flipping a coin. 
Suppose there is an experiment where the outcomes are not 
equally likely. Assuming the following situation :- 
ni 
upper 
n2 
tower 
total 
FIGURE 6.2 Experiment with n equally likely outcomes 
Where the experiment has 'n' equally likely outcomes, 
grouped into upper group nl and lower group n2, 
n= nl + n2 
Assume that we want to know whether the message generated is 
of the upper or lower group. Therefore, the significant output 
is one of two messages having probabilities :- 
pl = nl p2 = n2 
nl+n2 nl+n2 
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for the upper and lower groups respectively. 
The information associated with one message among 'n' equa- 
lly likely messages is 
1og2n 
for nl equally likely messages, the information is 
1og2n1 
This occurs for a proportion nl/n of the time. For one message 
of n2 equally likely messages, the information associated is 
1og2n2 
and this occurs for a proportion n2/n of the time. 
In order to find out how much information is associated 
with the upper and lower messages, we subtract the excess 
information associated with the 'n' equally probable outcomes 
H= 1og2(n) - (nl/n)1og2(nl) - (n2/n)1og2(n2) 
i. e. 
H= -p1*1og2(pl) - p2*log2(p2) ----- 1 
With a known set C of objects, the probabilities given by 
equation (1) can be approximated by relative frequencies, so 
that pl becomes the proportion of objects in C with class 1. 
We can write M(C) to denote this calculation of expected 
information content of a message from a decision tree for a 
set C of instances. Define M(0)=0. Let A be the attribute. 
Consider the possible choice of A as the attribute to test 
next. A partial decision tree will look like :- 
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Attribute A: 
Al }Cl 
A2 --> C2 
6000000.00. 
An ----v Cn 
and the expected information content is 
B(C, A) = ((prob. that value of A is Ai)*M(Ci)) 
- replace probabilities by relative frequencies. The suggested 
choice of attribute to test next is that which "gains" the 
most information, i. e. for which 
M(C) - B(C, A) 
is maximal. 
An example of a calculation for information content is given 
in Appendix A. 
Quinlan gives some idea as to the reliability of this ap- 
proach :- 
"This method of choosing the next attribute to test has been 
used in a substantial number of different experiments, and 
does seem to give-compact decision trees. " 
Quinlan (1983). 
ID3, then, allows the user to start with a small set of 
examples and to expand these until the set of examples gives a 
comprehensive coverage of the situation, thereby allowing it 
to induce rules from domains otherwise too complex. This 
working example set is made up of those examples used to 
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induce a rule at any one stage of the inductive process. This 
is called the 'window'. The ID3 algorithm can be outlined as 
follows: - 
1. Initialize the system with a random set of situations of 
user determined size (the window or the working set). 
2. Deal with any clashes in the working set 
3. Induce a rule from the working set 
4. Mark exceptions to the current rule that occur outside the 
working set 
5. If no exceptions are found go to 8 
6. Include a user determined number of exceptions in the 
working set 
7. Print details of the iteration 
8. Print rule and end session 
A clash occurs if two or more examples have the same attri- 
bute values but different class values. Finding the clash 
involves marking the points in the working set where the 
clashes arise. The user is informed that the current set of 
attributes is not adequate to classify the working set and the 
attribute set must be changed. An exception is where there is 
an example that conflicts with the rule induced. The process 
of iteration is complete when a rule has been formed that 
contains no exceptions and is correct for the whole of the 
working set. Quinlan (1983) -gives some results of his findings 
on using ID3 for a large set of objects. A non-trivial classi- 
fication problem involving 14 attributes and some 2000 objects 
was tested, resulting in a decision tree containing 48 nodes. 
Also, only 4 iterations were needed to find the correct deci- 
sion tree, and interestingly, only a small fraction of the 
2000 objects were needed to develop a correct decision tree. 
Quinlan points out :- 
"These features... enabled ID3 to discover correct decision 
trees for some large classification problems. " 
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6.2.3 Limitations of ID3 
1. Rules cannot be probabilistic 
2. Each example has equal weighting - two examples the 
same will have the same effect as one. 
3. Examples that clash cannot be dealt with 
6.2.4 Expert-Ease 
A brief introduction to Expert-Ease was given in section 
5.3.5. There we stated that it is an example driven system, 
based on attributes, values and classes. The system uses the 
induction system derived by Quinlan. The theory of this was 
discussed in the last section. Expert-Ease has been used in 
this work for the emergency isolation valve problem. 
When using the program, the first stage is to give it 
some examples of the problem you wish it to work on. From 
them, a rule is induced which distinguishes between classes of 
different objects. In the second stage, these rules can be 
applied to new data that you do not know anything about. In 
this respect, Expert-Ease, is a machine learning type of 
system. 
Expert-Ease uses five main screens. The file screen shows 
the names of all the problems held on the disk; the attribute 
screen is used to define the variables to be used in any given 
problem; the example screen is used to input examples from 
which the system will build up its discriminatory rule set; 
the rule screen is used to display the rule which the system 
has developed for you; and the query screen is used for a 
question and answer session with you and other users. 
The variables are described on the attributes screen and 
then some examples are given on the example screen. The rule 
induced may then be viewed on the rule screen. An enquiry 
system is then generated automatically by Expert-Ease. 
Examples can be either logical or integer values, and up 
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to 31 variables are allowed. It is possible to give the system 
up to 30,000 examples to work from. 
6.2.5 Ex-Tran? 
Like Expert-Ease, Ex-Tran7 induces rules from sets of 
examples provided by the knowledge engineer. The system uses 
an enhanced version of ID3 and the trees induced are organized 
according to the information theoretic measure of the discri- 
minatory power of each attribute. 
Ex-Tran7 is a more powerful tool than Expert-Ease, and 
provides the user with more facilities for enhancing the 
expert system. The tool was introduced in section 5.3.6, where 
the two main components, 'ACL-TRAN' and 'Driver' were men- 
tioned. The sequence of actions taken by Ex-Tran7 is :- 
1. ACL-TRAN 
a) Accepts examples of conditions and resulting decisions from 
an existing file, or from the user interactively, and induces 
a rule in tree format from the examples, or reads a rule in 
tree format from a file. 
b) Converts the tree format rules into Fortran code. 
c) Produces Fortran Code for the intermediate subroutines 
which link all the individual rules to make a homogenous 
knowledge base. 
2. Fortran Compiler 
a) The Fortran-source files are all compiled - one for each 
sub-problem and one for the intermediate sub-routines. 
b) All the compiled files are linked together with the Driver 
object file. 
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3. Driver 
Driver runs the compiled executable program under their 
control of the problem text file which contains details of the 
text relating to each condition. 
The problem text file contains information about the 
structure of the knowledge base. The rules file contains rules 
written or induced. ACL-TRAN converts the tree format into 
Fortran nested IF THEN ELSE statements. 
The decision tree is made up of a series of attributes 
each forming a node in the tree. Each node has a set of links 
leading from it corresponding to the set of possible outcomes. 
The links from the attributes lead either to another attribute 
or a decision - as in Expert-Ease. The tree represents all 
possible combinations of attributes relevant to making a 
decision. 
The inference logic used is propositional logic (section 
3.1.2). The system searches forward through the decision tree 
following the links whose conditions match the current values 
of the attributes until a conclusion is reached. 
6.3 Production Systems 
Production systems as a method of representing knowledge 
have received a detailed discussion in Chapter 3. Here, we 
give an example of- a specific system, as described by Winston 
(1984), called 'BAGGER'. A program of a similar type has been 
applied to the flare system design problem, and that is des- 
cribed in a later chapter. 
6.3.1 Theory 
Winston states that the most successful synthesis and 
analysis systems embody the rule-based problem solving para- 
digm. Such rule-based systems are built around rules of the 
'if-then' format. In order to move from condition specifying 
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'if' parts, forward chaining is used and a forward chaining 
condition-action system results. When all the conditions in a 
rule are satisfied by the current situation, the rule is 
triggered. When the actions are performed, the rule is fired. 
If the conditions of several rules are satisfied simultaneous- 
ly, conflict resolution is performed to determine which rule 
fires. 
As a basis for developing a step-wise design program for 
solving the flare system problem, the method of Winston's was 
used, called 'BAGGER'. 
6.3.2 BAGGER 
This example involves a forward chaining synthesis-orien- 
tated rule-based toy system for bagging groceries. The system 
is required to bag groceries in the manner of a store check- 
out clerk. The system does not do optimal packing, but the 
system knows something of the fundamentals of bagging groce- 
ries, e. g. big bottles go at the bottom. BAGGER involves four 
steps :- 
1. Check what the customer has selected, looking to see if 
something is missing, with a view to suggesting additions 
to the customer. 
2. Bag the large items, with special attention to putting 
big bottles in first. 
3. Bag the medium items, taking care to put frozen things in 
insulated freezer bags. 
4. Bag the small items, putting them wherever there is room. 
Also, if necessary, a new bag is started. A knowledge base is 
now needed for the rules to look-at. It must contain informa- 
tion about the items in each bag, the item yet to be bagged 
and the current step. The rules need access to information and 
other properties of various items, as shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 'BAGGER' Knowledge 
ITEM CONTAINER SIZE FROZEN ? 
Bread Plastic bag Medium No 
Glop Jar Small No 
Granola Cardboard box Large No 
Ice Cream Cardboard carton Medium Yes 
Pepsi Bottle Large No 
Potato Plastic bag Medium No 
chips 
Each item has a step name, and each rule in BAGGER's rule base 
tests the step name. The rules are then partitioned into 
packets suited to each bagging step. Activation of the follo- 
wing rule is limited to the check order step. 
B1 If the step is check order 
there is a bag of potato chips 
there is no soft drinks bottle 
then add one bottle of pepsi to the order 
The next rule gets us out of the order checking step and into 
the next step. 
B2 If - the-step'is check order 
then discontinue the check order step 
start-the-bag large items step 
This, on the face of it appears to indicate that B2 would 
trigger at anytime in the check order step, preventing the 
first rule from acting. Conflict resolution is used in order 
to prevent this from happening. BAGGER uses context limiting 
strategy since, by convention, the first condition clause of 
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each rule limits the rule to a particular step. Assuming 
BAGGER also uses specificity ordering, B2 check-order rule can. 
never fire as long as any other check-order rule triggers. 
Each step has a rule just like B2 to switch into the next step 
when nothing else can be done. Specificity ordering helps out 
in other ways too. Consider the first two rules for bagging 
large items. 
B3 If the step is bag large items 
there is a large item to bag 
there is a large bottle to bag 
there is a bag with less than 6 large items 
then put the bottle in the bag 
B4 If the step is bag large item 
there is a large item to bag 
there is a bag with less than 6 large items 
then put the item in the bag 
Large items go into bags which do not have many items, but the 
bottles, being heavy go in first. The extra condition in B3 
ensures this ordering. When there is a large bottle, both 
conditions will match, but B3 has more conditions than B4 so 
B3 takes precedence. 
Next is a rule for handling large items if there is no 
room in any bag. 
B5 If the step is bag large items 
there is a large item to bag 
then start a fresh bag 
Another step changing rule moves us on to the next step. 
B6 If the step is bag large items 
then discontinue the bag large items step 
start the bag medium items step 
The rest of the rules proceed in a similar manner :- 
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B7 If the step is bag medium items 
there is a medium item to bag 
there is an empty bag or a bag with medium items 
the bag is not yet full 
the medium item is frozen 
the medium item is not in an insulated 
freezer bag 
then put the item in an insulated freezer bag 
B8 If the step is bag medium items 
there is a medium item to bag 
there is an empty bag or a bag with medium items 
the bag is not yet full 
then put the item in the bag 
Specificity ordering again works here, since B7 and B8 are 
matched, but B7 wins, ensuring that the-frozen items are put 
in an insulated freezer bag. 
Continuing :- 
B9 If the step is bag medium items 
there is a medium item to bag 
then start a fresh bag 
B10 If the step is bag medium items 
then discontinue the bag medium items step 
start the bag small items step 
B11 If the step-is bag small items 
there is a small item to bag 
there is a bag that is not yet full 
the bag does not contain bottles 
then put the item in the bag 
B12 If the step is bag small items 
there is a small item to bag 
there is a bag not yet full 
then put the item in the bag 
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B13 If the step is bag small items 
there is a small item 
then start a fresh bag 
The final rule terminates action when done. 
B14 If the step is bag small items 
then discontinue the bag small items step 
stop 
A Prolog version of this system is shown in Appendix B. 
6.4 Advice Giving Systems 
6.4.1 Micro-Expert 
Cox (1984) gives a useful account of the thinking and 
theory behind the expert system shell Micro-Expert. It is 
written in PASCAL and runs under the UCSD operating system. It 
is written as an advice-giving system, and is modelled on the 
PROSPECTOR system. This was chosen because of its method of 
inference - using Bayes's rule, which means that the rules can 
be represented as collections of trees diagrammatically. The 
Micro-Expert (1984) User Manual also gives a useful insight to 
the system. 
Micro-Expert consists of two programs, a rules language 
compiler called EXPCOMP and a runtime system called RUNEXPT. 
To create a system, ' the user first writes his rules in the 
system rule language, and these are typed and edited under the 
UCSD system editor. The rules are stored as a source file, 
which is then compiled using EXPCOMP. Two output files are 
produced, the first being the object file which contains the 
structure of the model. This is in the-form of a table. The 
second output file is the message file, which contains the 
ASCII text strings from °the source. The compiler also produces 
a listing which can be directed to either the screen or the 
printer. The listing contains a copy of the source with line 
numbers followed by any error messages. A list of all the 
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variables and goals in the program is then given. 
When the model is correctly compiled, the program RUNEXPT 
is executed. Initially, the program asks for the name of the 
model. The object file is then read for that model and then 
the system tries to establish the certainty of the model's 
goal hypothesis by asking the user questions. 
The user can interrogate the system in many ways. He may 
ask why the system is asking a particular question, the 
current certainty of any hypothesis in the model, amplifica- 
tion of any question or the current state of the goal 
hypothesis. 
Often, it is useful to represent the model in diagramma- 
tic form, and an example of this is shown for the emergency 
isolation valve problem in Chapter 10. Here, we will describe 
some aspects of the advice language. Each model has a GOAL 
hypothesis which is the hypothesis the model is designed to 
prove or disprove. Each goal can have any number of hypotheses 
to help to establish the certainty of the goal. These come in 
various forms. A hypothesis of the type QUESTION with subtype 
CERT causes the system to ask for a certainty factor. For 
example :- 
"How certain-are you that THE TEMPERATURE IS HIGH I-5.. 0.. 51? " 
The user replies by typing in a number in the range -5 to 5. 
11-5" signifies "certainly not". 115" signifies "certainly" and 
"O" signifies "not sure". Other numbers in the range may also 
be used. 
Questions can: also have'the subtype YES/NO which is 
replied to with one of the -following answers :- 
Y° signifying YES 
N signifying NO 
or ! signifying NOT SURE 
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The program automatically converts these to certainty factors 
of 5, -5 and 0 respectively. 
The other type of QUESTION subtype is NUMERIC. This 
causes Micro-Expert to ask a question of the form :- 
"Give a value for TEMPERATURE ?" 
A range for the value is given and the value typed in is vali- 
dated with either a High Value or a Low Value, these depending 
on the range allowed by the model. The system then converts 
the value into a probability using RULE subtypes MODULUS or 
RANGE which have a target value and a maximum deviation. If 
the numeric value of the antecedent hypothesis is equal to the 
target value then the probability of the hypothesis is 1. If 
the difference between the target value and the numeric value 
is greater than the maximum deviation, then the probability of 
the hypothesis is 0. 
The other type of hypothesis is a RULE. Any hypothesis 
which is neither a GOAL or a QUESTION must be a RULE. GOALS 
and RULES have common subtypes, and these indicate the way in 
which the certainty of the hypothesis is inferred. The subtype 
AND signifies that its probability at any time is the lowest 
of the probablilities of any of its antecedents. The subtype 
BAYESIAN signifies that the current probability. is a Bayesian 
function of the current probabilities of its antecedents. For 
such a hypothesis, an a priori probability must be assigned to 
it. This indicates the probability of the hypothesis being 
true before any of the questions have been answered. 
As we indicated earlier the plausible reasoning scheme is 
based on Bayesian decision theory. Micro-Expert uses the so- 
called 'odds -liklihood' form of the rule. This form relates 
three quantities involving an evidence assertion E'and a 
hypothesis assertion H, the prior odds O(H) on the 
hypothesis, the posterior odds O(H: E) on the hypothesis, given 
that E is observed to be present, and a measure of sufficiency 
LS. Then Bayes' rule can be stated as :- 
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O(H: E) = LS * 0(H) 
Odds and probabilities can be interchanged using the 
relation :- 
0= P/(1 - P) 
where P denotes the probability, and hence 
P= 0/(1 + 0). 
The sufficency factor is a standard quantity in statistics 
called the likihood ratio, and is defined by :- 
LS = P(E: H) 
P(E: H') 
where H' means 'not H'. 
A complimentary set of equations describes the case in which E 
is known to be absent, i. e., when E' is true. In this case. 
Bayes' rule can be written :- 
O(H: E') = LN * 0(H) 
where 
LN = P(EI: H) 
P(E': H') 
The quantity LN is called the necessity measure. The two 
factors LS and LN receive attention below. 
Micro-Expert therefore takes into account uncertainty in 
data'and tentativeness in rules. The probability of a hypothe- 
sis is calculated from the certainty factors. A certainty 
factor of -5 is equivalent to a probability of 0. A certainty 
factor of 5 is equivalent to a probability of 1, and 0 is 
equal to the a, priori odds of the hypothesis. For intermediate 
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values linear interpolation is used. The current probability 
of a BAYESIAN hypothesis is calculated by first turning the a 
priori probability into odds. For each antecedent hypothesis 
the odds are multiplied by a factor. If the certainty of the 
antecedent hypothesis is -5, then this multiplying factor is 
equal to the LN value. If the certainty factor is 0, then the 
multiplying factor is equal to 1, and if the certainty factor 
is 5 then the multiplying factor is equal to the LS value. 
When each of the antecedent hypotheses has been dealt with, 
the final odds are converted back to the probability of the 
hypothesis. 
Other types of RULE subtypes include OR and NOT. OR takes 
as its probability the highest probability of its antecedent 
hypotheses, and NOT can only have one antecedent hypothesis, 
its probability being 1- (the current probability of that 
hypothesis). 
The hypotheses GOAL and RULE can have other subtypes, 
here, we have discussed the ones used most. 
One useful feature of Micro-Expert is its 'blocking' 
ability. It may be necessary to have control over the order in 
which questions are asked by the system and to ignore irrele- 
vant questions. This is done with the subtype BLOCKED. An 
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example of blocking is shown in the emergency isolation valve 
problem. 
In order to understand the workings of Micro-Expert more 
fully, it is worth quoting an example from the User Manual :- 
GOAL APPX 'The patient has appendicitis' 
TRACE 'Considering appendicitis' 
BAYESIAN SITE LS 10 LN 0.1 
TEST LS 100 LN 0.01 
YNG LS 5.0 LN 0.5 
The hypothesis SITE means that the site of the pain at onset 
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was right-lower-quarter and is a certainty question, the 
hypothesis TEST is a rule meaning that the patient has pain in 
the right-lower-quarter for more than 24 hours and rebound 
pain, and the hypothesis YNG is a certainty question for the 
patient is young. 
Let us look at the a priori probability of the goal 
first. The value given is 0.1 which means that the probability 
of a patient having appendicitis before any of the antecedent 
hypotheses have been resolved is estimated to be 0.1. The a 
priori probability is turned into a priori odds. A probability 
of 0.1 gives an odds of 1/9, i. e., 1 chance for and 9 
against. 
1/9 = 0.1111 
Let us assume that :- 
SITE has a certainty factor of 5 
TEST has a certainty factor of 2.5 
YNG has a certainty factor of -1 
The multiplication factors are therefore :- 
SITE 1+ (10-1) * (5/5) = 10 
TEST 1+ (100-1) * (2.5/5) = 50.5 
YNG 1- ((1-0.5) * (-1/-5) = 0.9 
The current odds of APPX will therefore be :- 
0.1111 * 10 * 50.5 * 0.9 ý= 50.5 
The current probability of the patient having appendicitis- 
will therefore be :- 
50.5/(1 + 50.5) = 0.98 
The shell Micro-Expert is used in this work for the topic 
on emergency isolation valves, described in Chapter 10. 
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7 Design of Plants Handling Hazardous Materials 
In this chapter we introduce the subject areas covered in 
this study, which we have termed "candidate topics". We are 
looking for characteristics of design problems together with 
the kinds of expertise inherent in chemical engineering design 
with the emphasis on plants handling hazardous materials. In 
the following sections, each of the topics are introduced, 
together with a section linking the problem of design to the 
techniques of artificial intelligence. The final section deals 
with the short studies carried out. 
7.1 Introduction 
The first section in this chapter follows on from section 
1.1 and describes chemical engineering design and discusses 
the inherent expertise involved. 
7.1.1 Design Expertise 
Design expertise is a skill, and may be studied as such 
in its own right. Useful accounts of engineering design have 
been written by Simon (1984), Turner (1984), and specifically 
in chemical engineering by Rudd and Watson (1968). 
Engineering design is a: process of achieving desired 
goals. It is creative and must start with a clear statement of 
the objectives to be achieved. Specifications must be met by 
both the project and the products. The process starts with the 
identification of a need together with evaluation criteria. 
Designs also have a number of alternative solutions, and these 
must be evaluated and often reinforced by modelling or simula- 
tion. Optimization is another important technique, and is used 
to find the solution which best fits the requirements, also 
considering the constraints. 
Simon (1975) speaks of design in great detail, and clas- 
sifies design phases as :- 
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Needs analysis 
Feasibility study 
Preliminary design 
Detailed design 
Production 
The next stage of design is the anatomy of design. This invol- 
ves the detailed examination of the action of the designs in 
identifying and solving the problem. The design anatomy will 
then lead to the final plan before implementation is realised. 
Simon characterises the design steps as :- 
Problem statement and needs formulation 
Information collection 
Modelling 
Value statement 
Synthesis of alternatives 
Analysis and testing 
Evaluation 
Decision 
Optimization 
Iteration 
Communication 
The value statement is the criteria and constraints. The 
decision is the decision to adopt a general type of design. 
The optimization is then performed on this general design to 
obtain a more, specific design of this type. Iteration is 
included-at one point near the end of the list, but actually 
applies throughout. 
Rudd and Watson (1968) deal with these aspects related to 
chemical engineering. In particular they deal with :- 
Generation of' alternatives 
Screening of alternatives 
Multi-level attack on very large problems 
Engineering for variability 
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They also emphasise the definition of the primitive problem, 
namely an, ill-defined statement of a need. 
Using the ideas of these authors as background some of 
the characteristics of the design skill include the following 
functions :- 
Problem recognition 
Problem definition 
Generation of alternatives 
Selection of alternatives 
The methodologies for performing the design skill are :- 
Logical argument 
Rules of thumb 
Mental models 
Use of analogies 
Awareness and information relate to :- 
Objectives 
Constraints 
Hazards 
Costs 
Process materials 
Materials of construction 
Instrumentation 
Site characteristics 
Legislation 
Standards, codes of practice 
Another interesting discussion on the theory of design is 
that of Simon (1981), which contains-strong links with this 
work. Here, Simon states that design is a science of the 
artificial and is concerned with how things ought, to be and 
with devising artefacts to attain goals. The discussion pro- 
ceeds with descriptions including the logic of design, means 
ends analysis, design evaluation and generator and test 
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cycles. Many aspects are directly related to this work and it 
is-worth noting some' of his key points. 
The theory centres around logic, including standard logic 
(such as propositional and predicate calculus), declarative 
logic, finding alternatives and the logic of search. Standard 
logic is to do with declarative statements and is well suited 
to asertions about the world and to inferences from those 
assertions. Generation of assertions will involve alternatives 
to the solution, and once a candidate has been found, we have 
to be satisfied that all the design criteria have been met. If 
an alternative does not meet the criteria, then a search must 
be made for another one. The characteristic of the search for 
alternatives is that the complete solution is built up from a 
sequence of component actions. The solution can be described 
as the complete set of actions which constitute a design. In 
carrying out a search, it is efficient to explore several 
tentative paths. Attached to the end of each path is a branch 
which has a number that expresses the value of a path and thus 
the gain in pursuing the search -a sort of heuristic search. 
For a complex design, Simon talks of the power of decom- 
posing the system into a series of semi-independent parts. 
Here, generate and test can play a part. Alternatives can be 
generated and tested against a whole array of constraints. The 
generators implicitly define the decomposition of the design 
problem and the tests guarantee that important indirect conse- 
quences will be noted and weighed. 
7.1.2 Design Problem Characteristics 
In deciding what topics are suitable for this study, it 
has been necessary to define characteristics, so that we know 
what to look for in the candidate topics. 
Generally, candidate topics are problems that are somew- 
hat ill-defined in nature and which cannot be solved by the 
application of a simple algorithm. As an example, consider 
pressure relief. The design of a relief valve appears to be a 
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relatively straightforward problem, with a logical sequence of 
steps to follow. However, the definition of relief 
requirements is a more suitable topic. 
Topic characteristics are likely to include :- 
Not fully straightforward/algorithmic 
Choice of solutions 
Constraints 
Conflicts 
Solution for the candidate topics is likely to require :- 
Archetypes 
Models 
Rules 
Algorithms 
Heuristics 
Data 
These are the types of characteristics that we are loo- 
king for. Also, in these candidate topics, we must look for 
the types for expertise that are being deployed. 
7.2 Topics Investigated 
In section 7.1.2, a brief description of the characteris- 
tics of suitable candidate topics was outlined, together with 
possible design solutions. Here we give a list of suitable 
topics, covered by the characteristics mentioned previously. 
The list is by no means complete, but gives some idea as to 
the type of topics that we are tackling. 
7.2.1 Candidate Topics 
The area of Safety and Loss Prevention is a large one, 
and there are many subjects worthy of further study. However, 
in the scope of this project, a short list has been drawn up, 
and suitable topics taken further for extensive work. Our aim 
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is to find something out about each candidate topic, particu- 
larly the different types of expertise in chemical engineering 
design problems. One of the main characteristics of the candi- 
date topics is that they all embody some form of expertise, 
although this will be in different forms. 
Specific Topics 
Specific areas of Loss Prevention as suitable candidate 
topics are listed below :- 
Plant Layout 
General 
Electrical area classification 
Drains and sewers 
Plants in buildings 
Corrosive materials 
Crystallising materials 
Polymerising materials 
High pressure 
High temperature 
Low pressure, vacuum 
Low temperature - 
Furnaces 
Centrifuges 
Dust handling plant 
Process heaters 
Flares 
Batch plant, especially multipurpose 
Utilities 
Terminals 
Pressure relief and blowdown 
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Fire protection 
General 
Ignition sources, especially static electricity 
Fire fighting agents 
Chemical reaction runaway, decomposition 
Chemical reactor protection 
Explosion prevention and protection 
Atmosphere control, inerting 
Combustion venting of vessels 
Combustion venting of ducts 
Venting of dust explosions 
Hydraulic problems, especially water hammer 
Fugitive emissions 
Alarm systems 
Instrumentation 
Microprocessor control 
Availability, throughput 
Inherently safer design 
Construction defects leading to leaks 
Pumps 
Valves 
Emergency isolation valves 
Slip plate systems 
Startup 
Shutdown 
Turndown 
Trip systems 
Hazards of air 
Hazards of water 
Topics picked out for further study are listed below. 
Emergency isolation valves 
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Fire protection of storage tanks 
Flare systems 
Fugitive emissions 
Pressure relief and blowdown 
Static electricity 
In addition, certain other areas have not been the 
subject of an original study, but they have been reviewed. 
These are :- 
Hazard identification 
Coarse scale 
Fine scale 
Modification chains 
Valve system design and operation 
7.2.2 Emergency Isolation Valves 
Emergency isolation valves (EIVS) are used in process 
plant to prevent leaks of flammable or toxic fluids. Kletz 
(1975) has given a discussion of emergency isolation valves, 
particularly on the situations in which they should be used. 
Points on a plant which are particularly vulnerable are pumps, 
drain points and hose connections. Kletz gives instances of 
leaks in which an emergency isolation valve would have averted 
disasters. In one example, a pump leaked-over a period of 20 
minutes, and there'was a3 ton escape of ethylene. Another 
area in which emergency isolation valves might be an advantage 
are drain points, in which water from hydrocarbons is drained 
off, and if there is less water than expected, or the operator 
forgets to return to the tank, hydrocarbons are liable to 
leak. Another problem with drain points is blockage, caused by 
ice or hydrate formation. In such cases, the operator may be 
unable to shut the valve, and a leak may occur. 'Such a bloc- 
kage is thought to have caused the disaster at Feyzin, France, 
in 1966, in which 18 people were killed (Lees, 1980). An 
appropriately situated emergency isolation valve may have 
averted the disaster by, stopp ) the leak of propane gas. 
116 
Emergency isolation valves are usually installed between 
the inventory and the point of the expected leakage. However, 
emergency isolation valves are not installed on every piece of 
equipment which might leak, due not only to the cost, but 
because such a device itself introduces further chances of a 
leak. Thus, emergency isolation valves are only installed 
where the chances of a leak are significant, and the conseque- 
nces serious. However, prevention of a leak in the first place 
is far better than isolating it after a leak has occurred. If 
however the probability of a leak is still high, then an 
emergency isolation valve may be fitted. 
This problem is on the face of it more clear out than 
others that we are describing in this chapter. However, the 
decision on whether or not to fit an emergency isolation valve 
or not is dependent on many factors, including pressure, 
temperature, inventory, etc. The decision involved is a 
straightforward yes/no type, but many factors are used in 
establishing the decision. The problem has been tackled in 
various ways, with particular emphasis on an olefin plant, and 
these are described in Chapter 10. 
7.2.3 Fire Protection of Storage Tanks 
Fires in process plant are a very serious hazard both to 
life and property. Petrochemical plants with large amounts of 
storage are particularly at risk and very stringent controls 
for prevention and protection are necessary. 
Normally, fires in process plants occur due to leakage or 
spillage of a flammable material from the plant. Leaks can 
occur from a variety of sources including vessel, pipe or pump 
failure, or from glands and seals. Ignition of the leak can 
take a number of forms, as can combustion. Ignition may occur 
at the point of issue, or a vapour cloud may form which may 
take some time to ignite. Alternatively, a flash fire may 
occur. Prevention of a fire is thus a matter of eliminating 
leaks and ignition sources. 
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Here, we are concerned with the protection of process 
plant from fires, particularly in storage tanks. There are a 
number of codes of practice dealing with fire protection, 
together with extensive literature on the subject, notably the 
Fire Protection Manual (Vervalin, 1985). 
There are two kinds of fire protection, which can be 
considered. The first is "passive" protection, which deals 
with fire elimination, including material transfer, fire- 
proofing, fire spread and plant layout. The second is 
"active" protection, which deals with fire warning systems, 
fire detection, fire-fighting agents and water supply. 
Obviously, not all the protection measures will be required in 
all installations, so distinctions are made, including such 
factors as type and size of tanks, layout of the tanks and the 
type of material being stored. 
In this work, we have concerned ourselves with active 
fire protection chiefly for hydrocarbon- installations. We have 
established the main criteria for designing a fire protection 
system, and derived rules with a view to building a knowledge- 
based system. The problem appears to be one in which a simple 
algorithmic approach is applicable and has been programmed, in 
Prolog as such. However, the interpretation of certain phrases 
associated with the algorithm such as 'near' can involve 
expert heuristics. 
An attempt has also been made to treat it as a classifi- 
cation problem using a version of ID3 written by the author. 
However, it was decided that this problem is not one of 
classification, partly because the expertise comes in the form 
of rules given in codes rather than examples and partly 
because the number of classes appears to be almost as large as 
the number of specific examples. 
The design of a fire protection system is therefore 
essential at an early stage in the proposals for a storage 
facility. Further, good operation and maintenance are 
necessary during the working life of the plant. Lees (1980) 
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makes the following point :- 
"Safety in storage is as much a matter of operation and 
maintenance as of design. " 
This aspect of design in the safety of process plant is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
7.2.4 Flare Systems 
In many industrial installations such as oil refineries, 
petroleum plants, storage and shipping facilities gaseous and 
liquid effluents which are a hazard to the environment must be 
disposed of. For gaseous effluents, a flare relief system is 
such a disposal facility, and its function is generally to 
deal with materials vented during normal and emergency 
conditions. Flare systems separate liquid for reprocessing and 
burn off the gases. They must cope with all situations, whate- 
ver the cause of the release and dispose of the effluents in a 
manner which is acceptable to the environment. 
A typical flare system is made up of a flare stack and a 
series of pipes which gather the gases which are to be vented, 
along with a flare tip, often with a smoke suppression device, 
seals on the stack to prevent flashback, and a knockout drum 
at the base of the stack to remove the liquid from the gases. 
The main flare header should slope towards the liquid knockout 
drum in order to drain the liquid into it, and low points 
should be avoided as liquids and solids could collect. 
Elevated flares, such as that described above can create 
a public nuiscance due to noise, light and smoke. Often, a 
ground flare is used alongside the elevated flare, and will be 
used for burning the continuous excess gases that are gene- 
rated in a process plant operation. The elevated flare will 
then be used in emergency conditions, for start-up or shutdown 
and any abnormal operation that may occur. They are basically 
large capacity open roof incinerators and are of the order of 
10-20m in height. 
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Lees (1980) lists some of the hazards inherent with 
flaring operations :- 
1. Explosions in the flare system 
2. 'Obstructions in the flare system 
3. Low temperature embrittlement of pipework 
4. Heat radiation from the flare 
5. Liquid carryover from the flare 
6. Emission of toxic material from the flare 
Even if not all these features are present to cause a hazard, 
the latter three may cause environmental problems. Other fea- 
tures likely to cause such a problem are smoke, noise and 
glare. One of the main causes for concern is explosion in a 
flare system. There is always a source of ignition present, so 
it is vital that air is kept out of the stack. This and other 
hazards will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on 
flare systems, Chapter 11. 
7.2.5 Fugitive Emissions 
Releases of chemicals from process plants to the atmos- 
phere can be either controlled orýfugitive in nature. Control- 
led emissions come from stacks and vents, and the details of 
their release are known such as the rate of release, their 
composition and their direction. It is essential that this 
kind of information is known about controlled emissions from 
an environmental point of view. Fugitive emissions, however, 
are quite different. There is no control of their rate, compo- 
sition or direction, and they can occur at any time. Such 
emissions occur from a wide range of plant equipment, inclu- 
ding pumps, flanges, compressors and valves, which are the 
largest contributor. The reason that such emissions are 
important is environmental, to increase the public credibility 
of the plant, and to reduce operating costs of the plant 
itself. The financial gains to be made by reducing fugitive 
emissions are quoted by Jones (1984). Potential losses can be 
as much as $1500 per day. 
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There are various factors which influence fugitive leak 
rate, which include high temperature, seal technology and 
maintenance. Jones (1984) gives the effect of these on leak 
rate. High stream temperature leads to a drying out of the 
seals, valves in "hot" service should have special status, and 
increased attention should be given to reduce the fugitive 
loss. Wetherold (1983) gives a cost benefit analysis of a 
monitoring and maintenance programme for valves. Valves are 
inspected every 6 months and those that are leaking replaced, 
is estimated to give a nett saving for a large olef in plant of 
$125,000 per year. 
This problem appeared to be one which is worthy of fur- 
ther study, and the use of heuristics seem an appropriate way 
forward. Fugitive emissions have been subject to only a short 
study in this project, and this is described in section 7.3.1. 
7.2.6 Pressure Relief and Blowdown 
Every kind of pressure vessel, including reactors, disti- 
llation columns, storage tanks and heat exchangers needs a 
pressure protection system, with provision for protection 
against overpressure. Here, we are concerned with situations 
in which the pressure rise is gradual as opposed to sudden 
pressure increase such as that caused by explosions. A number 
of codes of practice exist, particularly the American Petro- 
leum Institute codes, API RP 520 on the design and installa- 
tion of pressure relieving systems, and API RP 521 which is a 
guide to pressure relieving and depressuring systems. In 
addition, individual companies have their own codes of prac- 
tice. Legally, the Factories Act of 1961 states that steam 
boilers, receivers and air receivers should have a safety 
valve in order to prevent over pressure. The Chemical Works 
Regulations of 1922 require the fitting of a safety valve or 
similar to prevent overpressure on stills and closed vessels 
handling gases. Also, under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
of 1974, there is a general duty to provide safe equipment. 
The threat of rupture may arise from a number of diffe- 
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rent sources including excessive pressure or vacuum, excessive 
temperature, . overfilling, corrosion or explosion. The first 
and most difficult stage in relief blowdown design is the 
identification of potential hazards. Some, such as fire are 
obvious, but others may not be so. Also to consider is which 
of the causes are going to impose the largest relief load. The 
next stage in the design is to decide the kind of protection 
required. In some cases, protection may not be required, e. g. 
if the source of overpressure is a pump which has a maximum 
delivery pressure less then the design pressure of the vessel 
to which it is pumping, then protection will not be needed. 
The next question is whether pressure relief is the most 
practical way of dealing with the problem. Alternatives there- 
fore exsist, such as an inherently safer plant, high-trip 
systems or ignoring trivial hazards. 
The design of relief blowdown systems is a complex task, 
and, as stated by Fitt (1974), it is not practical to apply 
quantitative hazard analysis techniques to all pressure relief 
problems, and the analysis must therefore be based on intui- 
tive judgement. 
There are many cases of overpressure causes and conseque- 
nces, and in the past each problem has been dealt with on an 
individual basis. -Examples include bursting of heat-exchanger 
tubes, control failure, pressure letdown, power failure and 
cooling water failure. In this project we have tried to 
quantify the problem and obtain rules for relief blowdown 
design in a more general way. The intention has been, as in 
all the candidate topics, to try to understand the nature of 
the expertise involved in the design of a relief system and to 
indicate the possible application of expert systems to it. We 
have tried to indicate also, whether the problem is one of 
deep structure or whether it is a straightforward if long 
decision type problem. This work is described in Chapter 12. 
7.2.7 Static Electricity 
Static electricity is an important source of ignition in 
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process plants. There have been many mysterious explosions, 
the cause of which was eventually traced to static electrici- 
ty. There is now much more information avaliable on both the 
nature and on the prevention of static electricity, notably, 
British Standard 5958, parts 1 (1980) and 2 (1983). Despite 
this, it remains a phenomenon which is often not well under- 
stood or appreciated. 
Static electricity is a potential source of ignition 
wherever there is a flammable mixture of gas or dust. Its 
generation is essentially a surface effect, which is asso- 
ciated with the contact and separation of dissimilar bodies. 
When the surfaces are separated, one body tends to be left 
with a positive charge, and the other with a negative charge. 
If the bodies are good conductors of electricity, the charge 
moves freely and both bodies are effectively restored to their 
original state through the last points of contact at separa- 
tion. If one or both of the bodies are poor conductors, the 
charge will be retained. 
Many industrial processes involve surface contact, and 
movement and separation of poorly conducting materials. These 
processes may be classified in terms of the phases involved, 
e. g. gas-solid, dust-powder, or by the nature of the process, 
e. g. pnematic conveying. The hazard of static occurs in the 
process industries in fluid handling operations, dust and 
powder operations, truck filling and agitation. Also, dry 
refined oils, such as gasoline, kerosine, jet fuels and simi- 
lar oils will become charged during the following operations 
Flow through a pipe 
Agitation 
Overhead splash filling of tanks 
Settling of water from a volume of oil following a water 
wash 
Filtering of oils 
Rapid evaporation 
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For a fire on a plant, air, a flammable vapour and a 
. source of ignition must be present. It is difficult to prevent 
air and flammable vapours from forming an explosive mixture, 
so the source of ignition must be eliminated. There are a 
number of measures that can be applied to prevent static from 
building up and these can be incorporated at the design, stage 
by following rules. These will be discussed in the Short 
Studies section, described in section 7.3.2. 
7.2.8 Expertise in Candidate Topics 
The candidate topics that we have discussed above are 
characterised by the fact that they all embody some form of 
expertise. This expertise comes in different forms, and the 
aim of the current work is to find the characteristic features 
of the design of these topics in order to understand the 
expertise involved. This will be shown in subsequent chapters 
together with some example solutions. 
7.3 Short Studies 
7.3.1 General 
Coarse Scale Hazard Study 
The shell, Micro-Expert has been used to'do a mockup of an 
expert system which determined-how probable it was that a 
particular plant would give rise to serious hazard problems. 
HAZOP Study 
There has been a number of works concerning expert systems and 
HAZOP studies. Ferguson (1985) looks at an expert systems 
approach to HAZOP, and also work by Parmar (1986) has shown 
the application of Prolog to HAZOP. This, and other related 
work is described in Chapter 8. 
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Modification Chains 
It may be possible to develop rules which allow the user to 
check the probable effects of a plant modification which he is 
proposing. 
Valve System Design and Operation 
There can be a problem in designing a complex system of valves 
so that they operate safely. Possible hazards are getting one 
fluid into another which is compatable, e. g. flammables and 
air. The problem of valve sequencing has been described by 
Rivas and Rudd (1974). 
7.3.2 Fugitive Emissions 
We introduced fugitive emissions in section 7.2.5. There, 
we explained the nature of the problem and the extent to which 
companies can benefit from having a fugitive leak control 
programme. Here, we go into more detail, and have tried to 
work out some rules and heuristics for their control, particu- 
larly at the design stage. 
The main work concerning fugitive emissions comes from 
the B. O. H. S. Technical Committee (1984). There, all aspects of 
the problem are explained, together with various control mea- 
sures that can be employed. Work in this area also comes from 
Jones (1984), Morgester et. al. (1979), Rosebrook (1977) and 
Wetherold (1983). 
Measurement of Fugitive Emissions 
Direct quantification of fugitive emissions is difficult 
because of their inherently diffuse nature. There are a varie- 
ty of techniques available, all involving assumptions and 
approximations. " 
Fugitive emissions can be measured at a spot remote from 
the leak, such as at a boundary fence. However, if control 
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measures are to be implemented, then they have to be quanti- 
fied at source. The measurement techniques used include soap 
bubble, in which soap is put on the surface and the bubbles 
are observed and bagging, in which the emission is contained 
in a known flow of air, and the resultant concentration 
measured. The use of data collected by such methods is depen- 
dent upon mathematical models of containment and dispersion. 
The B. O. H. S. state that the major deficiency lies in the 
absence of a standard technique. Ideally, the techniques for 
measuring fugitive loss should be quick and simple, provide 
quantitative data on mass, and be reproducible and reliable. 
None of the techniques mentioned fulfills these requirements. 
Control of Fugitive Emissions 
In order to prevent a leak from a joint, the joint must 
be sealed effectively, and the hygienist must be aware of the 
alternatives available to him. Also, the design engineer must 
know when it is necessary to seal a potentially leaking joint. 
There are two classes of seals, static seals, which have no 
relative movement of the seals surface, such as pipe joints 
and manhole covers, and dynamic seals in which a seal must be 
made between surfaces that move relative to-each other. The 
motion may be rotary (centrifugal pump) or reciprocating 
(pum- 
p/compressor). Seals used for dynamic applications can be 
either contact seals in which-the seal bears against the 
mating surface under positive pressure, or clearence seals* 
which operate with a positive clearence between the two-sealed 
surfaces. There are many types of seals available for diffe- 
rent applications, among them mechanical seals, packed seals 
and labyrinth seals. Mechanical seals are the most effective, 
particularly when used as a double mechanical seal. These are, 
however, expensive and add to maintenance requirements. Jones 
(1984) points out that for valves, use of 100% foliated carbon 
packing considerably reduces fugitive losses, and it also has 
the advantages of flexibility and self lubrication, which 
means that drying out does not become a problem. The B. O. H. S 
point out that use of 100% foliated carbon may prove to be a 
major advance in the control of fugitive emissions. 
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Other workers in the field suggest alternative ways of 
dealing with fugitive leaks. Blackwood (1982) implies that the 
most effective control is to change the process or re-route 
materials to prevent air contamination. He goes on to point 
out that for now, fugitive emissions control is left to the 
imagination of the engineer. Goltz (1984) recommends an annual 
check of all gas or vapour valves using soap solution and 
carrying out selective maintenance. This has shown to be both 
effective and economic. Wetherold et. al. (1983) states that an 
effective valve inspection and repair program can result in 
substantial savings. They also say that for a given plant, 
there is an optimum monitoring frequency which will result in 
maximum savings. 
Heuristics for the Control of Fugitive Emissions 
The problem of fugitive emissions looks to be one that 
could be solved by the application of heuristics. It is a 
problem which is not fully defined, one that is covered by 
constraints, it has a choice of solutions and it is a problem 
of design. However, fugitive emissions are dependent on a 
large number of parameters, that are difficult to define for 
any one leak, and the measurement techniques are unreliable. 
There are no rules to say when an item will leak, or to what 
extent it will leak, although there are rules which state what 
type of seal to use in certain conditions, but this is not 
really tackling the problem at hand. The solutions outlined 
above are all clear cut solutions that appear to work well. As 
a result, it has been difficult to derive rules and heuristics 
that define and solve the problem. Another barrier in the 
definition of the problem is when does a fugitive emission. 
become aleak ?. The Environmental Protection Agency in 
America merely define an arbitrary leak rate, above which 
preventative maintenance is required. 
The-problem of fugitive emissions was not carried further 
in this work largely because the view was forcefully put to us 
from one source that there is a simple engineering solution to 
most fugitive emission problems, namely 100% foliated carbon 
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seals. 
7.3.3 Static Electricity 
Static electricity was introduced in section 7.2.7. Here 
we take the topic further by looking at some of the ways in 
which static can be controlled in various installations. The 
basis for this has come from British Standard BS: 5958 Part 2 
(1983). There are various other works concerned with the 
hazards of static electricity, notably Klinkenburg and van der 
Milne (1958), Gavis (1972) on the origins of static electrici- 
ty, Eden (1972) on the hazards of static in powders, and 
Howard (1985) and Mahley (1972) on the hazards of static in 
the petroleum industry. 
Causes of Static Electricity 
When liquid flows through a pipe, charge separation oc- 
curs and the liquid emerging from the pipe is charged. The 
amount of charge is dependent upon flow conditions. Turbulent 
flow generates more charge than laminar flow for a single 
phase liquid. The flow of a liquid/liquid or a solid/solid 
mixture through pumps etc. also causes charge to generate. 
Such generation may be greater than with a single flow liquid 
due to the increased interfacial area. Fine particle filters 
can be prolific generators of static, and generally the more 
stringent the filtration requirement the greater the charge 
generated. Settling also causes problems, but such generation 
is complex, and little data is available. Other causes of 
static generation in liquids is splashing of liquid jets, 
ejection of liquid droplets from a nozzle, stirring and mi- 
xing, and discharges involving liquids, e. g. mists and sprays. 
High resistivity solids and particularly powders are also 
prone to charge generation. 
Control of Static Electricity 
BS 5958 part 2 (1983) classifies the problem according to 
the items of equipment that need protection, such as storage 
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tanks, either metallic or non-metallic, road and rail trucks, 
ships and barges, filters and water separators, pipelines and 
containers for high resistivity powders. The code considers 
operations such as tank filling, filters, gauging and sampling 
and cleaning for each of the items mentioned above. Control of 
static electricity falls into the following categories :- 
Prevent formation of explosive mixture 
Prevent accumlation of static on equiment (earthing) 
Prevent accumulation of static in liquids (anti-static 
additives) 
Reducing the generation of static 
If we consider the case of a fixed metal tank storing liquid, 
charge can be generated within the tank from splashing, from 
the pipeline feeding the tank, and also from personnel main- 
taining the tank. An ignition hazard is created when charge is 
retained in the liquid, on insulated conductors, or on person- 
nel in the prescence of a flammable vapour/air mixture. Such 
hazards can be avoided by observing a few simple precautions. 
The tank and the associated fittings must be in good electri- 
cal contact with each other, such that resistance at all 
points is less than 10 ohms. Personnel should not present a 
hazard (e. g. suitable footwear), and new or repaired tanks 
should be cleared of debris. In filling the tank, splashing 
must be avoided. For liquids up to 50 p;, /m the inlet should be 
designed to minimize-turbulence, linear flow velocity should 
be 'less than lm/s, and for liquids greater than 50 pS/m an 
anti-static agent should be used. These guidelines are only an 
outline of the precautions needed, but they demonstrate the 
kind of guidelines that are needed. I 
Rules for the Control of Static Electricity 
From the above, a number of rules have been derived, for 
example': - 
If the item is new/has been out of service, then an inspection 
of the item should be made prior to use. 
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If a flammable atmosphere can form, then splash filling should 
be avoided. 
If the liquid conductivity is up to and including 50 pS/m, 
then the inlet should be designed to minimize turbulence and 
agitation. 
If the liquid conductivity is 50 pS/m then the linear flow 
velocity in the feed pipe should not exceed 1 m/s. 
The item should be in good electrical contact with related 
items, and the resistance at all points is less then 10 ohms. 
etc. 
The problem of static electricity appears to be basically 
algorithmic with expert interpretation of some of the words 
used. The British Standard goes a long way to providing the 
expertise, e. g. it does not talk about 'high' conductivity, 
but gives a conductivity break point of 50 pS/m. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the characteristics of some 
design problems, candidate topics and the expertise in such 
topics, and two short studies have been carried out. All the 
topics are quite different, although all embody expertise for 
which we are trying to identify__ 1 information in an 
explicit form. We have seen that not all the topics are 
suitable for further study, not because of their lack of 
expertise, but their solutions are clear cut and well defined. 
If expert systems are to be useful, then it is important that 
relevant topics are studied, and correct problem-solving 
strategies employed. At this stage it is worth noting the 
comments of Shirai and Tsujii (1984) who state that for 
artificial intelligence work, problems which have a well 
defined-method of solution should be excluded. 
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8 Hazard Identification 
8.1 Introduction 
In this work we have been dealing with the specific area 
of plants handling hazardous materials. It is relevant at this 
point to consider the general problem of. hazard identifica- 
tion, the expertise involved and possible problem solving 
approaches to use. In particular, we review previous work on 
hazard identification based on fault propagation, and briefly 
look at coarse and fine scale hazard identification. 
8.2 Hazard Identification 
Hazard identification has two main goals. They are to 
reveal substances or processes which have hazard potential and 
to identify all conceivable threats to the process which might 
lead to loss of containment. 
Hazard identification is a large and complex area and 
there is little in computer aided design to help. 
8.2.1 General 
In the context of this work, we should consider the 
nature and characteristics of hazard identification and estab- 
lish the expertise and types of problem solver which might be 
appropriate. 
As stated above, hazard identification is a large and 
general topic. It covers many areas including check lists, 
properties of the materials involved including reactivity, 
instability and explosibility and safety audits. Often pilot 
plants are built to identify unforeseen hazards, and use-may 
be made of hazard indices such as'the Dow Chemical Company's 
Fire and Explosion Index which assigns points for each hazard 
encountered. Hazard identification can be broken down into two 
main areas, that of coarse scale hazard identification and 
fine scale hazard identification. 
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Coarse scale is the determination of general hazards 
which may occur on a process plant, and draws on the expertise 
involved in check lists, safety audits and safety management. 
Fine scale is, by nature far more specific and involves hazard 
and operability studies (HAZOP) and fault trees etc. Lees and 
co-workers draw on the methods of fault propagation equations 
in order to trace a fault through a pipe, for example, and 
both methods have inherent expertise and some expert system 
characteristics. It is possible therefore to identify in 
hazard identification techniques some of the methods used in 
artificial intelligence, particularly in fault trees, which 
use top down and bottom up approaches. Work on a HAZOP style 
program involves a suite of programs partly written in Prolog, 
and having expert system features, and potential for 
enhancement of those features. This is described in section 
8.4.1 
In this chapter we describe the two methods of hazard 
identification and then concentrate on expert system features 
inherent in them. By studying this work we have been able to 
tentatively state the nature and characteristics of hazard 
identification and suggest possible problem solving strategies 
to enhance the methods, so making expert system development 
more promising. The next sections deal with the two methods of 
hazard identification, coarse and fine scale. 
8.2.2 Coarse Scale 
The core of this section is based on the work by the 
Chemical Industries Association (1977). In this section we 
will describe what is involved in coarse scale hazard identi- 
fication. 
When a major design is started, safety and loss preven- 
tion matters should be the concern of the whole design team. 
Thus, from the outset it is apparent that there are many 
experts involved who are helping to make the plant a safe one. 
This means that an appropriate system of work should be forma- 
lised for it to be effective. A hazard identification would 
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have little effect if the team were merely suggesting hazards 
'ad hoc' as they went along. We can therefore identify the 
objects of a system of work. They are to fully exploit the 
experience of the team and to provide checks to keep errors 
down. A set of standing orders and instructions for particular 
activities is typically the way forward. 
Thus a framework of knowledge is built up in these forma- 
lised stages, from research and development to the operation 
of the plant. It is also important that the items in the frame 
be executed correctly, both in phasing and matching. Another 
characteristic we can see developing is that of backtracking. 
An early task of the design team is identification of hazards. 
This first study will be coarse and will need revision at a 
later stage. 
One of the most useful aids to coarse scale hazard iden- 
tification is the safety check list, as outlined in detail by 
Wells (1980). The first aspect is the hazardous characteris- 
tics of the chemicals used in the process, including reaction 
synthesis and scale up. Next the basic process design must be 
carried out. Initially the process as a whole will be examined 
to determine whether it is inherently dangerous. 
This early study involves the plant layout diagram as the 
working document, and is a very general study. It is intended 
to highlight major hazards, chemical data and plant location 
features. A useful checklist at this stage is (CIA, 1977). :- 
Fire 
Explosion 
Detonation 
Toxicity 
Corrosion 
Radiation 
Noise 
Vibration 
Noxious material 
Electrocution 
Asphixyia 
Mechanical failure 
8.2.3 Expertise in Coarse Scale Hazard Identification 
The problem of coarse scale hazard identification is very 
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general, although specific to the design at hand. It is an on 
going problem, continuing throughout the design stage until 
the design is 'frozen'. The knowledge required is huge and 
includes aspects such as the process itself, together with 
that of specific installations such as reactions, storage and 
columns. Many different kinds of expertise are therefore invo- 
lved, although there is unlikely to be algorithmic expertise 
involved. Classification will play a part in refining the 
hazards identified, but essentially the expertise of awareness 
of problems is the major component. 
It is possible to see a framework of coarse scale hazard 
identification knowledge building up. Each aspect would have a 
general heading and particular cases would be specific instan- 
ces of the heading. This could be represented in a semantic 
net type system, which was introduced in section 3.1.1. The 
nodes in such a system would be used for representing descrip- 
tors from the safety check list, and the links might represent 
the relation between them in either 'is-a' format or 'has-a' 
format. For example, the object vinyl chloride is-a very toxic 
substance, or LPG is-a fire hazard. These are obviously simple 
examples, but may possibly represent how the'hazards assesor 
is thinking. Execution of the nets would have to have strict 
control, since phasing and matching are also important. 
If a problem solving strategy were to be suggested, then 
a forward chaining approach seems the most likely. The reason 
for this is that throughout coarse scale hazard identification 
data and knowledge are collected in order to satisfy specific 
goals, and ultimately the common goal - that of a safe plant. 
The experts therefore work forwards given the plant informa- 
tion, and incorporate coarse scale hazard identification in 
the initial stages of design. 
An early study carried out in the Department of Chemical 
Engineering, Loughborough University, considered coarse scale 
hazard identification. The presence of hazards was considered 
as a goal, to be set aside using a backward chaining method. 
In the view of the present author, this is probably not the 
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right approach. 
8.2.4 Fine Scale 
One of the methods of hazard identification on a fine 
scale is the HAZOP study. This is carried out by a multi- 
disciplinary team of specialists headed by an experienced 
chairman. Kletz (1983) gives a general account of the HAZOP 
process, and the HAZOP Studer Guide (1977) by the Chemical 
Industry Saftey and Health Council of the Chemical Industries 
Association gives a detailed account. 
HAZOPs are carried out once the design has been 'frozen' 
and the potential major hazards established. The purpose of a 
HAZOP is to discover deviations from intention and so discover 
possible hazards and operating difficulties. 
The working document is the process flow diagram. It is 
examined pipe by pipe and parameters such as flow, tempera- 
ture, pressure and concentration are reviewed using a check 
list of guidewords. The guidewords are NONE/NO, LESS, REVER- 
SE, PART OF, MORE THAN and OTHER THAN. The causes and effects 
of each deviation are then considered and the need for action 
is evaluated. The process is normally carried out on pipes 
connecting the units, as the consequences will usually show up 
in the units themselves. The results of a HAZOP are given in a 
table, which has the following format :- 
Guideword Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action 
required 
The HAZOP process is-therefore a very skilled and time 
consuming process and is very costly in terms of man hours. - 
In order to gain'a better understanding of the expertise 
in fine scale hazard identification, and in particular HAZOP, 
it is necessary to give an account of the HAZOP study 
procedure. 
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HAZOP is a critical examination procedure which can go to 
varying degrees of detail. Each part of the process design is 
questioned to discover how deviations from the intention of 
the design can occur. 
The team leader will ask questions of the team based on 
the guidewords given above. The guidewords are combined with a 
set of physical variables which include flow, temperature and 
pressure. Each guideword and variable combination is consi- 
dered to determine, how if at all, it could be caused and what 
if any, the consequences would be. Three cases are then to be 
considered. One is if the causes of a deviation are unrealis- 
tic or improbable, in which case the derived consequences are 
rejected. The second case is that the deviation may be tri- 
vial, or may have no consequences. Again the deviation is 
rejected. The final case is that of a deviation which has both 
valid and/or probable causes which lead on to a potentially 
hazardous situation. Here, the deviation together with the 
causes and consequences are noted down for remedial action. 
8.2.5 The Expertise in HAZOP 
The HAZOP process involves a team of highly qualified 
people and is therefore a process that has much expertise 
involved. It is difficult initially to identify any formalised 
methods of working or any specific expertise involved. However 
it is possible to break the process down and examine each step 
of it. Firstly in this section it is worth noting the kind of 
knowledge that-a HAZOP team need to have. 
Of course, the team need to be aware of the actual study 
procedure. For example, the order of examination, the meaning 
and use of guidewords and results presentation. Knowledge then 
required is in the form of specific facts, including the 
process under consideration the process equipment and mate- 
rials, the hazards, costs and probabilities. This kind of 
knowledge is 'experience expertise', which is knowledge built 
up through design, implementation and operation of plant. 
136 
Perhaps the most expert knowledge involved is that of pruning 
or filtering. Consider the three cases we mentioned above - 
there is no point in listing all the actions for all the 
possible causes and consequences that are thought up. This is 
impractical and a waste of time. The team must be satisfied 
that they are justified in disregarding some of the causes and 
consequences. Inevitably this pruning will result in the use 
of heuristics. 
Now let us go back and look at the HAZOP procedure. Roach 
and Lees (1981) have formulated a HAZOP algorithm as a result 
of recording an actual study in progress. This is interesting 
and shows that{the HAZOP procedure taken as a whole is an 
algorithmic one and thus involves algorithmic expertise. 
Let us now look at the HAZOP activities. Again, Roach and 
Lees were able to list a formal set of activities which shed 
some light onto the nature and expertise of the process. The 
activities are :- 
Selection 
Identification 
Generation 
Explanation 
Estimation 
Checks 
Specification-, 
The interesting activity in'this'list is the generation of 
causes and consequences. Roach and-Lees report that the team 
work backwards to a cause and forwards to a consequence. This 
implies that hazards are noted and the possible causes gene- 
rated and the consequences are generated'and the actions 
noted. The authors also report that in fault diagnosis 
generally, the high probability paths are followed first and 
other paths only, when the former are exhasute d. -This is op- 
posed to following all-paths in a fixed order regardless of 
probability. This is directly analogous to a best-first-search 
described in Chapter 4, section 4.3.4. In best first search, 
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the solutions found by a breadth first search are evaluated 
and the more highly probable... ones are considered first, and 
least likely paths are explored later or discarded if an 
exhaustive search is not needed. 
The other aspects of the HAZOP procedure are discussed in 
detail by Roach and Lees. In this section we have highlighted 
aspects that are relevant to expertise and problem solving. 
A HAZOP then, involves much expert knowledge and 
commonsense. An expert system for the procedure has obvious 
advantages, and we shall examine later a computer aid which 
has expert system potential for hazard identification. 
8.3 Fault Propagation 
We will examine fault propagation by first looking at 
fault trees, followed by fault propagation applied to hazard 
identification. 
8.3.1 Fault Trees 
Fussel (1976) gives an early account of fault tree 
concepts and techniques. A fault tree starts with a top event 
which is usually a hazard. This top event must be chosen with 
care, since the probability of the hazard occurring must be 
appreciated. A fault tree is used to identify possible causes 
of the hazard, some of which may not have been envisaged. 
Fault tree analysis takes the form of system definition and 
construction, together with quantitative and qualitative eva- 
luation. 
Constructing fault trees can be a time consuming task, 
and therefore there is a need for a computer method for fault 
tree synthesis. The work by Kelly and Lees (1986) is along 
these lines, in which a computer method based on the flow of 
information in the plant has been developed. The basic metho- 
dology is to use the line diagram, convert that by decomposi- 
tion into a block diagram of the plant and then derive a model 
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for each block, models being held in a model library. The 
models show how the output variables are affected by the input 
variables. The models are configured using rules, and rules 
are also used to synthesise the tree. The relationship between 
the inputs and outputs is given in the form of mini-fault 
trees. The main application of the computer processing is in 
the generation of the models in the form of mini-fault trees 
and the generation of the fault tree itself. 
8.3.2 Fault Propagation 
A fault propagation model for a process unit as described 
by Kelly and Lees (1986) is a representation of input process 
variable deviations into output variable deviations and also 
of the initiation and termination of these deviations. The 
behaviour of a unit is modelled in three forms :- 
1. Propagation equations 
2. Event statements 
3. Decision tables 
Fault propagation modelling involves the representation of the 
initiation of a fault at one point, its propagation through 
the plant and its termination at another. Fault initiation 
involves the relation 
Initial fault : Process variable deviation 
fault propagation the relation 
Process variable deviation : Process variable deviation 
and fault termination the relation 
Process variable deviation : Terminal fault 
Functional equations are used to model the propagation of a 
fault through a unit. These are equations which describe the 
relation between an output variable of a unit and the input 
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and other output variables of the unit. e. g. if z is an output 
variable and if x and y are the two input variables, which 
affect y such that an increase in z is caused by an increase 
in x or a decrease in y the functional equation is :- 
z= f(x, -y) 
Figure 8.1 shows a mini-fault tree for this equation. Further 
branches can be derived from the event statements. 
FIGURE 8.1 Mini-Fault Tree 
Fault propagation has therefore played an important part 
in computer aided hazard identification, and some of the 
applications are discussed below. 
8.3.3 Alarm Analysis 
Many processes have a large number of alarms, and it is 
desirable to analyse them using a computer based method. The 
problem is particularly acute in the nuclear industry, and 
alarm anaysis has been pioneered by this industry. Two objec- 
tives exist in alarm analysis, that of interpreting fresh 
alarms as they appear in real time and the other is to identi- 
fy the original cause. - Lees (1980) discusses various methods 
of alarm analysis. Most involve the flow of information 
through the plant, i. e. fault propagation. On the nuclear 
reactor at Oldbury, the propagation of a fault is followed up 
through successively higher levels of the tree. All the impor- 
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tant alarms are displayed together with the cause alarm at the 
head of the group and the effect alarms below it. The manual 
creation of alarm trees is time-consuming and attempts have 
been made to make it more systematic. In one approach (Andow 
and Lees, 1975), a network of process variables on which there 
are alarms is produced. The method is based on a list proces- 
sing technique which produces the alarms automatically from 
the unit models. The diagrams produced indicate the search 
paths for prime cause alarms. In another approach, more 
highly structured alarm information has been produced in the 
form of fault trees by Martin-Sollas, Andow and Lees (1978) 
using an early form of the fault propagation technology as 
described above. 
At this point it is worth quoting a point from Lees 
(1980) :- 
"... the techniques of list processing are widely used 
in the implementation on computers of the methods of 
artificial intelligence, such as computer chess playing 
and are likely to find increasing applications in 
process control. " 
8.4 Computer Aided Hazard Identification 
In the preceding sections to this chapter we have discu- 
ssed general aspects of hazard identification. Here we des- 
cribe one particular method developed for automatic hazard 
identification. 
A manual HAZOP was described in section 8.2.4, and it was 
noted that the process is a very time consuming and costly 
one. The work by - Parmar and Lees (1987) is described here 
showing its similarities to HAZOP and its expert system 
qualities. The deficiences of the program are outlined which 
give some indication as to the nature of a full expert system 
for hazard identification. 
141 
8.4.1 Computer Aided Fine Scale Hazard Identification 
The work of Parmar and Lees is a method of modelling 
fault propagation for hazard identification implemented on a 
computer based interactive facility. The information produced 
is similar to that of a HAZOP study, though less complete. The 
work is directly analogous to that of Kelly and Lees discussed 
earlier. The plant line diagram is decomposed into blocks. A 
model is written for each block, the set of models being held 
in a model library. In this case the models consist of a set 
of rules (as opposed to mini-fault trees in the Kelly and Lees 
method). Again, the model is generated automatically from 
functional equations and event statements. A cause and conse- 
quence search is then carried out. 
Model Rules 
Propagation equations were discussed in section 8.3.2. 
The equations, in terms of the initial and event statements 
may be expressed as rules. These are expressed in production 
system form :- 
If A occurs, then B may/will occur 
The propagation equation 
q2 = f(ql) 
is equivalent to the rule 
If ql is hi (lo), then q2 may/will be'hi (lo) 
Another example is :- 
The initial event statement 
maldistribution > x2'hi, x4 lo 
Is equivalent to the rule 
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If maldistribution occurs, then x2 hi and x4 lo may/will 
occur 
The propagation equations and event statements make up 
the basic information for a unit model. They can be entered 
directly using the formats given above. The corresponding 
rules can then be generated automatically. 
Material Models 
The modelling of the process is handled in terms of 
materials used, both process materials and materials of con- 
struction. The model defines the characteristics of the mate- 
rial in terms of its properties which are characteristics 
which could lead to a consequence without being activated by a 
process variable deviation, and susceptibility which could 
lead to a consequence only if activated by a process variable 
deviation. 
Searches are made for specific realizations of fault 
credibility and also in each line and vessel with respect to 
process material. The first search is for any material proper- 
ty resulting unconditionally in a specific realization, and 
the second is for any combination of susceptibility and 
process variable deviation which results in a specific reali- 
zation. Realizations found are entered into the consequence 
list. Process materials also have two other types of property, 
one being leak realization in combination with materials of 
construction, and the other is a noxious property, relevant to 
escapes. 
Materials of Construction Models 
The materials of construction model describes the mate- 
rials of construction. Characteristics are defined by its 
susceptibilities, as above, an example being if a material is 
susceptible to a leak by brittle fracture if the temperature 
is low. 
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Again, two searches are made of each line and vessel. 
They are for process material properties which activate a 
suscepibility and result in a specific realization, and for 
any variable deviations which activate a susceptibility which 
results in a specific realization. As before, these are then 
entered into a consequence list. Again, material of construc- 
tion knowledge is entered as part of the configuration data. 
Other Models 
Other models that go to make up the configuration data 
are listed below. 
Source model 
Process variable deviations at the inlet of any line 
crossing the plant boundary are generated by the source model. 
It consists of a set of event statements and is also used to 
account for impurities entering the process stream. 
Pipe model 
This is a special model used to consolidate the many 
faults that can occur in pipes. In the cause list for every 
unit are the common faults leak and blockage, and application 
of the generation rules will lead to many such faults being 
shown up. 
Escape model 
A common fault on chemical plants is a leak from a 
process unit. These come in two forms - that of a major leak 
which affects flow and pressure variables and a minor leak, 
affecting only the environment. The minor leak aspect is 
treated using a separate model for the event escape. A sepa- 
rate escape heading is created at the end of each line search 
and all the leaks for the units in the line are summarized in 
the cause list. Using the process material model a search is 
made of each leak and any noxious materials are identified. 
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These properties are listed in the consequence list. 
Other faults that are treated by the method are leak 
fault, blockage fault and impurities. 
Cause and Consequence Generation 
We stated above that in a manual HAZOP the process is 
started with a variable deviation in a line. Causes and conse- 
quences are subsequently generated backwards and forwards 
respectively for each unit. This is analogous to the computer 
method in that causes are generated by searching each line and 
unit for critical events which are causes of a deviation. The 
consequences are then generated by searching for terminal 
events which are consequences of the deviation. 
A given cause normally results in most of the consequen- 
ces, but not necessarily all. Similarly, a given consequence 
results from most of the causes, but not necessarily all. The 
link between causes and consequences is the variable deviation 
itself. 
The hazard identification table generated lists all the 
causes and consequences of a variable deviation. 
The Program 
The main input for the program is the plant configuration 
and the models from the model library. Other data includes the 
material model, materials of construction model, sourceýmo- 
dels, pipe model and escape model together with fault data 
such as leaks, blockage and impurities. 
The program is actually a number of programs, in which 
the plant configuration data, as explained above, is'input 
interactively by the user. The routine functions are carried 
out by the program MASTER, which contains CONFIGURATOR and 
CONSOLIDATOR. The former receives the data, unit models and 
materials models, and creates a file for the hazard identifi- 
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cation program. The latter receives from CONSOLIDATOR the 
hazard identification data and creates the hazard identifica- 
tion table. 
The model generation program MODGEN receives unit model 
data from the user and automatically generates a set of rules. 
The unit models are saved in a library file MODLIB. Together 
with this there are the process material program PROCMAT and 
the materials of construction program MATCON. These programs 
are written in Fortran 77. 
The main hazard identification program is called IDENTI- 
FIER, and is written in Prolog. This receives the plant confi- 
guration data and generates as output the list of variable 
deviations associated with causes and consequences. The goals 
satisfied by IDENTIFIER are the individual causes and 
consequences of each deviation. 
8.4.2 Deficiencies of the Computer Aid 
We have shown that hazard identification involves many types 
of'expertise and it is not supposed that fault propagation 
fully encompasses this. 
Specific deficiencies of the program developed by Parmar 
and Lees compared to that of a manual HAZOP are outlined here. 
The largest and most difficult area to enhance is that of 
filtering/pruning the causes and consequences generated. This 
is probably the part of the HAZOP procedure that requires most 
expertise and by nature involves the use of hidden rules and 
heuristics. The team will think of causes and consequences and 
probably dismiss some of them without giving a verbal or 
written explanation. These cases will be 'cut and try' cases, 
but the ones that need most expertise are the cases that fall 
into the grey area between accepting a fault and dismissing a 
fault. 
The key to the filtering process would appear to be the 
use of the heuristic that a fault is not persued unless it has 
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a credible realization This means that a specific realization 
of a fault must be identified. For example, a blockage in a 
pipe may be ignored unless there is a specific realization of 
it, a pipe freezing in winter say. Realizability is the key 
filter. Any program to fully simulate a HAZOP must contain in 
its knowledge base the heuristics used by the experts for such 
cases. 
Other aspects not covered by the program are operability 
and maintenance considerations. The program is only suitable 
for continuous operations. 
The above aspects are significantly the most expert parts 
of a HAZOP, and they are not easily represented using fault 
propagation equations. 
It should be noted at this stage that this work is not 
intended as an automatic HAZOP. What it does demonstrate are 
the difficulties inherent in producing such a system together 
with the fact that expert systems are one way forward. It also 
demonstrates automatic fault propagation well, 'and with impro- 
vements could prove a valuable design tool. 
8.4.3 Expert System Features 
The work described on computer aided hazard identifica- 
tion has certain features of an expert system, although the 
method was not developed with this specifically in mind. 
Firstly, the method has a knowledge base in the form of 
information in the plant configuration and in the unit and 
material model rules. Also, i't has a control strategy in that 
there is a procedure for using the rules to obtain a hazard 
identification table. On the face of it there is no 
explanation facility. However, if we examine the results of a 
manual HAZOP it is evident that this is in fact an explanation 
of causes and consequences together with actions required. 
This is also the case with the program output, so no overt 
explanation facility is needed. There is no knowledge acquisi- 
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tion facility, but there is potential to write it into the 
system since the unit and material models provide a strong 
framework for improvements. Parmar and Lees state that the 
method has the potential to become the kernel of an expert 
system for hazard identification. 
8.5 Expert Systems and Hazard Identification 
As a result of this work, we have been able to establish 
the expertise of coarse and fine scale hazard identification, 
together with some problem solving strategies used by the 
experts. In this section we discuss the feasibility of expert 
systems for hazard identification, taking each in turn. 
8.5.1 Expert Systems and Coarse Scale Study 
It is difficult to foresee an expert system for coarse 
scale hazard identification. The subject area is vast, invol- 
ving many aspects and any system developed would, to be cost' 
effective have to be'a general one covering all plants, both 
new and those being modified. It would be a difficult task 
to create a knowledge base to cover all eventualities. What is 
more practical and forseeable is a number of mini-systems 
aimed at helping the design team in a few problem areas. Such 
systems would probably be forward chaining and would capture 
design expertise including awareness of hazards, their conse- 
quences, costs and probability. Possible application areas 
include a-knowledge based safety check list which would ensure 
that all aspects of the plant have been covered, or systems 
for dealing with particular chemicals such as asphyxiants, or 
radiation hazards. At the present time however, a full expert 
system to encompass coarse scale hazard identification does 
not seem to be a feasible proposition, since the area is not 
restricted to one domain, it is very ill-defined and no forma- 
lised methods exist. 
8.5.2 Expert Systems and Fine Scale 
Problem aids to HAZOP have been discussed by Ferguson and 
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Andow (1986). This area holds more promise, but it still has 
limitations, as we shall outline below. Work already reported 
has shown this to be the case. We have discussed the specific 
area of computer aids for hazard identification, which pro- 
duced a cause and consequence list using fault propagation 
equations. This, as we have pointed out, contains various 
expert system qualities. 
If this work is to become a full blown expert system, 
development would have to take place in two directions. The 
first is to improve existing methodology in the performance of 
the tasks it is designed to do. The other is to add to it, or 
wrap around it, an expert aid to undertake the tasks such as 
filtering of the cause and consequence information and han- 
dling of aspects such as operability and maintenance. To 
create a complete knowledge based system for HAZOP presents a 
number of difficulties. The study by Ferguson and Andow (1986) 
has shed some light onto this concerning the knowledge itself. 
In our opening chapters to this work, it was pointed out that 
one of the main difficulties in building expert systems is the 
acquisition of expert knowledge. This seems to be a case in 
point. 
One major difficulty in producing an expert system for 
HAZOP is that of the guideword 'other'. This guideword is 
intended as a 'clear-up' type of activity, i. e., any hazards 
that do not fit any where else in the table are put here. This 
could lead to a multitude of unforseeable causes and actions. 
Another difficulty is that a HAZOP is a very 'open-ended' 
study. By nature, a computer program is restricted by boundary 
limits, and often a HAZOP would need to go beyond these 
limits. 
8.6 Summary 
This study has investigated the problem of hazard identi- 
fication, the expertise involved and the problem solving tools 
used. It is difficult at this time to envisage a complete 
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system for coarse scale hazard identification, but fine scale 
seems to show more promise, particularly after the work by 
Parmar and Lees. 
The subject is one of great expertise including some 
classification and algorithmic expertise. For a HAZOP the 
expertise is in the form of knowledge of faults occurring, 
knowledge of fault propagation and knowledge of fault termina- 
tion. This generates the deviations and there is then the 
expertise of assessing the hazards for realizability. One of 
the problems in identifying expertise is that a HAZOP is 
carried out by a multi-disciplinary team each with a responsi- 
bility for a different area. 
Coarse scale hazard identification is concerned with the 
expertise of awareness of the hazards which may occur. The 
design team must be aware of all conceivable hazards, and-one 
way of envisaging a system for this is in the form of a 
semantic net. 
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9 Fire Protection of Storage Tanks 
This topic was the first to be studied in this work, and 
was used as a learning process for a relatively simple 
problem. However, work was carried out, and this is what is 
reported here. The following sections describe various aspects 
of storage tanks and fire protection measures available. The 
final section in the chapter describes a knowledge based 
Prolog program. 
9.1 Overview 
The largest amount of chemicals associated with a proces- 
sing plant will be found at the storage facility. These may be 
at the plant site or in another remote area. Loss in storage 
through fires constitute a major loss sustained by the whole 
of the chemical industry, so loss containment is therefore 
very important. Much legislation exists for storage installa- 
tions, together with many codes of practice and industry 
standards. 
Siting and layout of storage is also an important fea- 
ture. The fire at the Pemex installation, Mexico City in 1964 
is a good case in point. Here, the storage facility was lo- 
cated in a highly populated area and over 350 people were 
reported to have died from the fire and the resulting BLEVES. 
The location of storage with respect to the process is also of 
concern since storage is more likely to be put at risk by a 
process. The two therefore are usually separated. The purpose 
of a storage facility is to smooth out fluctuations in the 
flows into and out of the process, and it is often held as an 
insurance. Storage is used to store reactants, intermediates - 
and final products. 
Flammable materials are stored as liquids or as liquefied 
gases. One objective of the design-of a. storage installation 
for such liquids is to minimize the risk of fire. This has 
several aspects which are to minimize the risk to personnel, 
to minimize loss due to the initial fire and to prevent the 
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spread of the fire to other vessels and equipment. The imple- 
mentation of these measures involves protecting the vessel and 
fire fighting 
In this work we are mainly conerned with the fire protec- 
tion of flammable materials storage. The ICI/RoSPA LFG Code 
(1970) gives an account of fire protection of liquefied flam- 
mable gas (LFG) storage, and this code has been used extensi- 
vely for the work developed here. Along with fire protection 
recommendations, the code goes into great detail and includes 
measures to minimize spillages, sizing and number of 
connections, and siting of the installation with respect to 
ground contours and prevailing winds. 
Before going into detail on the aspects of storage co- 
vered here, it is worth describing some other aspects of 
storage tank fire protection. 
9.2 Aspects of Storage 
There are many different aspects to storage tanks, inclu- 
ding design and construction, siting, safety protection mea- 
sures, segregation and bunding. This section is an introduc- 
tion to some of these aspects. 
9.2.1 Segregation 
The IP Refining Code (1974) gives a comprehensive account 
of the recommended distances for various types of storage. 
Factors accounted for include the type of tank and the mate- 
rial being stored. The main classification on which segrega- 
tion of storage is made is on the flash point of the material. 
These are :- 
Class A liquid with flashpoint below 22.8°C. 
Class B liquid with flashpoint between 22.8, °C and 66°C. 
Class C liquid with flashpoint above 66°C. 
The main distinction is between Class A/B and C liquids, 
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although some relaxation of fire protection measures is al- 
lowed to Class B liquids. Details of the recommendations of 
the code are considered later. 
Also used for classification of storage areas, although 
not in this work, are electrical area classification zones. 
These are to be found in the ICI Electrical Installation Code 
(1972). 
9.2.2 Bunds 
Some storage tanks are surronded by a bund wall or a pit. 
Bunds are recommended for most kinds of flammable storage, and 
they are generally made of concrete or earth. They are usually 
provided for atmospheric storage tanks and for refrigerated 
storage of liquefied gases, but not for pressure or semi- 
refrigerated storage. 
They are used to contain liquid if the tank fails in any 
way so that the leak can be dealt with relatively easily. 
Thus, they are provided for relatively weak atmospheric sto- 
rage tanks, but not for stronger pressure vessels. Often, low 
walls are used where full bunds are not necessary and this 
also provides protection against flammables reaching the tank 
from an external source, or the tank being damaged by site 
vehicles. 
Class A/B liquids in atmospheric storage should have a 
full bund surronding them and where there is a group of tanks 
in one bund, the capacity should be-that of the largest tank, 
allowing for displacement. 
9.2.3 Separation Distances 
Minimum recommended separation distances have come from 
the ICI LFG code'and the IP-Refining Safety Code for this 
work. An alternative which may be allowed is the use of engi- 
neering estimates to set separation distances. These estimates 
may be based on the heat from burning liquid or the ignition 
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of a vapour leak. 
9.2.4 Types of Storage 
Hughes (1970) describes the various types of storage that 
are in common usage. Figure 9.1 shows some typical storage 
tanks and vessels. These are :- 
1. Atmospheric storage, which contains liquid at atmospheric 
pressure and temperature. They can be either fixed or floating 
roof type, and they are designed to withstand an internal 
pressure or a vacuum of lpsig or below. Floating roof tanks 
can have various types of roof. In, all cases the roof floats 
on the surface of the liquid and the roof can be a pan, an 
annular pontoon or a double deck type. A floating deck may 
also be used inside a fixed roof tank for keeping vapour loss 
down. This type of tank is shown in Figure 9.2. 
The mechanical design-of such tanks is well governed by 
standards, notably BS 2594: 1955 for horizontal tanks and 
BS2654: 1973 for vertical tanks. 
2. Pressure storage, which contains liquefied gas under pres- 
sure at atmospheric temperature. Typical shapes for this kind 
of storage are horizontal cylindrical vessels and spherical 
vessels. They are more suitable for volatile materials such as 
gasoline. 
3. Refrigerated pressure storage or semi-refrigerated storage, 
which contain liquefied gas under pressure at low temperature. 
Typical shapes for this kind of vessel include horizontal 
cylindrical pressure vessels and spherical pressure vessels. 
The later has certain advantages in that the surface to volume 
ratio is very low and about 88% of that of the former. This 
reduces heat leak. Also, the foundation structure is less 
complicated and the low temperature stresses are easily deter- 
mined. 
Such vessels are usually standard pressure vessels desig- 
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ned to withstand a higher pressure and their mechanical design 
is governed by BS5500: 1976 and the API Std 620. 
4. Fully refrigerated storage which contain liquefied gas at 
atmospheric pressure and low temperature. Typically they are 
doomed roof flat bottom tanks and are essentially atmospheric 
vessels designed to a pressure below 1 psig. 
5. Gas under pressure. These are again designed to the pres- 
sure vessel standard BS5500. 
The hazards associated with these different kinds of 
storage are different. If a volatile material under atmosphe- 
ric storage leaks, a slow evaporation will result. If a gas 
under fully refrigerated storage escapes, an initial flash off 
will occur followed by a slightly higher evaporation rate. 
Escape of a liquefied gas under pressure results in immediate 
flashing off of a large proportion of the gas followed by a 
slower rate of evaporation. This is ususally the most serious 
case. It is therefore evident that the hazards involved vary 
widely, and so different fire protection measures are needed 
in each case. 
9.3 Fires in Storage Tanks 
Fire in storage facilities can be particularly hazardous 
because of the large quantities of material involved. There is 
therefore a need to design an adequate protection system, and 
there are various ways of achieving this goal. The subject as 
a whole is dealt with in detail by Vervalin (1985). 
Fires in such installations can start in different ways, 
and examples includes a fire or explosion in the flammable 
atmosphere above the liquid in the tank, ignition of vapour 
clouds outside the tank, ignition of liquid overfill or spil- 
lage, lightning strikes or ancillary equipment failure. It is 
accepted that the most common cause is that of tank overfill, 
which can be due either to human error or instrument error. In 
such cases, flash back may occur thus spreading the fire. 
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Fires starting in tanks, which results in an explosion, may 
blow off the roof, but can usually be contained. Where a fire 
starts outside the tank the consequences can be very serious, 
since subsequent equipment failure may feed the fire. For 
example, a fire in a bund may cause a pump or pipework to fail 
resulting in the spillage of the tank contents. Lees (1980) 
quotes pipework as failing typically in just 10 to 15 minutes 
when exposed to a strong heat source. Heat radiation then 
becomes a problem causing neighbouring tanks to buckle. 
There are many precautions that can be taken to prevent 
or contain potential fires. Specific measures include water 
sprays and foam, adequate pressure relief and to have mobile 
units avaliable, but these measures will differ depending on 
the type of tank in use. Measures which are more passive, but 
equally important include good layout, separate bunds, and a 
minimum of pipework, flanges and valves in bunds. Burying 
pipes and putting pipes outside bunds also helps. Overfilling 
can be prevented by high level alarms, trips and good manage- 
ment generally. If a fire does occur in one tank, sprays 
should be activated to keep other tanks cool, and pumpdown of 
these tanks to a receiver is also recommended. The water and 
foam supplies and the pumps providing the fire fighting 
material should also be adequate with an active maintenance 
programme. Water is used for cooling and for fighting fires. 
Water sprays and foam are often installed for fire prote- 
ction and this is sometimes supplemented by fireproof thermal 
insulation and mobile water and foam units. Water is used to 
fight fire and to cool exposed surfaces, and foam is used to 
extinguish fires. 
The next few sections deal with specific types of storage 
and the specific measures needed in each case. Figures 9.3 to 
9.5 are some typical protection measures, showing a perimeter 
sprinkler, a deluge system and a sprinkler system for a sto- 
rage sphere. 
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9.3.1 Atmospheric Storage 
The effects of a fire on an atmospheric storage tank are 
that those parts of the tank not cooled by the liquid contents 
get hot and weaken, and the liquid in the tank is heated and 
and its vaporization is increased. An atmospheric vent is used 
in the case of fixed roof storage. 
9.3.2 Pressure Storage 
Fire effects on pressure storage are similar to that of 
atmospheric storage. Unwetted parts of the vessel weaken due 
to heat rise. The vessel may burst even if it is below its 
design pressure. As the heat rises in the liquid the relief 
valve will lift. Further temperature rise will cause the 
liquid to vaporise without further rise in pressure so long as 
the valve has enough capacity. If not, or if the valve fails 
the vessel may burst. Kletz (1974) describes this in detail. 
Fixed water sprays are again effective in cooling sur- 
faces. For cylinders and spheres water comes off the vessel at 
the centre so sprays are provided above and below. The water 
spray systems are usually activated by an automatic deluge 
valve triggered by fire sensors. Fireproof thermal insulation 
is sometimes provided. This reduces the rate of heat uptake 
from the fire, which gives more time for mobile fire fighting 
units to be brought in. It is usual for insulation to provide 
2 hours protection before the vessel becomes seriously over- 
heated. Depressurization is also used, in which the tank 
contents are dumped on the start of a fire to a sink 
elsewhere. 
9.3.3 Refrigerated Storage 
Again, the effects of -fire in this case are similar to 
that of atmospheric storage, but here vaporization of the tank 
contents will occur much more rapidly. Protection is by firep- 
roof thermal insulation and fixed and mobile water sprays. The 
insulation is usually cork with vapour sealant which burns 
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slowly. An alternative is steel-jacketed polyurethane or 
perlite. 
It should be noted that although we are concerned mainly 
with flammable storage facilities, adequate protection for 
materials such as hydrogen, chlorine and ammonia should also 
be considered, particularly if they are stored in the vicinity 
of a flammable storage compound. 
9.4 Flammable Storage - Codes of Practice 
The work on fire protection of storage tanks has largely 
been based around the codes previously mentioned, that is 
ICI/RoSPA (1970) and the IP Refining Safety Code (1965). This 
section describes their recommendations in addition to the 
protection measures discussed above. 
9.4.1 ICI/RoSPA 1970 
The ICI/RoSPA code gives recommendations for the safe 
storage of LFG. Topics covered in the code include area clas- 
sification, pressure relief design, piping, instrumentation, 
transportation and operations and training. Here we are mainly 
concerned with the section on fire protection, and this infor- 
mation, together with that given above will be used for deri- 
ving rules for fire safety in storage installations. 
ICI/RoSPA give the' following three goals of fire 
protection equipment :- 
1. To prevent explosion or sudden spread of fire that would 
cause a hazard to personnel 
2. To minimize the loss of equipment and process materials 
involved in the initial fire 
3. To prevent the fire spreading to adjacent storage vessels 
or process equipment 
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The section on fire protection in the code deals with all 
aspects of protection of LFG installations. 
Vessel Supports 
Vessels should be supported on concrete plinths or steel 
supports with fireproof thermal insulation. The supports them- 
selves should be capable of withstanding at least four hours 
of exposure to an external heat source. 
Pipework 
The code suggests that discharge and drain lines should 
pass from the storage vessel through a remotely operated 
isolation valve. It is also suggested that fireproof insula- 
tion be applied to pipework which is in close contact with the 
vessel. Another problem is that liquefied gas can become 
trapped between two closed valves which may subsequently rup- 
ture the pipe. To alleviate this a pressure relief device 
should be fitted to all lines which can be isolated between 
closed valves. 
Hydrants 
Two fire hydrants are recommended at close proximity to 
the storage facility. They should be about 15 m from the 
vessels and close to roads. The goal in hydrant design is to 
be able to provide cooling to tank surfaces which could become 
engulfed in fire. 
Access 
Access to roads should, be such that it is possible to 
reach two sides of the facility and for 50 m3 or more of 
storage, roads should have'passing places available. 
The final sections on fire protection in the code deal 
with tank off-loading facilities, bund drainage, fire control, 
water supply, electric cable protection, LFG transfer and 
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water spray and foams. 
9.4.2 IP Refining Safety Code, Part 3 1965 
This code deals with aspects of petroleum plant. Relevant 
to this work is the section concerned with bulk petroleum 
storage. Topics covered include tank spacing and bund walls, 
gas-freeing and cleaning, construction of tanks and ladders 
and hand rails. 
As stated earlier, classification is done on the basis of 
material flashpoint. The code provides a comprehensive table of 
distances for bunds and tonnage per bund. This has been used to 
formulate rules in this work. 
9.5 Problem Solutions 
The solution to the fire protection of storage facilities 
problem has been tackled by writing a Prolog program. A clas- 
sification is used where the type of tank and material being 
stored are considered first. 
This type of problem is different from the other problems 
studied in that it is a kind of classification problem, but 
not the -kind where we ask an expert to generate examples. It 
has been heavily worked on by various codes etc., and is a 
fairly cut and dried algorithmic problem. 
The first part of this chapter was concerned with the 
literature available on storage tank fire protection. This has 
provided a basis of the type of knowledge needed in order to 
design a safe facility. The information is taken from expert 
accounts including literature and codes of practice. The next 
step in building an automated design program is to organise 
the knowledge into a form suitable for rule type representa- 
tion. The exercise has also proved useful for the process of 
knowledge acquisition. In the section below the suggestions 
made by an expert-are outlined. The next section discusses the 
formation of the knowledge for a Prolog program. 
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9.5.1 Logic Diagram 
By reading the expert accounts on safe storage facilities 
it is evident that the nature of the storage needs to be 
established, including aspects such as the type of tank, the 
material being stored and the proposed layout of the tanks. 
The designer therefore has to be familiar with the the kind of 
storage before proposing the fire protection measures necessa- 
ry. For this, it was decided that an algorithmic diagram would 
be most suitable, in which a series of questions regarding the 
material and type of storage are asked indicating which kind 
of protection was needed. This also has the advantage of 
organising the knowledge from the codes of practice and lite- 
rature into a readable form. The diagram is shown in Figure 
9.6. The diagram was constructed from distinctions that were 
made in the codes and also by discussions with an expert. As 
can be seen from Figure 9.6, the first classification made is 
on material. Initially, non-hydrocarbons are identified, and 
then classifications made on the basis of flashpoint for 
hydrocarbons or tank type. Next to be considered are the 
amount being stored and tank layout. As a result of making 
these distinctions, measures for fire protection are sugges- 
ted. 
The knowledge used can be split up into three areas, that 
of knowledge from codes, engineering knowledge or expert know- 
ledge. For example a 50 feet separation requirement is 
obviously that of a code, whereas 1110% bunds' is knowledge 
that was acquired from an expert. The expert was also able to 
clarify certain points concerning the diagram. These are 
listed below :- 
Clarify use of words such as 'near'. 
Questions such as Is there a another tank in the 
vicinity V would be enhanced by stating 'Is there 
another tank in the vicinity near enough to cause a 
knock-on effect V. 
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It can be taken for granted that an ignition source is 
present. 
Bunds should be able to contain 110% of the largest tank. 
Nitrogen blanketing should be installed for class A 
hydrocarbons stored in quantities of greater than 100 m3 
The algorithmic logic diagram has proved useful in clas- 
sifying the knowledge available and has shown the kinds of 
decisions that an expert and subsequently any knowledge-based 
system needs to make. The diagram has also shown that the 
problem is fairly well defined with clear-cut solutions avai- 
lable and that the basic structure of the problem is 
algorithmic. The decisions and interpretation of the algorithm 
may require the use of heuristics. However, it is thought that 
a knowledge-based system is appropriate because of the exten- 
sive amount of literature and expert accounts together with a 
wide variety of protection measures for different storage 
installations. 
9.5.2 Rules and Heuristics 
The rules used for the Prolog knowledge based program 
will be discussed later. Here, we detail the rules and heuris- 
tics that were acquired from an expert and from reading expert 
accounts. These rules, as opposed to the knowledge used in the 
program can be termed 'refining rules' and would be used to 
adjust the detail of any fire protection measures established. 
The knowledge was not used in the program, but it is forseen 
that any improvements to the program would probably incorpo- 
rate the rules. They were acquired through discussions with an 
expert, and from an expert account by Kletz (1985). The rules 
are listed below and have been stated in production system 
format :- 
Storage 
If the rate of filling is high and batch sizes are large, 
then fit a high level alarm. 
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If bunds are to be installed, then fit drain valves or 
bunds and inspect weekly. 
If a spillage occurs once in 5 years, then two protective 
devices must be installed. 
If the level indicator measures weight, then fit a high 
level alarm that measures volume. 
Liquid Overpressure 
If the tank vent is to pass liquid, then fit the vent near 
to the edge of the roof and its top not more than 8" 
above the top of the walls. 
If the vent is not large enough to pass the liquid inlet 
rate, then fit the tank with a hinged manhole cover and 
fit it to the roof near the tank wall. 
Maintenance 
If the tank is to be steamed out, then leave several 
hours to cool, with the manhole open. 
If a floating'roof tank has a rim fire, then personnel 
should not enter the tank to fight it. 
If welding on a floating roof tank then, the legs should 
be flushed with water from the top. 
Static Electricity 
If the tank is floating roof, then it should be grounded 
using shunts every few metres around the rim. 
If static electricity proves to be a problem then one or 
more of the following precautions can be taken :- 
Nitrogen blanketing 
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Antistatic additives 
Minimize pumping rates 
Filters and other restrictions should be followed 
by a long length of straight pipe 
In this case, expertise is needed in the selection of the 
appropriate method. 
The problem is-therefore capable of being represented in 
one decision tree, even if it is somewhat large. Therefore, a 
simple expert system type of program is valid. This is des- 
cribed below. 
9.5.3 Prolog Rules 
The rules listed below have been derived from two codes, 
that of the IP Refining Safety Code and the ICI/RoSPA Code. 
The rules have followed on from the algorithmic logic diagram, 
but with a greater level of detail. The rules listed are only 
a sample of the rules in the program. The remainder are given 
with the program listing in Appendix- C. The first category is 
atmospheric storage with either fixed or floating roof tanks. 
Common conditions for this set of rules are 110% bunds, 60,000 
m3 per bund (fixed roof) and 120,000 m3 per bund (floating 
roof) and water/foam sprays and mobile units. 
If atm storage, fixed roof, tanks in a group 
Then >15-m from inside top of bund of any adjacent group 
If atm storage, fixed roof, dia <9 m 
Then grouped up to 8,000ton water 
15m minimum separation 
If atm storage, fixed roof, dia >9 m 
Then separation 1/2 dia largest tank/15 m whichever is smaller 
If atm storage, floating roof, dia >9 m 
Then >15 m from inside top of bund to any adjacent group 
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If atm storage, floating roof, dia >9 m 
Then separation 1/2 dia largest tank/15 m whichever is smaller. 
The next category is pressure storage. Common conditions 
here are 15 m to overhead power lines, pipe bridges, low 
pressure refrigerated storage bunds, 7.5 m to above ground 
power cables and pipelines, water spray, fire proof thermal 
insulation. Other details are given in the program listing 
given in Appendix C. 
If pressure storage, ethylene 
Then >60 m from tanks to boundary/ignition sources 
If pressure storage, c_three hydrocarbon 
Then >45 m from tanks to boundary/ignition sources 
If pressure storage, c_four hydrocarbon 
Then >30 m from tanks to boundary/ignition sources 
If pressure storage, other hydrocarbon 
Then >15 m from tanks to boundary/ignition sources 
Other categories covered in the program include refrige- 
rated storage and non-hydrocarbon storage. 
9.5.4 Prolog Program 
As stated earlier, the program is written in Prolog and 
runs on a Honeywell Multics DPS8. It is written in two parts, 
one consisting of the knowledge base and the other the control 
mechanism. On loading the main program, the knowledge base is 
consulted automatically. The system is not supposed to be an 
expert system, but it is a small knowledge based system that 
demonstrates a way forward for future work. Also, the program 
is not designed to encompass the whole area of fire protection 
of storage tanks. Both expert system development and a program 
to cover all aspects of storage would be time-consuming and 
are beyond the scope of the current work. 
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9.5.5 Example Consultations 
Some example consultations are shown below. These illus- 
trate the kind of classifications made by the program. Classi- 
fication is on the basis of the type of tank, including the 
type of roof, the size of the tank and layout of a group of 
tanks together with the material being stored. On the basis of 
this information, the program searches the rule base for rules 
which match the conditions. The system is forward chaining 
data driven and uses Prolog's matching and backtracking to 
satisfy the goals. For example, the first consultation listed 
below concerns that of pressure storage. The user has a pres- 
surized tank containing a C3 hydrocarbon. Prolog thus matches 
pressure and C3 with the following rule that is' contained in 
the rule base :- 
rule( 'pressure ', 'c three', 'at least 45m from tanks to boundary 
and ignition sources'). 
The remainder of the rules are concerned with all aspects of 
pressurized storage, including separation distances and water 
or foam sprays. 
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York Portable Prolog Release 2.1. 
Please pass on any comments on this Prolog 
to RSMKirkwood via Multics Mail. 
9- 
KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION 
OF A STORAGE TANK 
PRE-CONSULTATION OPTIONS 
------------------------ 
start a consultation (s) 
list help (h) 
exit from the program (e) 
Option...? 
S. 
rules consulted. 
Is the material stored a hydrocarbon ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
y" 
What are the conditions of storage ? 
Type atm, pressure, or refrigerated... 
pressure. 
Is the material ethylene, C_3 or C_4 ? 
Answer by typing ethylene, c_three, c_four.... 
c- three. 
If pressurized C_3 storage, then 
---------------------------------- 
at least 45m from tanks to boundary and ignition sources 
Other separation requirements are : - 
------------------------------------ 
15m from tanks to buildings containing flammable materials 
15m from tanks to road/rail tank filling points 
15m to overhead powerlines and pipe bridges 
7.5m to above ground power cables and pipelines 
1/4 sum of diams of adjacent tanks to other pressure storage tanks 
15m from low pressure refrigerated tank bunds and 30m from tank shells 
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The two fire protection options are : - 
------------------------------------- 
evenly applied water spray 
fire proof thermal insulation-insulation to finish 200mm above base 
State which option you prefer... 
Type a for water spray and b for fire-proof 
thermal insulation... 
Option...? 
a. 
Is the ground beneath the vessel sloped away 
to a catchment area ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
n. 
water application rate of 0.2ga1/min/sq ft 
Do you want another consultation 
Answer yes (y), or no (n) 
4_ 
KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION 
OF A STORAGE TANK 
PRE-CONSULTATION OPTIONS 
--------------------- 
start a consultation (s) 
list help (h) 
exit from the program (e) 
Option...? 
S. 
rules consulted. 
Is the material stored a hydrocarbon ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
Y. 
What are the conditions of storage ? 
Type atm. pressure, or refrigerated... 
atm. 
Is the tank diameter gm or less ? 
Answer yes or no 
176 
no. 
Is the tank roof fixed or floating ? 
Type fitted or floating... 
fixed. 
110 per cent bunds 
15m minimum separation for tanks in one group from inside top of bund of any ad 
scent group 
15m minimum separation for tanks to boundary or ignition source 
fit drain va. ves to bunds 
normally closed position 
check weekly 
no more then 60,000 cubic metres per bund 
separation'1/2diam larger tank , 
or diam smaller tank/15m whichever is least 
bunds 
fit drain valves to bunds 
normally closed position 
check weekly 
Do you want another consultation ? 
Answer yes (y), or no (n) 
Y. 
KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION 
OF A STORAGE TANK 
PEE-CONSULTATION OPTIONS 
------------------------ 
start a consultation (s) 
list help (h) 
exit from the program (e) 
Option...? 
S. 
rules consulted. 
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Is the material stored a hydrocarbon ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
n. 
Is the material stored as LFG ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n). 
n. 
Ammonia, chlorine and hydrogen are covered in this program. 
Type in one of the above for information about its storage 
ammonia. 
Is there a tank containing flammable liquid 
near enough to cause a knock-on effect ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
Y. 
For ammonia storage in a hazardous area, then : - 
------------------------------------------------ 
15m minimum separation and cooling water spray 
Do you want another consultation ? 
Answer yes (y), or no (n) 
Y. 
KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION 
OF A STORAGE TANK 
PEE-CONSULTATION OPTIONS 
------------------------ 
start a consultation (s) 
list help (h) 
exit from the program (e) 
Option...? 
S. 
rules consulted. 
Is the material stored a hydrocarbon ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
n. 
Is the material stored as LFG ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n). 
Y. 
Is the nonhydrocarbon soluble in water ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n) 
n. 
Does the substance come under the category of methy: am: nes ? 
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Answer yes(y) or no(n) 
Y" 
For nonhydrocarbons, then : - 
------------------------- 
at least 15m from tanks to boundary and ignition sources 
at least 15m from tanks to buildings containing flammable materials 
at least 15m from tanks to road/rail car filling points 
at least 15m from tanks to overhead power lines and pipe bridges 
at least 7.5m to above ground power cables and important pipelines 
one quarter the sum of the diameters of adjacent tanks between tanks and other 
ressure storage tanks 
at least 15m from tanks to bund will of other low pressure tanks 
The two fire protection options are : - 
--------------------------------------- 
evenly applied water stray 
fire proof thermal insulation-insulation to finish 200mm above base 
State which option you prefer... 
Type a for water spray and b for fire-proof 
thermal insulation... 
Option...? 
a. 
Is the ground beneath the vessel sloped away 
to a catchment area ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
Y. 
Is the pipework carried beyond the vertical projection 
of the vessel. with no pipe fittings beneath the vessel ? 
Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
n. 
water application rate of 0.2gal/min/sq ft 
Do you want another consultation 
Answer yes (y), or no (n) 
n. 
[Execution aborted] 
[Leaving Prolog] 
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We stated earlier that the program was not intended to be 
a full expert system. The study was done to show how an expert 
system might go about tackling such a problem. Included in the 
features of an expert system are an explanation facility and a 
knowledge acquisition mode. Neither of these are present in 
the current system, but it is envisaged that it would be 
posssible to enhance the program by adding these features. 
Also, the knowledge contained in the rule base is from codes 
of practice and takes no account of expert heuristics such as 
those listed above. Again, these could be added without too 
much difficulty. 
9.5.6 Possible Application of ID3 
The theory of ID3 has been discussed in Chapter 6. A 
decision was made to see if this type of problem could be 
handled by a classifier, and also to get an idea of the appli- 
cation areas of a classification system of the rule induction 
type. 
For this, the author has written his own version of ID3 
in FORTRAN77, on a Honeywell 'Multics' DPS8. 
The system relies on a number of attributes being defined 
with suitable values together with a number of examples to 
represent the domain of storage facilities. Attributes chosen 
were conditions of storage, material being stored and the type 
of tank. These three attributes are the main ones considered 
when designing a fire protection facility for storage instal- 
lations. Values for these attributes are listed below :- 
Table 9.1 Attributes and Values for Storage Installations 
Attribute Possible values 
Conditions Pressure 
Refrigerated 
Atmospheric 
Material Class A or B hydrocarbon 
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Attribute Possible values 
Other hydrocarbon 
Tank type Sphere 
Floating roof 
Fixed roof 
At this stage it is necessary to obtain some examples of 
storage tanks so that we can use ID3 to work out which of the 
above attributes contains the most information, and to do a 
tree representation. However, on investigation, it was found 
that storage tanks tend to have unique, individual solutions, 
resulting in no classification of the traditional kind. It was 
therefore decided not to carry the work further. 
9.6 Summary 
We have in this chapter shown a method of solving the 
problem of fire protection of storage tanks. The method invol- 
ved the use of an algorithmic logic diagram to develop a 
forward chaining rule based program in Prolog. The Prolog 
program is not designed to be comprehensive system, but is 
intended to show application areas and improvements that can 
be made to it. 
Also tried as a possible problem-solving approach was a 
FORTRAN77 based ID3 method. 
Such systems could find a use for the process plant 
designer, if the designer has no indication of previous 
storage applications. 
There is a lot of expertise in fire protection of storage 
facilities, but this expertise is well established, and an 
expert is not really needed. It was originally chosen as a 
simple problem for the first topic in the work. We have shown 
however that a rule-based approach is worthwhile, that there 
is some expertise involved and that there is a large amount of 
knowledge, including literature and codes which encompass both 
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rules and heuristics. In this topic the main source of rules 
has been codes of practice. 
0 
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10 Emergency Isolation Valves 
10.1 Introduction 
Emergency isolation valve installation was introduced in 
section 7.2.2 as one of the candidate topics selected for 
further study. Three expert system tools have been used. Two 
of them, Expert-Ease and Ex-Tran7 are both classifiers, while 
Micro-Expert is an advice giving system. The basis for the 
work comes from a paper written by Kletz in 1975. 
The first part of this chapter describes some background 
to emergency isolation valves, including some case histories, 
criteria for installing emergency isolation valves and some 
typical installations. The second part describes the methods 
by which the solution to the problem has been tackled. 
10.2 Case Histories 
There are a number of case histories where the installa- 
tion of an emergency isolation valve would have averted a 
disaster. These are given by Kletz (1975), and a few are 
described below. 
10.2.1 Pump Glands and Seals 
Leaks from pumps in cold duty are not uncommon, and there 
have been many lucky escapes from fires which potentially were 
disastrous. In one such case, the plant above the pump in 
question was protected by a concrete wall. In another, the 
resulting fire could have caused disaster on a road, 35 feet 
away from the leak. Various companies report fires from leaks 
in pump glands and seals. One company reported 3 major leaks 
from cold ethylene pumps in one year. Causes of these leaks 
are typically failure due to stress corrosion of bolts holding 
the seals in position. In one of the cases, 90,000 cubic feet 
of vapour escaped in 20 minutes. In the other two, the leaks 
ignited near the pumps, probably due to static electricity. 
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In another example, the glands of a high pressure injec- 
tor failed due to stud failure. An extensive fire resulted 
causing serious injury to personnel and plant damage. The leak 
was ignited by the plant furnaces 200 feet away. As a result 
of this disaster, the injectors were fitted with remotely 
operated emergency isolation valves, and they were relocated 
inside a steam curtain. 
In 1972 a fire occurred as a result of a leak from a 
large hydrocarbon pump when the bearings gland failed. The 
fire burned for 6 hours, but was successfully contained. In 
this case a remotely operated emergency isolation valve was 
fitted, but for process use. The operating buttons for the 
valve were near to the pump, and therefore could not be 
reached by the operator. 
10.2.2 Fittings and Valves 
A*leak of propylene occurred when the gasket of a level 
indicator failed. Measures to contain the leak, such as blow- 
down and increased cooling, failed and 20 minutes after 
failure the leak ignited causing considerable damage to the 
plant. 
10.2.3 Drain Valves 
Leaks from drain valves occur usually as a result of ice 
or hydrate formation. The most notable incident is that of 
Feyzin, France in 1966 in which 18 people were killed. It 
started with a blockage in the drain line from a propane 
storage sphere. The drain line open end pointed vertically to 
the ground below the sphere, and contained two valves. The 
procedure to isolate the . tank was to open the valve next to 
the tank fully and control the draining operation with the 
second valve. The first valve could then be used to isolate 
the tank if the second valve gave trouble. 
At Feyzin the operator drained on the first valve with 
the second wide open. The first valve blocked, so he opened it 
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wider until the blockage gave way, resulting in a jet of 
propane being released onto the ground, rebounding in the 
operators face and knocking the handle off the valve. Attempts 
to replace the handle and shut the second valve failed and the 
resulting vapour cloud ignited 500 feet away, flashing back to 
the original sphere. 
The disaster was made doubly worse by the inexperience of 
the fire crew, who assumed the relief valves would prevent 
overpressure, so did not provide any water cooling. The tank 
eventually ruptured, spreading the-fire to nearby storage 
tanks. 
10.3 When to Install An Emergency Isolation Valve 
The case histories described above indicate the need for 
emergency isolation valves for isolating leaks before they 
ignite and cause injury and damage. Due to the cost of an 
emergency isolation valve they-cannot be practically installed 
on every item of plant equipment which might leak. Also the 
installation of such a valve may in itself cause increased 
chances of a leak. Far better is to design the plant initially 
for leak protection rather than isolating after a leak has 
occurred. Emergency isolation valves should be installed when 
the chances of a leak are high and/or the consequences are se- 
rious. Kletz describes some situations to be considered, in- 
cluding the size and consequences of a leak :- 
1. The equipment is particularly likely to leak; for example, 
very hot or cold pumps. 
2. The equipment is less likely to leak, but if it does a very 
large quantity of material will run out and there is no way of 
stopping it; for example, the bottom pump on a still contai- 
ning more than, say, 50 tons of flammable liquid. 
3. The equipment is less likely to leak, but if it does so'the 
leak-will be very large; -for example, a very large pump. 
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Apart from using the above rules to decide whether or not 
to fit an emergency isolation valve, the particular conditions 
must be considered in order to decide if a leak will occur. 
These are considered in detail later. The following argument 
can also be used to help the decision. 
If the cost of installing an emergency isolation valve is 
$5000 (1972 prices) and the loss resulting from a 
. 
leak is $5 
million and if the chance of a leak is greater than 1 in 1000 
in the life of the plant, then it is worth installing an 
emergency isolation valve. However, data on the frequency of 
gland failure is not usually accurate or available, and Kletz 
argues that it is easier to estimate a piece of missing data 
then to estimate the answer to a whole problem. In this work, 
we have considered data on the conditions in a large plant 
rather than rely on data on the probability of a leak. 
Figure 10.1 shows some possible approaches to emergency 
isolation valve installation on an existing plant. 
10.3.1 LPG Storage Installation 
On LPG storage vessels there should only be one outlet 
below the liquid level, protected by a remotely operated 
isolation valve. All other connections, such as drain points, 
sample points, instrument connections etc. should come after 
this valve. The figure (Figure 10.2) shows the arrangement 
recommended by ICI/RoSPA (1970). 
10.3.2 Olefin Plant 
Data from an olefin plant was used in this work, and is 
shown later on in the chapter, as given by Kletz (1975). The 
data takes the form of likely sources of leaks, material, its 
temperature and pressure, the inventory which will escape if 
there is a leak. Also considered is if an item is particularly 
likely to leak, based on industry wide experience. Kletz 
(1975) gives similar data for an aromatics plant. 
186 
C 
O 
ci 
a 
.a O 
_. N C 
O 
u > 
a) W 
C3 . a- C 
d 
N 
-4- 
C 
o 01 a 
0) d N 
N . C O w 
0 a) 
-4. - 'J . C O y ci d N o C C 
T- 
w 
l7 
LL 
aj 
187 
C, C 
C- 
C- 
4- 
0 
4 aJ 
C V) 
WN 
E °1 
oj 
c 
d LJ 
dL 
n' 
N 
W cl C 
CIJ 0 
N 
Ö 
e- 
W 
L7 
IL, 
188 
Generally speaking, emergency isolation valves are only 
fitted on the suction lines of pumps and other items. Delivery 
lines are usually protected by non-return valves. 
10.4 Solutions to the problem 
As described above, the data for solving the problem was 
taken from that given by Kletz for an olefin plant. The work 
indicates that it is better to decide on whether to fit an 
emergency isolation valve from examples already exsisting and 
from experience learnt from case histories. The data used is 
shown in Table 10.1. The entry 'A' indicates that the item is 
particularly likely to leak. Entry 'B' indicates that the 
equipment is less likely to leak, but if it does, a very large 
quantity of material will run out, and unless there is an 
emergency isolation valve there will be no way of stopping it. 
Various tools from artificial intelligence were used in sol- 
ving this problem. These are described below. 
10.4.1 Expert-Ease 
The theory and background to Expert-Ease has been des- 
cribed in Chapter 6. It will be recalled that it is an example 
driven system, in which the examples are in the form of attri- 
butes with values and a class value. 
Table 10.1 EIV Data for an Olefin Plant 
Item of Material Temp Press Inventory AorB EIV Notes 
Equipment 'C lb/sq. in. tons fitted? 
Furnaces Naphtha 
Feed pump Naphtha 
(gassy) 
100 120 Small - Yes Control 
valves 
used as 
EIV 
15 140 70 B No No leak 
history 
cold 
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Item of Material Temp Press Inventory AorB EIV Notes 
Equipment °C lb/sq. in. tons fitted? 
Bottoms Fuel oil 210 30 100 A Yes Close 
pump to auto 
ignition 
temp. 
Sidestream Distillate 160 25 
pump fuel oil 
Bottoms Fuel oil 210 30 
pump 
Bottoms Gasoline 85 20 
pump 
Bottoms Fuel oil 220 30 
pump Distillate 180 25 
fuel oil 
Reflux Ethylene -30 270 
Pump 
Sidestream Ethylene -30 270 
PUMP 
Reflux Propylene 40 250 
pump 
Cold Al Methane -100 370 
exchanger 
20 B Yes 
(? ) 
60 A Yes - 
25 - No Invent 
can be 
pumped 
1 A No Invent 
1 small 
feed 
isolable 
30 A Yes Pump 
has 
leaked 
10 A Yes it 
and 
ignited 
50 B Yes - 
30 A Yes Isolate 
with 
hand + 
control 
valves, 
+EIV 
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Item of 
Equipment 
Material Temp 
*C 
Press Inventory 
lb/sq. in. tons 
AorB EIV Notes 
fitted? 
Process Methane, 40 30 50 - No No 
gas Ethylene history 
compresso r Propylene leak 
etc. rate 
low 
Compresso r Ethylene -100 65 40 - Yes- for 
process 
convenience 
Compresso r Propylene -40 40 100 - No as for 
process 
gascomp 
Bottoms Light 90 150 5 A No Manual 
pump gasoline valve 
Reflux Methane - 100 370 5 A Valve fitted 
PUMP remote 
Reflux Ethane/ -14 350 5 -" 
pump ethylene 
Converter Ethane/ 0/15 0 350 - A Yes - 
ethylene 
Reflux Propylene 5 90 1 - No - 
pump 
Reflux Propylene 30 175 5 - No - 
pump 
Reflux Butylene 120 50 15 - No - 
pump 
Reflux Butylene 35 50 5 - No - 
pump 
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Notes 
The entry 'A' indicates that the equipment is 
particularly likely to leak. 
The entry 'B' indicates that the equipment is less 
likely to leak, but if it does a very large 
quantity will escape. 
It is im mediatley apparent from Table 10.1, reproduced 
from Kletz (1975), that the data for the olefin plant is very 
similar to that required by Expert-Ease. The attributes are 
equipment item, material, temperature, pressure, inventory, 
'A' or 'B' and the classes are emergency isolation valve 
fitted and emergency isolation valve not fitted. This is a 
straight binary split. Typical values would be furnaces (equi- 
pment), naphtha (material), 100'C (temperature), 120 lb/sq. in. 
(pressure), small (inventory), don't care (A or B) and the 
class value is fit emergency isolation valve. This example, 
and others similar to it were fed into Expert-Ease. 
The system was written on a version of Expert-Ease in the 
'Alvey Starter Pack' running on an IBM PC/AT. 
Results 
The following 41 node rule was induced by Expert-Ease 
from the examples as given in Table 10.2 :- 
Table 10.2 Expert-Ease EIV Rule 
Material 
naphtha : Equipment 
furnace : fiteiv 
feedpump : null 
bottomspump : null 
sidestreampump : null 
ref luxpump : null 
compressor : null 
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convertor : null 
exchanger : null 
gascompressor : null 
fueloil : Temperature 
< 215 : fiteiv 
>=215 : noeiv 
distfueloil : Equipment 
furnace : null 
feedpump : null 
bottomspump : noeiv 
sidestreampump : fiteiv 
refluxpump : null 
compressor : null 
convertor : null 
exchanger : null 
gascompressor : null 
gasoline : noeiv 
ethylene : fiteiv 
propylene : Temp 
<35 : noeiv 
>=35 : fiteiv 
butylene : noeiv 
ethane : fiteiv 
methane : Equipment 
furnace 
fee dp ump 
bottomspump 
sidestreampump 
refluxp ump 
compressor 
convertor 
exchanger 
gascompressor 
null 
null 
null 
null 
fiteiv 
null 
null 
fiteiv 
noeiv 
In this case, Expert-Ease has established that the 
attribute 'material' is the most discriminatory, i. e. the one 
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that yields most information. The next most discriminatory are 
the attributes 'equipment', and 'temperature'. The value 
'null' means that the system does not have enough information 
in order to reach a decision. 
The rule as stated can be translated into 'if-then' 
format. The rule would then look like (ignoring the null 
values) :- 
IF the material is naptha 
AND the equipment is a furnace 
THEN fit an eiv 
IF the material is fueloil 
AND the temperature is less than 215°C 
THEN fit an eiv 
ELSEIF the temperature is greater than or equal to 
215°C 
THEN no eiv 
IF the material is distillate fuel oil 
AND the equipment is a bottomspump 
THEN noeiv 
ELSEIF the equipment is a sides'treampump 
THEN fiteiv 
IF the material is gasoline 
THEN noeivý 
ELSEIF the material is ethylene 
THEN fiteiv 
ELSEIF the material is propylene 
AND the temperature is less than 35'C 
THEN noeiv 
ELSEIF the temperature is greater than or equal to 
35°C 
THEN fiteiv 
ELSEIF the material is butylene 
THEN noeiv 
ELSEIF the material is ethane 
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THEN fiteiv 
IF the material is methane 
AND the equipment is a refluxpump 
THEN fiteiv 
ELSEIF equipment is an exchanger 
THEN fiteiv 
ELSEIF the equipment is a gascompressor 
THEN noeiv 
On querying the system, the value of the most discrimina- 
tory attribute is asked for first. If the user types 'nap- 
htha', the value of 'Equipment' is then asked. Supposing the 
user typed 'furnace', then the system responds with the class 
value 'fiteiv'. If the response to the value of 'material' had 
been 'fueloil', then the system would have requested the value 
of the attribute 'temperature' before reaching a conclusion. 
The answers given by Expert-Ease are correct when queried 
about an olefin plant. However, this is not much use when 
talking about chemical plants in general. Also a designer is 
not going to have much confidence in a system if it produces a 
result on the basis of material and equipment type alone. On 
paper, the designer would take into consideration many other 
factors, such as leak history, and type of hazard. It is 
therefore evident that the attributes need revision if the 
system produced by Expert-Ease is going to be of use to gene- 
ral plant design. 
Expert-Ease has been able to fully represent the problem 
with the use of three of the original six attributes. This is 
fine from a rule inducing point of view, since Expert-Ease 
will use as few attributes as possible in order to represent a 
problem. The designer in the emergency isolation valve problem 
will use more attributes, relevant to his particular 
installation. 
The emergency isolation valve problem tackled by Expert- 
Ease needs revision because°: - 
195 
1. The examples do not fully represent the domain 
2. Greater care is needed in choosing the attributes and 
examples 
3. A more general rule needs to be induced 
Revision of the Emergency Isolation Valve Problem 
As a result of subsequent discussions with T. A. Kletz, 
the definition of the problem has been changed. 
It transpired from these discussions that the table was 
in fact drawn up by two experts working together, and that in 
fact, some of the entries were the outcome of compromises. 
The comment was also made that the problem was to 
retrofit rather than fit from new, and that modern practice is 
to fit in some cases where the- decision at the time was not to 
it. 
The experts apparently started from rules rather than 
examples, and they have stated some rules explicilty. However, 
the creation of the examples does, nevertheless, advance the 
matter. The rules stated by the experts were mentioned above, 
and these rules have been reformulated by the author as 
follows :- 
1. Equipment is particularly likely to leak. It is so (a) if 
it has a history of leaking or (b) it is pumping at extremes 
of temperature or (c) it is otherwise likely to leak. 
2. Equipment is less likely to leak but if it does could 
release a large quantity with no means of stopping it. 
3. Equipment is less likely to leak but if it does could 
release a very large quantity. 
Rule 1 is considered to be a 'strong' rule. 
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There also appears to have been some 'hidden' rules which 
came to light after discussions with the expert. These are :- 
4. The material is more hazardous if it is above its autoigni- 
tion temperature. 
5. Fit an emergency isolation valve if it is convenient for 
process reasons. 
6. Control valves may be treated as a kind of emergency isola- 
tion valve. 
7. Do not fit an emergency isolation valve if there is another 
means of stopping the leak. 
8. Do not fit an emergency isolation valve if the fluid is gas 
in a compressor. 
A particular rule also seems to have some influence as a 
counter-rule. Thus a small inventory weights the decision 
against fitting an emergency isolation valve. This is referred 
to as a counter-rule. The rules above have been applied to the 
original table of data, and this is shown in Table 10.3. The 
attribute 'leak history' has been included as a separate 
column in the table, since it has not been included in the 
rules list above. The table shows that the criterion of 
history of leaks tends to be fairly dominant in that a history 
of leaks is associated with the decision to fit an emergency 
isolation valve, and no history of leaks with the decision not 
to fit one. This is also the case with the criterion of rule 
2, i. e. that the equipment is less likely to leak, but if it 
does could release a large quantity with no means of stopping 
it. This attribute has been termed 'large hazard'. 
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Table 10.3 Rules Application to EIV Data 
Item History Fit EIV Comments 
of leaks 
Furnaces - 
Feed pump N 
Bottoms pump Y 
Sidestream N 
PUMP 
Bottoms pump Y 
Bottoms pump - 
Bottoms y 
pump l 
Bottoms 
pump2 
Reflux pump y 
Sidestream_ Y 
PUMP 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Rule 1(c) apparently, 
rule 6 
Influence of 
counter-rule 1(a), 
rule 4 
Rule 1(a) + (b), rules 
2 and 4 
Rule 1(a) + (b) not 
satisfied, but 
influence of rules 
2+4 perhaps 
Rule 1(a) + (b), rule 
2 
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Rule 7 
Rule 1(a) + (b) but 
overridden by rule 7 
Rule 1(a) + (b) not 
satisfied 
Rule 1(a) + (b) 
Rule 1(a) + (b) 
Item History Fit EIV Comments 
of leaks 
Ref lux pump NY Rule 2 apparently 
Cold Al exchanger Y Rule 1(a) + (b), 
Y partly rule 6 
Process gas 
compressor N Rule 8 
Compressor -Y Rule 8, but overridden 
by rule 5 
Compressor -N Rule 8 
Bottoms pump Y 
Relux pump y 
Convertor Y 
Reflux pump - 
Ref lux pump - 
N Rule 1(a), but 
overridden by rule 7. 
Influence of counter- 
rules 2 and 4 
? Meaning of notes not 
clear. Does valve 
fitted refer to 
existing valve ? 
Y Special case 
N Rule 1(a) + (b) and 2 
not satisfied 
N 
Bottoms pump -N 11 
Ref lux pump N if 
Notes 
* Refers to borderline case 
Extremes of temperature taken as <-30 degC and >180 deg C 
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Table 10.4 Revised EIV Data 
Attribute No. 12345678 EIV 
fitted ? 
Plant Item 
Furnace N Y N N N N N * Y 
Feed pump N N Y N N N N * N 
Bottoms 
pump y N N Y Y N N * Y 
Sidestream 
pump N N Y N Y N N * Y(? ) 
Bottoms 
pump Y N N Y Y N N * Y 
Bottoms 
pump N N N N N Y N * N 
Bottoms 
pump y N N Y N Y N * N 
Bottoms 
pump N N N Y N N N * N 
Ref lux 
pump Y N N Y N N N * Y 
Sidestream 
pump y N N Y N N N * Y 
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Attribute No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 EIV 
fitted? 
Reflux 
pump N N N N Y N N * Y 
Cold Al 
exchanger Y N N Y N N N * Y 
Process gas 
compressor N N N N N N Y * N 
Compressor N N N N N N Y Y y 
Compressor N N N N N N Y * N 
Bottoms 
pump y N N N N Y N * N 
Convertor Y N N "N N N N * Y 
Reflux 
pump N N N N N N N * N 
Bottoms 
pump NNNNNNN*N 
Bottoms 
pump NNNNNNN*N 
Key 
Attribute No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Attribute 
Is there a history of leaks ? 
Is it otherwise likely to leak ? 
Is it above the auto-ignition 
temperature ? 
Is it pumping at high temperature ? 
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5 Is it less likely to leak, but if so a 
large quantity will escape with no way 
of stopping it ? ('large hazard') 
6 Is there an alternative way of stopping 
a leak ? 
7 Is the gas fluid in a compressor ? 
8 Is the fitting of an EIV convenient for 
process reasons ? 
Attribute values 
Y ye s 
N no 
don't care 
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As a result of establishing the above rules, the data for 
Expert-Ease was revised, and this is shown in Table 10.4. The 
attributes have been changed such that they are questions, 
with values being 'yes', 'no' or 'don't care'. It is believed 
that this new set of examples is representative of factors 
which are considered for any plant when the decision is made 
as to whether to fit an emergency isolation valve or not. 
The data was input to Expert-Ease as before. The 
equipment item was not included as this is not an attribute 
that is particularly important when considering the choice. 
More important are temperature, alternatives and leak history 
etc. These and other attributes have been included in the 
data. 
Result 
Expert-Ease induced the following rule from the data given in 
table 10.5 :- 
Table 10.5 Revised Expert-Ease Induced Rule 
large hazard 
yes : fiteiv 
noý: history 
yes : fiteiv 
no : otherwise likely to leak 
yes : fiteiv 
no : pumping at high temperature 
yes : alternative 
yes : noeiv 
no : fiteiv 
no : noeiv 
This is an 11 node rule, and the example which includes the 
first compressor (14) contradicts the rule. 
Translated into 'if-then' format, the rule looks like :- 
IF the hazard is large 
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THEN fit an eiv 
ELSEIF there is a history of leaks 
THEN fit and eiv 
ELSEIF it is otherwise likely to leak 
THEN fit an eiv 
ELSEIF it is pumping at extremes of temperature 
AND there is an alternative way of stopping the leak 
THEN no eiv 
ELSE fit an eiv 
ELSEIF not pumping at extremes of temperature 
THEN noeiv 
The attribute 'large hazard' is defined as 'it is less 
likely to leak, but if it does so, could release a large 
quantity with no way of stopping it'. Expert-Ease has establi- 
shed that this is the most discriminatory attribute, and on 
querying the system the user is asked whether there is a 
'large hazard'. If the answer is 'yes', then a conclusion is 
reached, i. e. fit an eiv. If the answer had been 'no' then the 
user is asked the value of the next most valuable attribute, 
that of leak history, and so on down the tree. 
This version of the rule appears to be much more useful 
than that previously induced. It is also more general and is 
applicable to many cases. On testing the system, the rule 
worked well in the face of the data available. 
10.4.2 Ex-Tran? 
The theory of Ex-Tran7 was explained in section 6.2.5. It 
works in a similar way to Expert-Ease, but uses an enhanced 
version of ID3. Also, the facilities available to the user are 
more comprehensive than Expert-Ease. The system starts off in 
a similar vein to Expert-Ease, with the user defining attri- 
butes, values and classes, then typing in the example set. In 
this case, the same set of examples was used, i. e. the data in 
Table 10.4 Once a rule has been induced, the user can enhance 
the explanation facility for user consultations. 
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The system was written on Ex-Tran7 running on a DEC 
Micro-VaxII under the VMS operating system. 
Ex-Tran? induced the following rule :- 
Table 10.6 Ex-Tran7 Induced Rule 
(largehazl : 
yes : fiteiv 
no : [other I: 
yes : fiteiv 
no : [history l 
yes : [alternat] : 
yes : noeiv 
no : fiteiv 
no : noeiv 
In 'if-then' format, the rule looks like :- 
IF the hazard is large 
THEN fit an eiv 
ELSEIF it is otherwise likely to leak 
THEN fit an eiv 
ELSEIF there is a history of leaks 
AND an alternative way of stopping the leak 
THEN no eiv 
ELSE fit an eiv 
ELSEIF there is no history of leaks 
THEN no eiv 
As can be seen, the rule is slightly different to that 
induced by Expert-Ease. The reason for this is the conflicting 
example, i. e. the example that contradicts the Expert-Ease 
rule. In Ex-Tran7, conflicting examples are put into a secon- 
dary dormant store, and are taken into account when a rule is 
induced. 
Again, the rule works well in the face of the data avai- 
lable, and has again shown that induction works well when the 
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examples used specifically cover the problem domain. 
Listings from Ex-Tran7 for the emergency isolation valve 
problem are shown in Appendix D. 
10.4.3 Emergency Isolation Valve Advice System 
One of the main advantages of rule induction systems such 
as Expert-Ease and Ex-Tran7 is their ability to induce concise 
and reliable rules in the face of a large amount of seemingly 
random data. Although rule inducers can be writen in an 
advice-giving mode, it would seem better to use a regular 
advice system for routine advice work. For this reason, we 
have now turned to Micro-Expert, the theory of which was 
explained in section 6.4.1 
The rules developed by the above two systems have been 
converted into Micro-Expert advice language to produce an 
efficient system, which allows the use of probabilities and 
has been built with the best information avaliable. 
This aspect of the work, therefore, is an example of the 
transfer of rules from a rule induction system to an advice 
system. The use of an advice system then makes it possible to 
introduce probabilities which allow both for the strength of 
the rules and uncertainty in the values of the attributes. 
It is worth indicating at this stage how the classifica- 
tion rules were coded into advice-giving rules. The rule 
automatically induced from Ex-Tran7 was used. The Micro-Expert 
user manual suggests that in order to write the advice lan- 
guage code, a diagram is needed. This is shown in Figure 10.3. 
The model is drawn in diagrammatic form. Each block in the 
diagram represents a hypothesis which is given a name shown in 
the top left hand box of the block. For example the block at 
the top of the diagram is called EIV and represents the hypot- 
hesis "An EIV is needed". This hypothesis is a goal hypothesis 
because it is the hypothesis which the model is designed to 
prove or disprove. The hypotheses HISTORY, HAZARD, TEMP and 
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ALTER are of the type QUESTION. 
Also associated with the hypotheses are the logical 
sufficency and logical necessity factors. In the diagram, 
HAZARD is assigned an LS factor of 100 and an LN factor of 
0.01. This means that the definite presence of 'large hazard' 
makes the fitting of an emergency isolation valve 100 times 
more likely. The definite absence of 'large hazard' makes the 
fitting of an emergency isolation valve 100 times less likely 
(i. e. 1/0.01). 
The code for the system, together with the explanation of 
how it works, appears in Appendix E. Here, we show the results 
of some sample consultations. 
The system is running on a '. Torch' micro-computer running 
under the UCSD PASCAL operating system. After compiling the 
code successfully using 'EXPCOMP', the system is run using the 
program 'RUNEXPT'. 
The following is an example of the output, user input is shown- 
in bold type :- 
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Start of consultation 1. 
"The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -5.00 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the hazard is large 1-5.. 0.. 51? 5 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.90 Certainty range is 0.00 to 5.00 
Is it true that there is an alternative way to stop a leak 
[Y..!.. NJ? N 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.90 certainty range is 0.00 to 5.00 
Is it true that the item is pumping at extremes of temperature 
[Y.. I.. Nl? Y 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.99 Certainty range is 4.90 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the item has a history of leaks I- 
5.. 0.. 51 23 
This goal was whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 5.00" 
End of consultation 1. 
Here, the user is certain that the hazard is large, i. e., 
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the item is not particularly likely to leak, but if it does, a 
large quantity will be released, the item is pumping at ex- 
tremes of temperature, and he is reasonably certain that the 
item has a leak history. Micro-Expert has therefore concluded 
(i. e. the certainty factor is 5) that it is certain that an 
emergency isolation valve is needed. 
Start of consulation 2. 
"The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -5.00 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the hazard is large [-5.. 0.. 51? -5 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is -5.00 Certainty range is -5.00 to 4.80 
Is it true that the item is pumping at extremes of temperature 
(Y..!.. NI? N 
This goal was whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is -5.00" 
End of consultation 2 
In this case, an emergency isolation valve is definitely not 
needed, since hazard is certainly not large, and the item is 
not pumping at extremes of temperature - as indicated by the 
certainty factor of -5. 
Start of consultation 3" 
"The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -5.00 to 5.00 
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How certain are you that the hazard is large 1-5.. 0.. 51? 3 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.84 certainty range is -1.23 to 5.00 
Is it true that the item is pumping at extremes of temperature 
(Y.. 1.. N1? Y 0 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.98 Certainty range is 4.84 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the item has a history of leaks (- 
5.. 0.. 51? -2 
This goal was whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.97" 
End of consultation 3. 
In this case it is certain that an emergency isolation valve 
be fitted. 
Start of consultation 4. 
"The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 certainty range is -5.00 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the hazard is large I-5.. 0.. 51? 0 
The current goal is whether-or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -4.90 to 4.52 
Is it true that there is an alternative way to stop a leak 
[Y.. I.. NI? Y 
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The current goal is whether or not :- 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is -4.90 Certainty range is -5.00 to 4.52 
Is it true that the item is pumping at extremes of temperature 
[Y.. 1.. N]? N 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is -4.99 Certainty range is -5.00 to 3.53 
How certain are you that the item has a history of leaks (- 
5.. 0.. 5)? 0 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is -5.00" 
End of consultation 4. 
In this case it is certain that an emergency isolation valve 
is not needed. 
Start of consultation 5. 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -5.00 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the hazard is large 1-5.. 0.. 51 0 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -4.90 to 4.52 
Is it true that there is an alternative way to stop a leak 
(Y..!.. N1? N 
The current goal is whether or not 
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An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 1.67 Certainty range is -4.95 to 4.80 
Is it true that the item is pumping at extremes of temperature 
(Y.. I.. NI Y 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 3.52 Certainty range is -1.56 to 4.80 
How certain are you that the item has a history of leaks (- 
5.. 0.. 1? 1 
This goal was whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.33" 
End of consultation 5. 
In this case an emergency isolation valve is almost certainly 
needed. 
Start of consultation 6. 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 0.00 Certainty range is -5.00 to 5.00 
How certain are you that the hazard is large [-5.. 0.. 5]? -1 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 4.76 certainty range is -2.11 to 5.00 
Is it true that there is an alternative way to stop a leak 
[y.. I.. N1 ?I 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
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Certainty factor is 4.76 Certainty range is -4.96 to 5.00 
Is it true that the item is pumping at extremes of temperature 
(Y..!.. NJ N 
The current goal is whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is -4.61 Certainty range is -4.96 to 3.02 
How certain are you that the item has a history of leaks I- 
5. . 0. . 51 ?2 
This goal was whether or not 
An eiv is needed 
Certainty factor is 1.22" 
End of consultation 6. 
In this case it is likely that an emergency isolation valve is 
needed. 
10.5 Discussion 
This chapter has shown one way of building an advice 
giving expert system. The original data for deciding whether 
or not an emergency isolation valve is needed was used as an 
example set for a rule induction method. The data needed 
subsequent revision, but eventually a rule was induced that 
appeared to completely cover the domain. Two aids to building 
an expert system were used for this. The first, Expert-Ease 
induced a similar but longer rule than the enhanced version, 
Ex-Tran7. Both methods rely on an example set with a certain 
classification, in this case a binary split between fitting an 
emergency isolation valve and not fitting one. The expertise 
required therefore is of a classification type. The induction 
methods were able to decide which of the attributes represen- 
ting the examples provided the most information in order to 
reach a decision. With this in mind, we can infer that the 
rule induced is the best possible in respect of the data 
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available. 
The method has shown a certain disadvantage of induction 
methods. Great time and care is needed in choosing the attri- 
butes for the examples to fully represent the domain in ques- 
tion. Our original example set did not work well under an 
induction method, and reasons for this are given in the text 
above. However, when time had been spent with an expert, new 
'hidden' rules were found to be useful in re-representing the 
problem. The method also highlighted which rules were strong, 
or most influential. 
Although it appears that induction methods induce only 
one rule, this is not quite the case. The rule can be 'split' 
into a number of production style rules, although the order in 
which they are fired must be kept the same. The induction 
method has provided us with a set of rules, in which we have 
confidence and which we then used in an advice giving system. 
The shell Micro-Expert was used in order to produce a 
true advice giving system. The rules that had been induced by 
induction were used for this purpose. The shell requires that 
the rules be written in Micro-Expert advice language. This is 
a straightforward procedure which allows probabilities toget- 
her with sufficiency and neczssity factors to be assigned. The 
rules induced are thus useful in deciding what these factors 
should be, since an indication of the strength of the rules is 
given. 
The attribute 'large hazard' is the most discriminatory 
of the attributes that the rule induction system dealt with. 
This therefore is a strong rule with respect to fitting an 
emergency isolation valve, and Micro-Expert allows us to ex- 
ploit this with the use of a logical sufficiency factor. Hence 
in the advice giving system 'large hazard' has the highest 
sufficiency factor, i. e. 100. Micro-Expert also allows us to 
deal with counter rules, i. e. those rules that come out stron- 
gly against fitting an emergency isolation valve. In this case 
the attribute 'alternative' is a counter rule, and for this we 
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assign a low logical sufficiency factor and a high logical 
necessity factor, i. e. 50. The other factors for the advice 
system have been assigned on the basis of their 'placing' in 
the induced rule. This has indicated a useful property of an 
induced rule. The rule indicates the value of the information 
gained by using a particular attribute, which is essential 
when the rule is used in a practical way, such as in an advice 
giving system. 
We have shown in this study an example of the development 
of a successful advice giving system derived from classifica- 
tion rules. 
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11 Flare System Design 
11.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 7 the problem of flare system design was 
introduced as one of the candidate topics thought to be worthy 
of further study. Here the problem is expanded and a design 
strategy is suggested for its solution. The opening sections 
of this chapter give accounts of the general aspect of flaring 
together with a review of the literature. Rules have been 
derived in production system format together with a more 
precise outline of the design process. A production system 
program, written in Prolog, for some aspects of the design is 
then described. 
11.1.1 The Need for a Flare 
When plant equipment malfunctions, a rise in pressure is 
not uncommon. These pressures are relieved to an adequate 
relief disposal system before the pressure levels reach unac- 
ceptable limits. If the material being used is flammable, then 
it is generally sent to the flare relief system to be burned 
off, and the safety of the plant is then dependent on a 
reliable relief disposal system. Such a system must therefore 
be able to cope with a whole variety of conditions and mate- 
rials. 
A flare system therefore is needed due to overpressure 
caused by plant upset conditions. What are the causes of 
overpressure ? This will be discussed in more detail in Chap- 
ter 12, but it is worth noting some causes here :- 
Loss of cooling water 
Power failure 
Failure of heat exchanger tubes 
Control system failure 
Chemical reaction runaway 
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11.2 General Aspects to the Design of a Flare System 
Reference was made in Chapter 7 to some of the components 
of a flare system. These included a knock-out drum, seals and 
flaring hazards. In this section more detail is outlined on 
these and other aspects. 
A typical flare system will consist of a relief header, a 
stack, a knock-out drum, a flare tip and usually some sort of 
seal or other device for preventing flashback down the flare. 
The main hazards encountered in a flare system are the ingress 
of air leading to explosion, a blockage, heat radiation, 
liquid carryover, low temperature embrittlement and the 
problem of toxic gases. Related problems include smoke, noise, 
glare, land sterilization and positive ignition. 
11.2.1 Physical Design 
The physical design of a flare stack is well documented, 
such as the API RP 520 and 521. Here a brief description of 
the sizing of a flare stack is given. The process starts with 
basic physical data and includes expected gas flowrate through 
the flare, average molecular weight, gas temperature, gas 
pressure at the tip and the expected wind velocity at the tip. 
The diameter of the flare stack is calculated on the basis of 
designing for a velocity Mach Number of 0.2. The flame length 
is calculated using the flame models, which take account of 
flame distortion caused by wind velocity. The flare stack 
height required is based on the heat liberated, the fraction 
of heat radiated and the maximum allowable radiation 150 feet 
from the stack. The API suggest a 25% increase on the design 
height from that calculated. The final procedure is to calcu- 
late the maximum concentration of gas at grade. This will 
obviously depend on the type of gas being flared. 
In this work we are concerned with the procedure for 
designing a flare stack together with the choices and con- 
flicts for the designer. For this, each aspect of a flare 
system is described below. This is termed an 'awareness aid'. 
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11.2.2 Flare System Awareness Aid 
Boeiji (1979) dicusses flare relief systems in general 
and he gives some typical flare installations together with 
commercially available ground flares, flare system control, 
burners and flashback protection. Another paper concerned 
generally with flaring comes from Bluhm (1985) whose discus- 
sion includes hazards, knock out drum sizing, low temperature 
flares and maintenance. 
Elevated Flares 
Elevated flares are usually used in conjunction with a 
ground flare. They are used for infrequent emergency condi- 
tions and are typically designed to handle 1,200,000 lb/hr in 
the molecular weight range 25-40. Figure 11.1 shows a typical 
elevated flare installation. 
Ground Flares 
Ground flares are used for burning normal excess emis- 
sions from a plant during the day to day running. This ensures 
that the elevated flare is ready in the case of an emergency 
condition. Their main advantage is that they burn quietly and 
only harmless invisible combustion products are discharged to 
the atmosphere. The burning occurs inside a special refactory 
lined enclosure. Generally, excess gases which are not recove- 
rable go to the ground flare. Relieved gases come from the 
plant and hit a pair of liquid seals. When an emergency occurs 
the gases pass through the upper liquid seal and burn at the 
elevated flare. A typical flowrate of a ground flare is 70,000 
lb/hr and gases of molecular weights in the range 20-40 are 
normally burned. Their installation is dependent on local 
conditions, including environmental. Figure 11.2 shows a 
typical ground and elevated flare installation. 
Knockout Drum 
A knockout drum is used to prevent hazards associated 
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-4- 
with burning liquid droplets escaping from the flare stack. 
The drum must be of sufficient diameter to effect the desired 
vapour-liquid separation. The capacity of the drum should 
provide a liquid hold up time of 10 to 30 minutes. Generally 
the diameter of the drum is 1/2 to 1/3 the length of the drum 
and is 3 to 4.5 times the diameter of the flare stack. A high 
and low level alarm should be fitted together with an automa- 
tic pump out to the slops system. Seals are required to stop 
air entering the header since after a release the header 
cools, and air could be drawn in. 
Sizing is a complex task, and in doing so the type of 
process equipment connected to the flare, the maximum rates at 
which liquid can enter the system and the time operators need 
to correct a system upset must be considered. 
Water Seals 
Water seals are used to prevent flashback into the flare 
headers. The water provides a seal between the header and the 
outside atmosphere. Their design is based on the maximum 
quantity to be released. They should offer minimum resistance 
to flow during emergency conditions. Where freezing tempera- 
ture conditions are a problem, water seals are not recommen- 
ded. 
Quench Drums 
Quench drums are used to cool liquid streams that may be 
released at high temperature. Their sizing depends on the 
design of the drum internals as well as the amount of heat 
that must be removed. Generally, the exit stream temperature 
must be reduced to a range 150 - 200' F, assuming that the inlet 
stream will be 40 - 50% vaporized. 
Molecular Seals 
Molecular seals are installed below the flare at the top 
of the riser and will stop the entry of air into the stack. 
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They are very prone to choking, particularly from carbon from 
incompletely burned gases. For this reason, companies are 
generally not using such seals. 
Flame Arresters 
Flame arresters will protect against flashback as long as 
the flame arresting elements can withstand the heat released 
from excessive combustion. They are, however, subject to fou- 
ling that cause large pressure drops. during periods of high 
flow and may cause dangerous overpressure on connected equip- 
ment. One view is that there are only two instances were their 
use is justified :- 
1. If the gases being vented can decompose without the 
addition of air. 
2. In vented pipes of storage tanks containing a 
flammable mixture of vapour and air. 
Purging 
Purging of inert gases is used as an effective way to 
stop air entering the relief system when it is not in use. A 
purge ensures safe operation and protects against explosion 
and detonation. It can, however, be expensive. A purge of flue 
gas is estimated to cost about $7,500 per year (1986). Genera- 
lly, a purge rate adequate to produce a flame visible from the 
ground in daylight is safe. One company recommends that purge 
should be continuous with a miniumum flowrate of 236*flare 
diameter m3/hr. The purge gas is usually either nitrogen or 
flue gas. Not all refiners use such a system, but it seems to 
be one of the most effective ways of keeping air out of a 
stack. 
Igniters and Pilots 
Continuous pilot burners on the flare tip ensure igni- 
tion. The pilot burners themselves are commonly ignited by a 
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flame front generator system. Ignition is then guaranteed 
regardless of wind direction by placing three continuous pi- 
lots around the flare tip. Thermocouples on the pilot activate 
an alarm system to warn of pilot flame failure. 
Noise Levels 
The roar of the combustion process is the most serious 
problem in an elevated flare stack. Sources of noise include 
steam injection, moisture condensation shock, seal drum slos- 
hing and low flow instability. It is difficult to deal with 
combustion roar, but one solution is to burn the most moderate 
and frequent releases at a ground flare, keeping the elevated 
flare for emergencies. Steam injection will add to the combus- 
tion roar as well as providing its own higher frequency roar. 
The noise can be controlled by mixing the steam with the 
inspirating air more quickly. 
Smoke 
Flares can be made smokeless by providing an adequate 
quantity of oxygen in the combustion zone. Factors to consider 
in designing a smokeless flare are :- 
1. The quantity of oxygen in the combustion zone. 
2. The temperature of the combustion zone. 
3. The type of hydrocarbon being burned 
For smokeless burning of a paraffin approximately 20% of the 
stiochiometric quantity of air must be evenly distributed in 
the primary mixing zone. For an olefin, this quantity is 30%. 
It is an offence under the Clean Air Acts 1956 and 1958 
to emit 'dark smoke' or 'black smoke' except at certain times. 
Flare Tips 
There are three generic designs of flare tips available. 
They are the utility flare tip, the centre steam flare tip and 
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the steam ring flare tip. The choice of which to use is depen- 
dent on the materials being burned and the type of burning 
required. They are susceptible to failure due to cracking or 
the burning out of internals. 
Heat Radiation 
The API RP 520 states that the following heat radiation 
limits should not be exceeded in the area around the flare 
stack :- 
1.7 kW/m2 for exposure of the general public or for 
continuous working. 
5 kW/m2 for short time exposure of personnel 
13 kW/m2 for control room externals 
In calculating the distance required between the nominal flare 
centre and a point of exposure. the fraction of heat radiated, 
the allowable radiation, the flare rate and the net calorific 
value must be considered. 
Controlled Blowdown 
Controlled blowdown is a method whereby the relief loads 
are smoothed by staggering the operation of pressure relief 
valves. It has the advantages of saving money, reducing noise 
and smoke levels and space. The effect, of blowdown is to 
reduce the peak flow during flaring operations (although the 
total amount flared is the same with or without controlled 
blowdown) thus reducing the size of the stack. However it does 
require a much more thorough design. The system is particular- 
ly well suited to offshore platforms where space is short. 
Figure 11.3 shows graphically the advantages of controlled 
blowdown. 
Atmospheric Relief 
Many relief valves are routed directly to the atmosphere. 
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Often they are used in conjunction with a flare system. Only 
light hydrocarbons and non-toxics are disposed of in this way, 
but it is a good way of reducing the header and relief requi- 
rements. 
11.2.3 Hazards in Flaring 
Flaring is by nature a hazardous operation because there 
is an open line to the atmosphere with a continuous ignition 
source present. The presence of a flare system implies that 
there are hazardous unwanted materials to be disposed of. 
Therefore any such system must be inoffensive to the surroun- 
dings with respect to noise, light and pollution. In this 
section the main hazards will be detailed together with met- 
hods of eliminating them. 
Oxygen Intrusion 
For an explosion to occur,, a flammable material, a source 
of ignition and oxygen must be present. All three are present 
in a flare system if precautions are not taken to prevent 
this. It is possible for air to enter the stack through a 
variety of ways including open vents or drains, flare lines, 
start-up or rapid condensation of hot vapours which can suck 
air back down a line. Precautions against this happening have 
been outlined in the awareness aid, and include purging, flame 
arresters, or molecular seals. These are only precautions and 
are not a fool-proof technique. It is better to prevent air 
entering the system by stopping it in the first place by 
eliminating air in-leak into-the pipe work, and purging equip- 
ment to atmosphere rather than the stack during start-up. 
Liquid Carryover 
This is usually prevented by using liquid knock-out drums 
as described above. Their purpose is to separate large quanti- 
ties of liquid that accompany vapours going to the stack. If 
liquid does get to the flare, then the flame becomes more 
smokey and burning droplets of liquid disperse. 
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Blockages 
Flare system obstructions can occur as a result of seals 
blocking or freezing. To prevent this, flare lines are usually 
sloped to the knock out drum and are free of pockets. Knock- 
out drums themselves are often protected against freezing. Oil 
may also plug the system by congealing at-the temperatures of 
the flare stack. The only cure for this is elimination. 
Low Temperature Embrittlement 
When liquids of low boiling point are being flared, then 
complete flare line failure is a possibility resulting from 
low temperature brittle fracture. It can occur from low tran- 
sition operating temperature, notches, cracks and stress. If 
the system is operated at a temperature below the transition 
temperature of the material from which the flare is made, then 
brittle failure may occur. Special materials of construction 
are used to prevent this, and notches and cracks are alle- 
viated by stress relieving. 
Maintenance 
Whilst maintenance is in progress, flammable or toxic 
material may be released. The risk is increased because it is 
often necessary to open flare lines without gas freeing. The 
most common problem seems to be asphyxiation of personnel 
whilst opening lines for maintenance. 
11.3 An Account of Flare Literature 
There is an extensive literature conerning flare systems. 
This is largely in the form of technical papers, but some 
codes of practice are available. Some 100 papers have been 
collected for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, rules and 
heuristics together with some ideas as to how a flare system 
is designed. In this section some of the more notable papers 
are described. 
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11.3.1 General 
The American Petroleum Institute (1986) give an extensive 
account of the safe operation of refinery flares and the 
precautions necessary. The following quote, applicable to this 
work comes from the API :- 
"A flare system does not lend itself to a standard 
design or to uniformly applicable procedures. " 
This comment supports the idea that flare system design is an 
expert matter. 
Reed (1968) talks of the importance of flare stacks being 
able to cope with upsets, keeping air out of the system and 
purge rates. 
Kneale (1984) is concerned with the engineering design of 
relief systems. Aspects include system requirements, total 
system hardware, data and other factors including dispersion 
and emission, noise, and scrubbing. Kneale also describes the 
design process as :- 
1. Defining the system 
2. Sizing the device 
3. Designing the hardware 
4. Treating the products of relief 
Klooster et. al. (1975) discuss flare system design optimiza- 
tion and factors in design which can lead to a safe disposal 
system. 
Brzustowski (1977) is concerned with heat radiation, 
flame shape and radiation. 
11.3.2 Specific Aspects 
Many of the works available describe more specific 
aspects of a relief system design. These include explosions, 
smoke, noise and radiation control. 
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Explosions 
The paper by Kilby (1968) is specifically to do with 
explosions in flare stacks. He describes four incidents 
showing how different conditions can lead to an explosion. 
These include air contamination during maintenance, entry of 
combustible material prior to air freeing and contamination by 
reactive materials. Peterson (1967) describes experiments 
designed to control the hazard of flare stack explosions. In 
particular, he discusses an explosion suppression system. 
Environmental 
Seebold (1971 and 1972) deals with the specific aspect of 
flare noise. The' noise from flares comes mainly from combus- 
tion and steam injection. Steam noise seems to be dependent 
upon the type of injection nozzle used. Miller et. al. (1958) 
and Agar (1978) discuss the problem of smoke from flares. 
Steam and water injection help, to alleviate the problem, and 
smoke can also be reduced by using a multi-jet burner. Steam 
does, however, cause noise, so there will inevitably be a 
trade-off between the two, and is therefore an expert matter. 
Heat radiation is also the topic of many papers, and 
works by McMurray (1982), Kent (1968) and DeFaveri et. al. 
(1985) deal with the problem. McMurray argues that better 
estimates of heat radiation from flares can be obtained by 
using data from controlled field tests. Kent and DeFaveri 
discuss estimating flare radiation from physical data. The 
emissivity of the flare is important and this is estimated 
from flame temperature, reaction coefficients for complete 
combustion and steam quantities. 
Flare Tips 
Brzustowski (1976) gives a good account of the different 
kinds of flare tips available. The choice is largely dependent 
on the needs of the designer. For example, if the flare needs 
smoke suppression and only small quantities of heavy saturates 
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and unsaturates are being flared, then a centre steam flare 
tip is suitable. 
Sizing a Flare Stack 
Tan (1967) offers nomograms for speeding up the process 
of stack height and knock-out drum sizing, together with purge 
gas rates and steam requirements. Oenbring and Sifferman 
(1980) ask ".. are current methods too conservative ? ". They 
compare radiation, noise and flame length and deflection from 
actual plant flares with the methods given in API RP 521. They 
suggest that before designing for the worst case the designer 
considers the likelihood of worst cases occurring simultaneou- 
sly and the consequences of this occurring. Finally, Seebold 
(1984) discusses general calculation procedures including 
height, flame stability, purge and ignition. 
Other papers in this field deal exclusively with specific 
plants, e. g. Feldman and Grossel (1968) talk about an ethylene 
plant and Cindric (1984) discusses ammonia plant front end 
vents. Kletz (1974 and 1985a) gives details of case histories 
involving flare stacks and-the subsequent lessons that 
designers can learn from them. 
Vapour Recovery 
McGill and McGill (1978) report on plant vent and flare 
hydrocarbon recovery and reprocessing systems. Refineries and 
petrochemical plants have traditionally suffered continuous 
losses of valuable hydrocarbons to plant flares and free 
vents. They discuss various aspects of designing such a 
system, including problem identification and selecting the 
best option. Packages commercially available include clean gas 
recovery, in which a clean gas vent needing no processing to 
be used as fuel is recompressed in a simple compression- 
cooling system. Also available is a system for recovery and 
polishing gas for fuel use, which uses a compression- 
absorption system and a system for recovery from flares con- 
taining solids. Generally, a vapour recovery system is 
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implemented by using a compressor which takes suction off the 
flare line. This has the advantage of reducing pollution and 
keeping air out of the stack. 
Various papers have been discussed in this section - 
there are many more. However, we have been able to show an 
important aspect of acquiring knowledge and some sources of 
rules and heuristics. Points to note are the author and date 
of the work, any contradictions that occur from one worker to 
another and words such as "normally", "generally" etc. These 
words imply that there are exceptions to the statments made. 
11.4 Discussion with an Expert 
Whilst collecting together the knowledge required for 
designing a flare system, a number of pointsýof confusion 
arose. It is therefore relevant at this stage to include 
details of discussions with an expert to fill in some finer 
points concerning the design. The actual points creating con- 
fusion become apparent from the transcript below which is 
taken from a discussion with an expert. It has been quoted 
verbatim so that nothing is lost through re-writing it. The 
discussion took the form of a question and answer session and 
is reproduced in Table 11.1 
Table 11.1 Discusion with an Expert 
Question Expert Answer 
Why are ground level 
flares used ? 
Are ground flares 
They are used to minimize 
light and noise. Their use 
is considered a luxury and 
the question of using 
them is based on 
environmental reasons. 
Yes. 
always used in 
conjunction with 
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Question Expert Answer 
elevated flares ? 
Are elevated flares The use of an elevated 
only used in emerge- flare can be classified 
ncies ? into two : - 
1. In refineries they are 
used on a continuous basis 
and a purge of nitrogen 
may not be needed. 
2. In chemical plants they 
are not in continuous use, 
and useage may be rare. A 
nitrogen/flue gas purge is 
needed, and they are 
strictly for emergencies. 
How does a flare The design of a flare stack 
designer go about is based on the maximum 
designing a flare 7 rate of flow and on the 
composition of the gas. 
Typically, for an olefin 
plant the worst flow 
occurs, that is emergency, 
when the cooling water 
fails. This is said to 
occur once in 10 years. 
The designer will then 
consider the radiation 
levels of the stack. He 
will have to optimize 
between the height of the 
flare and the radiation 
levels. The higher the 
stack, the lower the heat 
radiation at ground level, 
for sterilization. 
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Question Expert Answer 
What are the require- A pilot light, an ignitor, 
ments of any flare steam for smokeless flaring, 
system ?a purge, unless flaring is 
continuous, a knock-out pot, 
flow measurement, a check 
for oxygen once per shift, 
and a tip, which will be of 
specialist design. 
Which seals are used Seals are optional extras. 
and when ? It is strongly recommended 
that there are no flame 
arresters, no molecular 
seals and no lutes, except 
in warm weather. 
How are large quant- Hydrogen is best vented in 
ities of hydrogen a completely separate 
dealt with ? system, and it need not be 
lit. - The important property 
with hydrogen, and indeed 
CH4 and below, is its 
density. In order to 
dispose of hydrogen one 
would need vast quantities 
of nitrogen because its 
buoyancy would keep it 
down. The amount of 
nitrogen needed could not 
be supplied. So, hydrogen 
should be directed to 
atmosphere, along with high 
velocity gases, restricted 
to C3 and below, in 
infrequent discharges if 
quantities are trivial. 
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11.5 Rules for Flare System Design 
So far in this chapter we have described many aspects of 
flare system design together with an account of the literature 
available. In this section we draw out some rules, some in 
'if-then' format. They have been drawn mainly from the litera- 
ture, and below some rule derivations are described by quoting 
the sentence from the work then writing the rule. This gives 
an insight into how rules might be formed. Not all of the 
rules are noted in this way, the rest appear in the summary 
table which gives the source, date and topic of the rule. 
Finally, contradictions are noted. 
11.5.1 Rules Derivation 
Here the rule source is quoted together with the author 
and date of the source. 
Quote :- 
"Ground flares are particularly useful to the petrochemi- 
cal industry where start-ups or shut-downs of units, e. g. 
ethylene units, can give rise to large volumes of gases 
that have to be burned over an extended period. " 
Rule :- 
If there are large volumes of gases to be burned over an 
extended period, then a ground flare should be used. 
Boeije, 1979 
Quote :- 
"To prevent air pollution at low level, gas containing 
relatively high concentrations of sulphur compounds or 
other toxic components may have to be burned at the 
elevated flare or in incinerators specifically designed 
for burning the gases. " 
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Rule :- 
If the gas contains toxics, then they should not be sent 
to the ground flare, but the elevated flare or special 
incinerators. 
Boeije, 1979 
Quote (on utility flare tips) :- 
"... can be used for flaring hydrogen, methane, hydrogen 
sulphide and carbon monoxide... " 
Rule :- 
If either hydrogen, methane, hydrogen sulphide or carbon 
monoxide are to be flared, then a utility flare tip may 
be used. 
Brzustowski, 1976 
Quote (on centre steam flare tips) :- 
"... cheapest provision for smoke suppression for 'small 
installations in which only small quantities of heavy 
saturates and unsaturates are flared. " 
Rule :- 
If only small quantities of heavy saturates and 
unsaturates are to be flared and 'smoke suppression is 
required, then a centre steam flare tip should be used. 
Brzustowski, 1976 
Quote :- 
"The quicker the steam becomes mixed with inspirated air, 
the less noise produced by the steam system itself. " 
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Rule :- 
If the steam is mixed quickly with inspirated air, then 
less noise will be produced. 
Seebold, 1972 
11.5.2 Rules Summary 
The following is a table listing all the rules derived 
concerning flare system design. 
Table 11.2 Rules for Flare System Design 
Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
1. 
Kletz 1985b Atmospheric If the gas velocity can be 
venting made high, frequency of 
discharge is low, 
quantities are small, and gas 
contains C3 and below, then 
vent to atmosphere. 
2. 
B lu hm 
3. 
Paruit 
and Kimmel 
1985 it If start-up conditions apply, 
then vessels are usually 
vented to atmosphere. 
1979 Controlled Conditions favourable to 
blowdown controlled blowdown are large 
gas inventories, shortage of 
space and off-shore. 
4. 
Kletz 1984 
5. 
Klooster 1975 
Elevated Elevated flares flare in the 
mol. wt. range 25-46 
Typical flowrate through an 
elevated flare is 1,200,000 
lb/hr. 
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Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
6. 
Kletz 1985a Ground Excess continuous gases which 
flares are not recoverable should go 
to the ground flare. 
7. 
Klooster 1975 If there are light ends in 
the molecular weight range 20 
-40 they are usually sent to 
ground flare. 
8. 
Brzust- 1976 Ground Design heat release rates for 
owski flares ground flares are in the 
range 1 to 100MW. 
9. 
Boeij e 1979 " If there are large quantities 
of gas to be burned over an 
extended period then a ground 
flare should be used. 
10. 
Boeije 1979 " If the gas contains toxics, 
then they should not be sent 
to ground flare but to the 
elevated flare or special 
incinerators. 
11. 
Kletz 1984 General Stacks should not contain any 
bolted joints between 
unmachined surfaces. 
12. 
Kletz 1984 A boot should be fitted at the 
bottom of the stack for the 
collection of debris (Fig 
11.4). 
13. 
Boeije 1979 If the gas discharged comes 
under one of the following : - 
acts corrosively 
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Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
blocks passage for effluents 
reacts/decomposes explosively 
produces toxic combustion 
gases 
then the'gas should not be 
discharged to the flare 
system. 
14. 
Kletz 1984 Large stacks should be fitted 
with an oxygen analyser, 
small stacks should have a 
portable analyser. 
15. 
Brzust- 1976 Flare tip If either hydrogen, methane, 
owski hydrogen sulphide or carbon 
monoxide are to be flared, 
then a utility flare tip 
should be used. 
16. 
Brzust- 1976 " If the system requires smoke 
owski suppression, then a utility 
flare tip is not recommended. 
17. 
Brzust 1979 " If only small quantities of 
-owski heavy saturates and 
unsaturates are to be flared, 
then a centre steam tip is 
recommended. 
18. 
Brzust- 1979 If large flows of heavy 
owski saturates and usaturates are 
to flared, then a steam ring 
flare tip is recommended. 
19. 
Seebold 1984 Three continuous pilots. 
should be placed around the 
flare tip. 
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Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
20. 
Kletz 1985b Hydrogen If hydrogen is present then 
it should be sent through a 
separate vent at least 10 
feet from buildings. 
21. 
API 1957 Layout If the following are present 
oil water separators 
floating roof tanks 
then there should be at least 
200 feet horizontally from 
the flare to these units. 
22. 
API 1957 A refinery flare should not 
extend less than 50 feet 
above the top of the tallest 
unit within a radius of 100 
feet. 
23. 
API 1957 " If ground flares are present, 
then they should be at least 
300 feet from process units. 
24. 
Kletz 1985a Purge If not flaring refinery gases, 
then a purge of 0.03-0.06 m/s 
is recommended at all times. 
25. 
Kletz 1984 If hot gases are being flared 
then there should be a 10 
times increase in the purge 
gas flow rate. 
26. 
Seebold 1972 Steam If the steam becomes 
injection thoroughly mixed with 
inspirated air then, less 
noise will be produced by 
the steam. 
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Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
27. 
Seebold 1972 if If moisture condensation 
shock is a problem, then dry 
or superheated steam is 
recommended. 
28. 
Seebold 1972 
29. 
Seebold 1972 
30. 
Kletz 
31. 
Reed 
32. 
Kletz 
33. 
API 
34. 
Reed 
35. 
Bluhm 
A steam injection rate of 1/2 
lb of steam per lb of 
hydrocarbon is recommended. 
1985b 
11 
if 
Steam is supplied to the 
injectors at 100-150 psig. 
Steam should not be used in 
stacks which might freeze. 
If sulphur dioxide is present, 
then on emission it should not 
produce a grade level 
concentration of greater than 
O. lppm. 
1968 Pollution 
1985 " If hydrogen sulphide is 
present, then it can be 
burned off at the stack. 
1957 If sulphur dioxide and/or 
sulphur trioxide are present, 
then they should be removed by 
scrubbing. 
1968 If ammonia, or trace 
quantities of phosgene, or 
hydrogen sulphide or hydrogen 
cyanide are present, then 
complete burning is required. 
1961 Blockage If conditions are such that 
242 
Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
flare lines could freeze, 
then flare lines should be 
sloped and free of air 
pockets. 
36. 
Andrew + 1974 If blockage is a problem, 
Williams then a steam trace can be 
used. 
37. 
Seebold 1984 Seals If the gas velocity is 1-3 
feet per second, then a gas 
seal need not be fitted. 
38. 
Company 1966 If the stack is handling hot 
gases or there is a risk of 
blockage, then a molecular 
seal not suitable. 
39. 
Reed- 1972 " If-the gas content in the 
vertical part of the flare can 
be buoyant, then a molecular 
seal is recommended. 
40. 
Kletz 1985a Flame If the gas can decompose with 
arrester air, then fit a flame 
arrester. 
41. 
Andrew + 1974 Knockout If there is likely to be 
Williams Drum liquid discharges or 
formation of condensibles, 
then a knockout drum is 
needed. 
42. 
Andrew + 1974 If a knockout drum is used, 
Williams liquid then a hold up time of 
between 10 and 30 minutes is 
recommended. 
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Source Date Flare Topic Rule 
43. 
Andrew + 1974 it If a knockout drum is used, 
Williams then an additional seal is 
needed at the base of the 
stack to trap any liquid 
formed downstream of the 
drum. 
44. 
Bluhm 1961 it If a knockout drum is used, 
then demister mats are not 
recommended due to liability 
of fouling. 
Most of the rules are therefore of the 'if-then' type. Those 
which are not are in cases where 'if' cases do not occur, i. e. 
where it is certain that the item under. consideration will be 
used on a flare stack. 
It is evident from the'rules table that there are various 
types of rule. Rule types that have been identified are prohibi- 
tion rules, suggestions of alternatives, suggestions of addi- 
tions, selection of one alternative, suggestions to a solution, 
and typical numerical design values. The following table catego- 
rizes the rules under these headings : -- 
Table 11.3 Types of Flare Rules 
Rule Type Rules in`these Types 
Prohibition 
Alternatives 
Additions 
Solutions 
10,11,13,30,31,34,38,44 
1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10,36 
12,14,26,33 
15,16,17,18,27,32,35,39, 
41,43 
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Design Values 5,8,20,21,22,23,24,25,29,37, 
42 
There are likely to be exceptions to the rule types 
prohibitions and selections of alternatives. 
The following table shows the nature of expertise in these 
rule types :- 
Table 11.4 Expertise in Flare Rules 
Expertise often Explicit Expertise often Elusive 
Prohibition rules 
Typical design values 
Suggestions of alternatives 
Suggestions of additions 
Suggestions to a solution 
11.5.3 Conflicts 
The rules table shows rules for many aspects of flare 
design. They have been derived from the literature, as shown in 
the previous section and refined after discussions with an 
expert. Many of the rules come from literature written some 20 
years ago, and this has been the main cause of the conflicts 
discovered. Apart from this the literature is consistent in its 
opinions on the design of flare systems. It is worth noting some 
of the conflicts that have been discovered. 
Many earlier workers recommend the use of flame arresters 
for flashback protection. Today it is widely accepted that 
flame arresters can cause blockages, so they are now only 
recommended in severe cases where the flared gas is likley to 
decompose with air. 
The same is true of molecular seals. These are 'inverted 
cans' put in the stack to stop air coming down it. They are 
susceptible to blockage by carbon deposits and ice, and their 
use is not recommended-today. Water seals may be subject, to 
water loss or freezing 'in extreme weather conditions and also 
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fall into this category. It is accepted today that the only 
effective and safe way to seal a flare system is by the use of 
a continuous gas purge. 
Other sources of conflict arise from changes in legislation 
regarding grade level concentrations of toxics, noise, smoke and 
light. In these cases the date of the source is therefore very 
important. 
11.6 Flare Design Expertise and Strategy 
Having described aspects of flare design through the use of 
an awareness aid and a set of rules, the overall shape of the 
design problem is becoming apparent. In this section we propose a 
strategy for flare system design together with the method that a 
designer might use . The first section is concerned with the 
expertise in flare system design. 
11.6.1 Flare System Design Expertise 
The expertise in the design of a flare system comes in the 
form of knowledge of the components of a flare system and the 
awareness of conventional solutions, alternatives available, 
costs, consequences and probabilities. In the actual process of 
design, distinctions and decisions must be made by being aware of 
the criteria and consequences. In order to show these aspects 
some illustrative examples are given below. 
Basic System 
The designer must be aware of all the possible components of 
a flare system together with which of them is needed on the 
particular installation under consideration. He must also decide 
whether a ground flare is needed alongside an elevated flare, and 
whether using multiple flares will maintain capacity during a 
partial shutdown of one of them. 
In the design of an elevated flare there are certain minimum 
components, such as a flare tip, ýa stack and pilot burners. The 
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expertise is then in the form of decision-making, deciding what 
other components are needed, such as molecular seals, knockout 
drums, smoke suppression and-noise suppression. The rules deve- 
loped above will help in these areas. 
For a ground flare, there is also a minimum requirement of 
all such flares, that is that the air inlet shall be screened off 
to out out direct routes for noise and light. An alternative is 
grouped burners for consecutive operation so giving a greater 
turn-down. 
These aspects of flare design are characterized by the fact 
that each has minimum requirements and the expertise is in the 
form of deciding which 'add-on' components are needed. Some of 
these are discussed below. 
Combustion Devices 
This aspect is a good example of alternatives available and 
criteria for deciding. The nature, frequency and quantity of 
relief, are factors which aid the decision-making, together with 
the-effects on the environment. 
Steam assisted burners are one-such device, but only the 
external type is to be used if freezing is a problem. Air- 
assisted burners are to be-used if smokeless burning is required, 
high pressure gas assisted burners are to be used if heat 
radiation is a problem and water assisted gas burners for ground 
flare installations. Here, though, an awareness of the criteria 
for freezing is required. 
An awareness of operational flaring (periods exceeding 30 
minutes) is needed for deciding if smoke suppresion is needed, 
together with a knowledge of-legislation and local conditions. 
t 
Sim 
There are no specific siting rules so the decisions must be 
made on the basis of the characteristics of the particular flare 
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and local conditions. Knowledge of the proximity of serving 
units, the likely route of the flare line, prevailing winds, 
thermal radiation, and the probability of burning droplets are 
needed. In the case of multiple flares, it must be possible to 
maintain one whilst the others are operational (unless shut- 
down of all flares is an operational requirement). 
Flashback Protection 
There are various ways of dealing with flashback protection 
including purging, liquid seals and gas seals. These may be used 
singly or in combination. Thus, knowledge of each of these is 
required together with an understanding of the particular flare 
system. 
Purging is probably the most complex aspect here. A choice 
must be made for the gas used with attention given to the 
consequences of releasing unburned toxic materials. The purge gas 
rate can be determined by a conventional method, although 
attention is needed if the purge gas has a density lighter than 
that of air. If a flammable gas is used, a rate which adequately 
keeps the flare alight is needed, although internal burning of 
the flare tip may occur. If this is a problem, it must be econo- 
mically evaluated against alternatives such as an increase in the 
purge rate, an upgrade of the material specification of the tip, 
replacing the tip more often or providing tip cooling. 
Seal designs are conventional solutions the only distinction 
being which seal to use if at all. Criteria include not using 
flame arresters if blocking is a problem, and no water seals 
if the temperature of the vapour can fall below 0'C. General 
criteria to satisfy-in the design of a seal system are :- 
Prevention of hydrocarbon build up. 
Prevention of displacement of seal liquid. 
Maintaining the correct seal liquid level over the operating 
Pressure range. 
As we can see, the design of a complete system encompasses 
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many types of knowledge and expertise. Conventional solutions do 
exist for some aspects for elevated flares, flare tips, ground 
flares and knockout drums. Additional requirements for a sys- 
tem involve awareness of alternative solutions together with 
the criteria for deciding which alternative will satisfy the 
design constraints. 
The following table is a summary of some of the elements 
of the expertise required for the design of a flare system :- 
Table 11.5 Expertise for the Design of a Flare System 
Knowledge - codes 
- literature 
- expertise 
Rules - if-then type 
- sources and dates 
Expertise - distinctions 
types of plant 
refineries 
petrochemical plants 
- alternative solutions 
atmospheric venting 
controlled blowdown 
trip systems 
- conventional solutions 
elevated flares 
ground flares 
flare tips 
knockout drums 
seals 
(archetypes) 
- alternatives for specific flare items 
flashback protection 
, flare tips 
- awareness, 
local conditions 
legislation 
environment 
costs 
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probabilities 
consequences 
- criteria for decision making 
11.6.2 Flare Design Strategy 
The following table is a design strategy for the overall 
design of a flare relief system. The list is in the form of 
aspects of the design that we have discussed in this chapter and 
is in an order that a designer might use. 
Table 11.6 A Strategy for Flare Design 
System definition 
Required capacity 
Alternatives 
atmospheric venting 
controlled blowdown 
trip systems 
Design options 
multiple flare systems 
dry gas vs wet gas 
regular vs emergency flow 
high vs low level flares 
Hazards 
Blockage 
Explosion 
Heat radiation 
Toxic gases 
Liquid carryover 
Evaluation criteria 
Heat radiation levels 
Smoke levels 
Noise levels 
Toxicity limits 
Space considerations 
Economics 
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Relief header costs 
Purge gas costs 
Land sterilisation 
Equipment costs 
Hardware design 
Process design 
relief header 
flare stack 
knockout drum 
flare tip 
pilot light 
Mechanical design 
materials of construction 
corrosion 
-brittle fracture 
Explosion Protection 
Purge gas 
Seals 
Oxygen monitoring 
Flame arresters 
Process control 
Manual vs automatic control-- 
Controlled blowdown' 
Startup 
-Initial purge with inerts 
High gas flows 
Shutdown 
Air diffusion 
Plant operation 
Operating instructions 
Emergency action 
Plant Maintenance 
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By studying in detail the design of a flare system, it 
has become apparent that the strategy is very much a linear 
forward moving activity. There seems to be little if any 
iteration involved. However, there may be some in the actual 
sizing of the stack and other system components. Apart from 
that, the design appears to move from one section to the next, 
as outlined above. The 'problem is probably amenable to 
solution by an algorithmic approach or by a production system 
using forward chaining. The, number of rules would, however, 
probably be greater than those identified here. Of the two 
methods, the production system approach appears attractive 
with its usual advantage of allowing the rules to be written 
down in a transparent form. It is the production system 
approach that is being pursued here. 
11.7 A Prolog Program for Flare System Design 
In this section a brief description of a program for 
flare system design is given. The program is written in Prolog 
and runs on a Honeywell Multics DPS8. It is intended to show 
how Prolog might be used for a more extensive application of 
the design of a flare system. It is based on the methodology 
of Winston, given in Chapter 6, who designed a toy system for 
packaging groceries called BAGGER. He used a step design 
technique in production system format. Those aspects have been 
incorporated in this work, including the following design 
steps :- 
check flare items 
determine flare type 
determine flare layout 
determine flare tip 
establish alternatives 
establish safety requirements 
general aspects 
A listing of the program is given in Appendix F, together with 
a list of production rules that the program uses. Here we will 
show the output of the progpam. 
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Like BAGGER this program uses forward chaining strategy, 
the control mechanism then matching the data with the rules in 
the rule base. It is non-interactive, and the output consists 
of a list of recommendations for various flare applications. 
The program contains a random list of rules about flare system 
design and provides a design according to an ordered sequence. 
The rules used have been derived from the rules listed above. 
The program, like BAGGER, uses context limiting conflict 
resolution strategy because by convention the first condition 
clause of each rule limits the rule to a particular step. 
Specificity ordering is also used in that the rule with more 
stringent requirements is triggered after a rule with less 
stringent requirements. 
11.7.1 Program Output 
The output from the flare program is shown below :- 
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York Portable Prolog Release 2.1. 
Please pass on any comments on this Prolog 
to RSMFirkwood via Multics Mail. 
?- flare consulted. 
4_ 
ground_flares present 
stack present I 
*** step is flare_type *** 
There is an item to flare ! 
hydrocarbon 
Conditions are lo-flow and continuous 
Conditions are lo-flow and excess 
*** therefore ground-flare *** 
Conditions are hi-flow and nonrecoverable 
Conditions are lo-flow and non-continucus 
*** therefore elevated-flare *** 
*** step is plant-layout 
There is a ground flare 
p1ant_layout 
Conditions are any_flow and process units 
*** therefore three hundred_feet_separation *** 
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There is a stack I 
plant_layout 
Conditions are any_flow and oil water_separator 
Conditions are any_flow and floating_roof_tank 
Conditions are process_units and stack 
*** therefore two_hundred_feet *** 
*** step is flare. _tip *** 
There is an item for flare tip ! 
Conditions are hi-flow and smokeless-flame 
Conditions are unsaturated_hydroo and hi-flow and smokeless-fl&me 
*** therefore steam_ring_flare_tip *** 
Conditions are hydrogen sulphide and any_flow and smokey_flame 
Conditions are methane and any_flow and smokey_flame 
Conditions are carbon_monoxide and any_flow and smokey_flame 
*** therefore utility-flare-tip *** 
Conditions are saturated_hydroo and 
Conditions are unsaturated_. ydroc and 
Conditions are saturated hydros and 
Conditions are unsaturated_hydroc and 
*** therefore centre_steen_tip *** 
lo-flow and smokeless-flame 
lo-flow and smokeless_ lame 
hi_flow and smokey_flame 
hi-flow and smokey_flame 
*** step-is alternatives *** 
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There is an item for alternatives I 
gas 
Conditions are lo-flow and toxic 
*** therefore do_not_flare *** 
Conditions are hi-flow and hydrogen 
Conditions are discharge_freq_lo and hydrogen 
*** therefore vent_to_atm *** 
Conditions are general_discharge and hydrogen 
Conditions are general discharge and methane 
*** therefore use_separate_vent *** 
***step is safety *** 
There are safety items I 
gas + hydrogen 
Conditions are hi-flow and large_stack 
*** therefore oxygen-alarm-five-per-cent *** 
gas 
Conditions are hi-flow and large_stack 
*** therefore oxygen_alarm_two-, per_cent *** 
Conditions are any-flow and maintenance 
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*** therefore purge_with_nitrogen *** 
Conditions are any_flow and decompose_in_air 
*** therefore fit_flame_arrestor *** 
***step is general flaring rules *** 
There are general flare items ! 
hydrogen 
Conditions are any_flow and venting 
*** therefore vent_at_least_ten_feet_above_buildings *** 
Conditions are ammonia and any-flow and burning 
Conditions are gas + phosgene and any-flow and, burning 
Conditions are gas + hydrogen sulphide and any_flow and burning 
*** therefore complcte_burning_required *** 
no 
[Leaving Prolog] 
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11.8 Summary 
In this chapter aspects of the design of a flare system 
have been described with a view to obtaining a design strategy 
and an understanding of the expertise of expert flare 
designers. This has been done by working from literature 
available and by talking with an expert. As a result, a flare 
system 'awareness aid' has been established together with a 
reasonably comprehensive' set of rules for flare system design. 
The rules were mostly in 'if-then' format and could be chara- 
cterised by being prohibition rules, rules for alternatives, 
rules for additions, rules for conventional solutions, and 
typical design values. This has been followed by a list of the 
expertise involved and the design strategy that an expert 
might employ. 
The expertise comes in many forms including knowledge of the 
components of a system, rules to apply in designing the system, 
awareness of alternative solutions, awareness of conventional 
solutions including archetypes, awareness of local conditions, 
costs and probabilities, etc. and criteria needed for making 
decisions. 
The design strategy included aspects of flare system 
design in an order that the designer might adopt. They include 
system definition, hazards, evaluation criteria, economics, 
hardware design and explosion protection, etc. It has been 
noted that this list seems to be a forward-moving one, and 
that a forward chaining problem solver or an algorithm might 
be appropriate. 
Finally, a Prolog program has been written for various 
aspects of flare system design. It uses forward chaining and 
employs conflict resolution strategies. 
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12 Pressure Relief and Blowdown 
12.1 Introduction 
The subject of pressure relief and blowdown was intro- 
duced as a candidate topic in Chapter 7. It is one of the 
topics thought worthy of further study in order to understand 
the design process and the expertise involved. In contrast to 
the previous sections of this work, no programs have been 
written for the design of a pressure relief system. The topic 
has been chosen since it is one that appears to have deeper 
structure than the others studied. In this chapter, various 
aspects of the design of a relief system are described, an 
account of the literature is given, some rules are proposed 
and a design strategy and design expertise are established 
from an example problem. 
Systems which operate under pressure need to be protected 
against overpressure. Various standards and codes are availab- 
le to help with the design, most notably BS5500 and API RP 520 
and API RP 521. These API codes have been the prime sources of 
information in 'this work. The basic requirement of any relief 
system is the protection from excessive pressure or vacuum, 
excessive temperature, corrosion or explosion or similar. 
Also, there is a, legal requirement for overpressure protec- 
tion, and this, together with some of the code requirements is 
discussed next. 
12.1.1 Legal and Code Requirements 
Apart from the, obvious safety requirements-that need to 
be met, the law in the U. K. states certain conditions 
regarding pressure vessels. - Fitt (1974) regards them as having 
limited scope, and the only items covered are steam boilers, 
steam and air receivers and certain stills and closed vessels. 
They are covered by the Chemical Works Regulations of 1922 and 
the Factories Act of 1961. Apart from this, pressure relief is 
dictated by the common law obligation to safeguard employees 
and members of the public and insurance requirements. 
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API RP 520 and 521 apply to relieving devices and their 
discharge systems on refinery pressure vessels and equipment 
designed for a maximum allowable working pressure of more than 
15 psi. They are recognized standards for the safe design and 
operation of pressure relieving systems. API RP 520 is divided 
into two parts, the first on design and the second on the 
installation of such systems. Part 1 starts with an introduc- 
tion to the different types of relieving device available, 
relief requirements and fires outside vessels. Requirements 
for the relief of vessels exposed to open fires are then 
discussed followed by protection of vessels from fire. Part 2, 
on installation, is concerned with inlet piping, pressure drop 
limitations and piping configurations together with discharge 
piping and valve location. API RP 521 is a guide for all 
aspects of pressure relieving systems and starts with some 
causes of overpressure and determination of individual relie- 
ving rates. Next is a section on the criteria for selecting of 
a suitable disposal method, with the final section concerned 
with the physical design of one aspect, a flare relief system. 
BS 5500: 1976'Unfired Fusion Welded Pressure Vessels 
covers a wide range of topics to do with the physical design 
of such vessels. The standard applies to the design, construc- 
tion, inspection, testing and certification of pressure ves- 
sels. With respect to materials, the standard covers the 
selection of materials, ` the nominal design strength and 
carbon, carbon manganese and alloy steels. The section on 
design includes corrosion, erosion and protection, design 
stresses, vessels under--internal and external pressure, sup- 
ports, attachments and internal structures and the design of 
welds. Cutting, forming and tolerances, welded joints and heat 
treatment are also covered in manufacture and workmanship, 
with a final section on inspection and testing. An Appendix of 
BS 5500 covers pressure relief devices. 
12.1.2 Some Definitions 
Before proceeding with the discussion it is worth noting 
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some definitions concerned with pressure relief and blowdown. 
Basic definitions appear in API RP 520 and 521, and Emerson 
(1985) has given an enhanced explanation of these. 
Safety Valve 
This is similar to a relief valve but opens rapidly and 
is hence sometimes called a 'pop' valve. It is primarily used 
for gas or vapour service. 
Safety Relief Valve 
This is an automatic pressure actuated relieving device 
sutiable for use as either a safety valve or a relieving 
device. It can therefore possess all the'features of both 
types of'valves, 'and -is thus suitable for both liquid and 
vapour service. 
Relief Valve 
This is an automatic pressure relieving device activated 
by the pressure at the inlet of the valve. It is used mainly 
for liquid service, and characteristics include valve opening 
in proportion to any increase in pressure over opening 
pressure. 
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure 
The maximum allowable working pressure is the maximum 
pressure at which h-a single pressure relieving device may be 
set for asystem to prevent exceeding the limit. 
Operating Pressure 
This is the pressure to which the vessel or pipe is 
subjected in normal operations.. 
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Set Pressure 
The set pressure is the inlet pressure at which the 
pressure relieving device is adjusted to open under service 
conditions. Usually the operating pressure does not exceed 90% 
of the pressure relief valve set pressure. 
Overpressure 
The overpressure is the pressure over the set pressure of 
the relieving device. 
Bl owd own 
Blowdown is the difference between the set pressure and 
the reseating pressure of a pressure relief valve, expressed 
as a percent -of the set pessure. 
Back Pressure 
The pressure that exists on the outlet side of the valve 
is called the back pressure. 
12.2 Aspects of Pressure Relief Design 
In this section, various aspects of the need for and 
design of a pressure relief system are described. This 
includes sections dealing with the causes of overpressure, 
considerations for the determination of individual relieving 
rates, a discussion on the kinds of relieving device available 
and disposal systems. 
12.2.1 Causes, of Overpressure 
Why have a pressure relief system ? As we have outlined 
above, it is because vessels may become subject to a rise in 
pressure. There are various reasons for this and some of these 
were listed in-the chapter on flare relief systems. It is 
worth reminding ourselves of the causes listed there :- 
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Loss of cooling water 
Power failure 
Failure of heat exchanger tubes 
Control system failure 
Chemical reaction runaway 
In this section these and other qualitative causes of 
overpessure will be outlined in more detail. Overpressure 
itself is by an inbalance of flows in the plant, and this may 
haveoºvariety of causes. 
Closed Outlets on Vessels 
If a block valve on the outlet of a vessel is closed 
while the plant is on stream, then a pressure exceeding the 
maximum allowable working pressure may result. If the block 
valve is not sealed or locked in the open position then a 
pressure relieving device is needed. To avoid such a hazard 
occurring it is recommended that block valves are not used 
interposed between vessels in series. 
Water/Steam Hammer 
Water hammer, steam hammer and process changes must also 
be considered when designing for overpressure. Water hammer 
cannot be dealt with by a safety relief valve due to its 
relatively slow response time. It causes pressure wave damage 
in vessels and piping, and the API recommend using pulsation 
dampers. Steam hammer occurs in pipes that contain condensate. 
Use of a slow closing valve may help to alleviate the problem. 
Utility Failures 
The following table, as outlined by the API RP 521, gives 
a list of some possible utility failures which will lead to 
overpressure together: with- the equipment that may be affected. 
Utility failure is an indirect cause of one of the other 
causes of failure. 
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Table 12.1 Utility Failures 
Utility Failure Equipment Affected 
Electric Pumps, fans, compressors, 
instrumentation, including 
valves 
Cooling water Condensers, ' coolers, 
jackets 
Instrument air Instrumentation, including 
valves 
Steam Turbine drivers, reboilers 
reciprocating pumps 
Fuel (oil, gas) Boilers, reboilers, engine 
drives, compressors, gas 
turbines 
Inert-gas, Seals, catalytic reactors 
purge 
Fire 
Fires can occur from leakage of hydrocarbons from 
refinery equipment. The source of liquid or gas leakage fee- 
ding the fire may be either the vessel exposed to the flame or 
an adjacent operating or storage vessel. The leakage may 
result from leaking joints in a pipeline, from. equipment or 
from operational mishaps. If there are ground slopes, then the 
fires may spread some distance from the source in the case of 
liquids. Gases can be spread by air-currents. 
If the fire is open and free-burning, then the vessels 
and other adjacent equipment exposed to the flame will absorb 
the heat by radiation or by direct contact. The vessel con- 
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tents, if exposed for long enough, will then become heated and 
vapour will be generated, the pressure will rise, and the 
safety relief valve will open. The valve will then limit the 
maximum pressure in the vessel. In some cases, the rate of 
vapour generation will be greater than the rated capacity of 
the valve and the pressure then rises beyond the permissible 
overpressure and may reach a pressure unsafe for the vessel. 
To alleviate this problem, it is necessary, in sizing the 
safety relief valve, to consider the possiblity of fire expo- 
sure. There are standard methods for dealing with general fire 
exposure. The method given by the API code is the principal 
such method. Not all cases are covered by the standard method. 
If the hydrocarbon leakage caused by a pipeline failure or a 
gasket blowing, for example, - is then ignited, a jet fire will 
result. There is no standard approach for-the impingement of a 
jet flame on a vessel. 
12.2.2 Determination of Individual Relieving Rates- 
In this section we discuss the determination of indivi- 
dual relieving rates quantitatively. ' 
The net energy input, in the form of heat and direct 
energy, is used to determine the liquid and vapour rates used 
to establish relief requirements. The maximum rate which must 
be relieved is then the peak individual relieving rate. The 
possibility of two unrelated failures occurring simultaneously 
is, according to the API, remote and does not usually need to 
be considered. 
The discussion proceeds by taking each cause of overpres- 
sure in turn. 
Cooling Water Failure to Condenser 
On a distillation column the relieving rate is determined 
by a heat and material balance on the system at the relieving 
pressure. The required relief capacity is based on the total 
incoming steam and vapour plus that generated under normal 
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operation, less the vapour condensed by sidestream reflux. 
Reflux Failure 
In the case of a-tower-top reflux failure, the required 
relief capacity is based on the total vapour to the condenser 
at relieving conditions, whilst for sidestream reflux failure, 
the difference between the vapour entering and leaving the 
section is considered. 
Power Failure 
This has to be considered for each individual situation, 
but generally the effect of power failure should be considered 
and the relief valve sized for the worst condition that can 
occur. In the case of power failure to a fractionator, the 
pumps would go down and hence reflux and cooling water would 
fail. The valves are then sized in a similar way to that of 
cooling water failure to a condenser. In the case of reactors, 
the agitation or stirring would stop, and the valve should 
then be sized for product generation from a runaway reaction. 
This is done by considering vapour generation from both normal 
and uncontrolled conditions. 
Entrance of Volatile Material 
This is a-source of potential overpressure, but according 
to the API, no means for calculating the relieving require- 
ments are available-and-no relieving device is provided for 
this contingency, ''although there may be exceptions to this. 
Abnormal Heat or Vapour Input 
In the case of fired heaters or steam reboilers, the 
required relief capacity is based on the the estimated maximum 
vapour generation including non-condensables from overheating. 
In the case of a split reboiler tube the steam entering from 
twice the cross-sectional area of one tube is that rate 
required for relief capacity. 
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Protection of Vessels from Fire 
Provision for fire relief does not give full protection 
against fire. Unwetted surfaces which are exposed to fire may 
experience overtemperature and may even rupture, even though 
overpressure of the vessel has not occurred. In addition to 
pressure relief, the vessel may be protected against fire by 
depressurization, fire insulation or water sprays. The depres- 
surization of a vessel by removing part or all of the contents 
to a relief header or dump tanks not only relieves the pres- 
sure, but also decreases the amount of material able to feed 
the fire. The valve for depressurization should be capable of 
remote operation. 
12.2.3 Pressure Relief Valves 
As we have seen above there are various types of relief 
Ace. 
valve available, and there, \rules which state which valve 
is to 
be used when. Anderson (1976) gives a good review of such 
devices. In this section, the various types of valve are 
described together with criteria for valve selection and 
aspects in sizing and capacity. 
Safety Valve 
These valves are suitable only for steam service in such 
applications as power boilers. They are available as either 
full nozzle or semi-nozzle design (the nozzle is the area in 
which the relieved pressure enters) and they reseat after 
relieving. 
Safety Relief Valves 
There are two types here, classified again in terms of 
the type of nozzle they have. The first, the full nozzle type, 
is used for liquid or vapour service and has the advantage 
that the body of the valve is isolated from the process fluid 
when not relieving. The second, the semi-nozzle type, can 
2 67 
again be used for liquid or vapour service, and is cheaper 
than the full nozzle type. Neither of them is suitable for 
polymer service, but both are suitable for applications such 
as unfired pressure vessels, pumps, compressors and water 
boilers. 
Pilot-Operated Safety Relief Valves 
This type of relieving device consists of two valves, a 
main valve and a controlling pilot valve. This has the advan- 
tage that it can withstand a high inlet pressure, it can be 
set to relieve near to the operating pressure, it can be 
remotely operated for manual depressurization and its high 
outlet velocity ensures good dispersion. However, it cannot be 
used in high temperature service or for services containing 
dirt, slurries or polymers. It is particularly suitable for 
clean high pressure gas service, gas pipelines and reciproca- 
ting compressors. 
Relief Valves 
The main type here is the base nozzle relief valve where 
the nozzle is formed from the base of the valve. Again, they 
are not good for polymer service, but they can handle toxics. 
Typical applications include pump discharge, thermal relief 
valves, heat exchangers and water heaters. 
Rupture Discs 
These consist of a breakable disc held between flanges. 
The two main types are pre-bulged and reverse buckling. They 
are good for slurries and polymers, they can handle large 
capacities and high pressures, and give fast response time and 
can therefore relieve explosions. They are, however, subject 
to fatigue, and once blown, the whole inventory is lost down 
to atmospheric pressure and the unit must-be shutdown. For 
high pressure service, it is recommended that they be used in 
series with relief valves. 
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Setting and Capacity 
The API RP 520 states that if the set pressure is equal 
to the maximum allowable working pressure (effectively the 
design pressure), then for abnormal operation the maximum 
pressure relief should not exceed 110% of the maximum allowab- 
le working pressure. For fire relief, it should not exceed 
120% of the maximum allowable working pressure. 
The valve setting and capacity requirements for adequate 
pressure relief differ between different codes and standards. 
The ICI LFG code summarises the requirements, a distinction 
being made between abnormal operation and that required for 
fire. The code states that under abnormal operation the maxi- 
mum pressure attained during relief should not exceed 100% and 
110% of the design pressure respectively. Under the combined 
situation of abnormal operation and fire relief the set pres- 
sure should not exceed 110% of the design pressure, and the 
capacity should be at least equal to the greater of the two 
capacities calculated for abnormal conditions and fire relief. 
As given by BS5500, the size of a relief valve is esti- 
mated in terms of the rated capacity (in kg/s) and is a 
function of the actual discharge area, the coefficient of 
discharge, the molecular weight, the accummulation pressure 
and the absolute inlet pressure. The coefficient of discharge 
may vary, and BS5500 quotes 0.25 for a parallel inlet guided 
wing type of high lift value and 0.97 for a nozzle inlet type 
of flat disc value. More detail can be, found in the standard, 
where the calculations for bursting discs are also stated. 
12.2.4 Relief-Disposal Systems 
There are various ways of disposing . of the products of 
relief, including using a flare system. This topic therefore 
connects with the work, carried out on.. flare system design. 
Disposal methods include the use of a scrubber for conde- 
nsable mixtures, the products then going to atmosphere via a 
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vent stack, use of a closed flare system or a burning pit. Use 
of such pits depends on space, local conditions and economy. 
Another alternative is to send the relieved material to a low 
pressure system, providing an economical means of disposal. 
This is dependent on the receiving system being able to handle 
the additional load. Liquid from relief systems may also be 
disposed of in a number of ways. For example, water from 
coolers may be discharged to surface drainage. Hydrocarbons 
relieved from lines outside the process area should be discha- 
rged to a tank, closed vessel or sewer. 
Atmospheric disposal of noncondensable vapour is possible 
provided that the equipment location is such that it is safe. 
Such discharge should be limited to those vapours which will 
not condense appreciably at low atmospheric temperature. 
Direct atmospheric relieving of valves is safe only if igni- 
tion can be tolerated with respect to hazards to personnel, 
structures and equipment. 
12.2.5 Location and Position of Relief Valves 
So that the valve can be maintained easily, pressure 
relief valves should be located for easy access and removal. 
Sufficient working space should be provided around the valve 
for this purpose. 
The valve should also be close to the pressure source so 
that the valve will be 'fed' properly under flowing 
conditions, e. g. where a vessel is involved it is recommended 
that the valve be installed on top of the vessel. In cases 
where there are large pressure fluctuations at the source, the 
valve is usually located at a point where the pressure region 
is more stable. Where items such as reducing stations, orifice 
plates, flow nozzles and other valves and fittings are invol- 
ved, it is recommended that the pressure relief valve be 
fitted some distance downstream of the device. Figures 12.1 
and 12.2 show two typical pressure relief valve locations. 
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12.3 Account of the Literature 
Like the design of a flare disposal system, pressure 
relief system design is also the topic of many technical 
papers together with the codes that have already been des- 
cribed. In this section an account is given of some principal 
papers 
12.3.1 General 
Fitt (1974) gives a good introduction on the process 
engineering of pressure relief and blowdown. He discusses the 
problem of excess pressure and ways of dealing with it. He 
states that a quantitative hazard analysis for each relief 
problem is impractical and a qualitative approach is more 
applicable. Alternatives for dealing with the problems of 
possible overpressure are given as :- 
-an inherently safer plant, i. e. stronger vessels 
-instructing/equipping the operator to avoid or neutralize 
the hazard 
-a high integrity trip system to shut off energy sources 
-better emergency services 
-limiting the consequences by excluding personnel from the 
danger area 
-ignoring trivial or highly improbable hazards 
Fitt then goes on to classify individual hazards into those 
which can be ignored, those where protection is needed, but 
normal relieving devices will suffice, and those which need a 
special design. Particular cases are then described including 
the shut-in pump or compressor, pressure letdown, a continuous 
still and low pressure storage tanks. Relief headers and the 
relief header design basis also receive attention. Fitt states 
that in designing a relief system, all the causes must be 
considered, and the single worst case-is designed for. 
Kauders (1981 and 1985) has written extensively on 
process engineering design in general and in particular 
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designing for plant upset conditions. His discussions are 
biased to the mechanical design of vessels, but include as- 
pects such as pressure relief system design, vessel thickness, 
piping considerations and vessel depressuring. 
Moore (1984) is also concerned with general aspects of 
relief. He states that the four main stages in the design 
process are :- 
1. Specification of the relief requirement 
2. Selection of the relief device 
3. Detailed design of the pipework/hardware 
4. Designing for dispersion or treatment of the products of 
relief 
Other aspects discussed include specifying the relief 
requirements, which can be done by a relevant safety code, 
taking into consideration the particular vessel or group of 
vessels, relief devices, pipework design, dispersion and a 
list of conventionally available safety valves. 
Swift (1984) talks of the developments in the design of 
an emergency relief system for chemical reactors. He states 
how critical this is. Emergency relief systems are not called 
upon to function continually and the amount and type of data 
needed will depend on the particular design strategy adopted 
and data generated during the normal process design are not 
usually suitable, since they seldom cover extreme conditions. 
He proposes an algorithm for the elements of an emergency 
relief system design strategy. 
12.3.2 Particular Cases 
There are various'accounts concerning pressure relief and 
blowdown applied to particular instances such as heat exchan- 
gers, distillation columns and storage tanks. Some of these 
aspects are described below. 
Bradford and Durrett (1984) discuss aspects on the sizing 
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of safety relief valves for distillation columns. Apparently 
these are often under-sized, because the designer does not 
consider the actual maximum tower load. Factors considered in 
the sizing of such valves include tower flooding, reboiler 
capacity and condenser capacity. The question of alternative 
locations for relief valves is also discussed. 
Crozier (1980) talks about the pressure relief to prevent 
heat exchanger failure. Such failures may be caused by water 
and steam hammer, vibration, errosion, overpressure and pro- 
cess upsets. Crozier then goes on to discuss various types of 
relief valves and discharge piping. Finally, he gives an 
example of the sizing of a relief valve for an ammonia 
vaporizer. 
Air-cooled heat exchangers are the subject of a separate 
section in API RP 521 and are discussed by Brown and France 
(1975). Air-cooled heat exchangers can fail due to blocked 
outlets, louver failure or electrical failure. Methods for 
calculating the relief loads from blocked outlets are well 
established for air-cooled heat exchangers, but under electri- 
cal failure, when there is natural convection heat loss, 
methods are few and inaccurate. 
12.3.3 Relief Devices 
Most of the work covered in the general area of pressure 
relief and blowdown tends to be concerned with the different 
kinds of relief device available. Hodnick (1985) talks about 
four devices for unfired pressure vessels. These are rupture 
discs, safety relief valves, safety valves and combinations of 
safety valves and rupture discs. He states that the simplest 
relief device is the rupture disc. Further, the materials of 
construction are discussed which include stainless steel, 
inconel and nickel etc. An account is then given of the diffe- 
rent types of relief devices available, and the use of a 
combination of-rupture discs and safety valves in primary and 
secondary relief. 
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Puleo (1985) gives an account of the choice between 
relief valves or rupture discs. Factors considered are the 
loss of valuable fluid if a rupture disc is used, gradual 
pressure rises and rapid pressure rises. For rapid rises in 
pressure, a relief valve may not be adequate since it may not 
act quickly enough. In such explosive situations, rupture 
discs are far better. 
Emerson (1985) categorizes valves into direct-acting or 
pilot-operated. Direct-acting types use a weight or spring to 
maintain valve closure to the set point, while pilot-operated 
valves use an unbalanced piston assembly in the main valve, 
with their position and type of operation controlled by a 
pilot. 
12.3.4 Alternatives to Pressure Relief 
One alternative to relief valves for pressure relief is 
the use of protective systems that isolate sources of pres- 
sure. Lawley and Kletz '(1975) discuss this aspect. The reason 
for considering such an alternative is that as plants become 
larger so do relief, systems and therefore costs. The use of 
stronger vessels may also avoid the use of a relief valve. In 
other cases, relief valves can be replaced by instrumented 
protective systems, or 'trip' systems. These detect a rise in 
pressure and shut off the source of pressure. Typically on a 
distillation column, the rise in pressure can be used to 
isolate the heat input to the base, and where runaway chemical 
reactions are a possiblity a trip can isolate the supply of 
one of the reactants, avoiding the possibility of having to 
install a relief valve. Lawley and Kletz then go on to des- 
cribe the design-of a typical trip system for a fractionator. 
They state that an optimum trip system is one that yields 
adequate protection at minimum cost. The design is based; on 
fail-danger fault rates of relief valves to obtain-a fractio- 
nal dead time for the trip system. Basic requirements are a 
high pressure sensor on the overhead vapour line, and a 
solenoid valve and associated trip valve. 
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12.4 Pressure Relief Design 
There are many aspects, therefore, to the design of a 
pressure relief system, and in order to gain some idea of the 
expertise being deployed an attempt is made here to give an 
outline of the problem and a logical approach to it. 
12.4.1 Alternatives 
The first item to consider, after a system definition, is 
a decision on whether pressure relief is the most appropriate 
solution for overpressure protection. Alternative solutions 
are listed below :- 
Pressure limitation by design 
Pressure limiting instrumentation (trips) 
Pressure containment 
Aspects used in the decision here will involve an awareness of 
the costs, likelihood of system failure, and codes of 
practice. The optimum solution may then be chosen. 
12.4.2 System Definition 
Assuming that the designer has chosen pressure relief as 
the viable alternative, it is then necessary to specify the 
following features for each relief device :- 
Location 
Set pressure 
Capacity 
Venting sink 
We shall now draw together pressure relief aspects that were 
described above, and consider them under the following hea- 
dings :- 
Pressure relief situations 
Overpressure sources 
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Pressure protection principles 
Pressure protection - individual solutions 
Pressure protection - consolidation and system solutions 
These are now considered in turn, in terms of classifica- 
tion as opposed to a design strategy. The classification makes 
the problem of detailing a design strategy easier, and is 
really a structured summary of the aspects of pressure relief 
design described above. 
12.4.3 Pressure Relief Situations 
These are :- 
Normal operational relief 
Emergency operational relief 
Fire relief 
12.4.4 Overpressure Sources 
There are many aspects here, but the main ones are :- 
Extraneous components 
Water in hot oil 
Light hydrocarbon in hot oil 
Light components in distillation fluids 
Chemical reactions 
Combustion 
Reaction runaway 
Exposure to high pressure sources 
High pressure process fluids 
High pressure utilities 
Pressure raisers 
Heat exchanger high pressure side 
Loss of low pressure sink 
Heat input 
Burners 
Steam 
Heat transfer fluid 
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Atmosphere 
Cooling loss 
Water cooling 
Air cooling 
Heat transfer fluid 
Ref lux cooling 
Subcooled feed 
Thermal expansion (blocking in) 
Fluid at ambient temperature 
Fluid below ambient temperature 
Fluid below temperature of another process fluid 
Pressure transients 
Water hammer (incompressible fluid) 
Steam hammer 
Fire 
12.4.5 Pressure Protection Principles 
It is not practical to design for the very worst case and 
so it is necessary to have some principles to select cases for 
design. Some of these principles might be :- 
Single failure 
Utility loss cases 
Capacity credit 
Fire scenarios - 
Of the above, the term capacity credit needs explanation. 
In order to evaluate the relieving needs due to any cause, it 
is assumed that automatic control valves remain in the 
position required for normal'processing flow. Unless the 
condition of flow through the valves changes, credit may be 
taken for the normal capacity of these valves, corrected to 
relieving conditions, providing that the downstream is capable 
of handling an increased flow. The decisions involved here 
involve evaluating response times and effects of controller 
settings, such as band, reset and rate.. 
The other principles listed above have received attention 
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in the text above. 
12.4.6 Pressure Protection - Individual Solutions 
It is possible to identify certain standard cases, or 
archetypes, that are the same in most design cases. Not all 
the cases have a solution, with prevention and awareness being 
important in these cases. Some of these are listed below :- 
Water in hot oil - prevention not protection 
Light hydrocarbons in hot oil - protection not prevention 
Light components in distillation fluid - awareness 
Combustion - combustion venting - special case 
Reaction runaway - reaction venting - special case 
High pressure pipe - valve normally open or closed 
Pump, compressor - overdesign 
low pressure side - non-return valve or 
special system 
Heat exchanger tube failure - pressure relief or special 
system 
Steam heated heat exchanger awareness 
Cooling water failure - conventional pressure relief 
Fire - pressure relief - special case 
Pressure transients - damping chambers" 
Ref lux - pressure relief - special case 
Thermal expansion - pressure relief 
12.5 Design Rules 
The next step in gaining an insight into the design 
expertise is to write some rules for pressure relief design. 
These are described below. 
12.5.1 Rules for Valve Selection 
It has not been possible to identify rules for the design 
of a pressure relief system in the same way as flare system 
design. However, one area, that of relief valve selection is 
well suited to rules. One way forward here is for some sort of 
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automatic classification system, based on Ex-Tran7, as in the 
case of emergency isolation valves. This approach is possible 
because examples of valve installations could be written down 
in terms of properties such as material and temperature, and 
their values together with a class distinction such as 'safety 
relief valve', 'bursting disc' etc. Therefore, in this case 
distinctions need'to be made about the types of valves in use, 
and thus classification expertise is involved. The following 
set of rules tries to capture these distinctions. 
1. If inert materials are used and when shutdown and material 
loss can be tolerated, then a rupture disc may be suitable 
Puleo (1985) 
an' 
2. If toxics are usedAthe system is venting to a flare system 
and leakage and shutdowns can be tolerated, then a rupture 
disc may be suitable. 
Puleo (1985) 
3. If additional protection is needed, then use a rupture disc 
in series with a relief device. 
Puleo (1985) 
4. If the temperature is high, then a safety relief valve 
should not be used. ' 
Andrew and Stockton (1979) 
5. A safety relief valve should be used for gas/vapour 
service. 
Andrew and Stockton (1979) 
6. If the system is in liquid service, then use a relief 
valve. 
Andrew and Stockton (1979) 
7. If a valve is likely to lodge open with dirt, then use a 
bellows sealed relief valve. 
Bright (1972) 
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8. If freezing fail open is likely to be a problem, then use a 
pilot operated relief valve with no guiding surfaces. 
Bright (1972) 
9. If leakage due to corrosion or foreign body is likely to be 
a problem, then use either a resilient seated valve or use a 
rupture disc under the relief valve. 
Bright (1972) 
, 
10. For storage vessels in a hot climate, a pilot operated 
relief valve is recommended so as to open enough to relieve 
the demand. 
Bright (1972) 
12.5.2 Rules for Pressure Relief in General 
As above, the rules are written largely in production 
system format as this is the type of system envisaged for 
design of a, pressure relief system. -Most of the rules derive 
from the API design codes, and they are derived in the same 
way as was used in the work on flare systems. 
11. A relief valve should be set to open at the MAWP of the 
vessel. 
Bright (1972) 
12. If there is more than one pressure relief valve, then the 
set pressures should be-staggered. 
Bright (1972) 
13. If block valves are not sealed open or locked, then 
pressure relief is needed. 
14. If overfilling is likely to be a problem on a vessel, then 
a warning to the operator is needed, and pressure relief if 
the vessel is likely to become full, designed for the maximum 
liquid pump in rate. 
15. If pressure relief is needed, then design the system for 
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the condition(s) that require the most relief. 
16. Relief may not be needed on all vessels, only those which 
can be isolated from the material sink. 
17. If a vessel cannot withstand atmospheric pressure, and it 
is likely to be subjected to a vacuum, then vacuum relief is 
needed. 
18. If closed outlets are a problem, then design for maximum 
liquid pump in rate (liquids) or total steam and vapour input 
under normal operation (vapours). 
19. If cooling water failure to the condenser is a problem, 
then design for total vapour and steam entering less the 
vapour condensed by ref lux. 
20. If top tower reflux failure is a problem, then design for 
total vapour going to the condenser. 
21. If sidestream reflux failure is a problem, then design for 
the difference between the vapour entering and leaving the 
system. 
22. If accumulation of non-condensables is a problem, then a 
safety relief valve is needed designed for total steam and 
vapour entering under normal operation less the vapour conden- 
sed by sidestream reflux. In the case of vessels handling 
liquid design for the maximum liquid pump in rate. 
23. If failure of automatic controls is a problem, and there 
is a low pressure controller, then design for total normally 
uncondensed vapour. 
24. If failure of automatic controls is a problem, then it is 
not necessary to design for 'all valves closed' failure mode 
except where water and reflux are used. 
25. If fired heaters and/or steam reboilers are in use, then 
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design for the maximum vapour generated and the non-condensib- 
les from over-heating. 
26. In the case of split reboiler tubes, then the requirement 
is for steam entering an area of 2 times the cross-sectional 
area of one tube. 
27., If designing for abnormal chemical reactions, then use an 
estimate of the amount of vapour generation from both normal 
and abnormal operation. 
28. If designing for power failures, then design for the worst 
possible case (dependent on local conditions) 
29. If a fractionator needs relief, then design for the total 
vapour entering and that generated under normal operation. 
30. If a reactor needs relief, then design for the product 
generation from a runaway reaction. 
31. If air-cooled heat-exchangers need relief, then size the 
valve for the difference between normal and emergency flow. 
32. If a surge vessel needs relief, then design for the maxi- 
mum liquid inlet rate. 
33. If a vessel is in need of protection and there are no 
fluctuations in pressure, then fit the valve to the top of the 
vessel. 
34. If fluctuations in pressure arise at the-source, then fit 
the pressure relief valve at a point where the pressure is 
stable. 
35. If valves and fittings are in close proximity to the 
pressure source, then fit the valve at a point some distance 
downstream of the device. - 
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12.5.3 Rule Types 
As with the rules for flare system"s, certain types of 
rule emerge from the list above. Rules 1-12 are all rules of 
alternative relief valves which make distinctions about the 
properties of the different valves available. As we stated 
above, these look well suited to an induction type of system, 
involving classification. The rules in their action suggest 
which type of valve should be adopted for particular installa- 
tions. Rules 13-17 are all rules giving an indication to the 
solution to adopt for the overpressure problem. At this stage 
in the design no more information is needed apart from system 
definition and suggested solution strategy. These rules indi- 
cate this. The rules 18-32 are of a similar but more specific 
type. It is assumed by now that pressure relief is the adopted 
solution strategy, along with certain scenarios for certain 
kinds of equipment. Rules 18-24 are indications of a solution 
for certain overpressure situations such as accumulation of 
non-condensibles. Rules 25-32 are indications towards a conve- 
ntional solution for archetypes such as fractionators and heat 
exchangers. Rules 33-35 take the design further by detailing 
the location requirements of relief valves. The rules are 
indications of a solution from various alternatives from given 
conditions. 
One point to note here is that the rules are specialised 
rules. This means that not all the rules will apply to all 
situations, so the designer selects the rules which apply to 
his particular installation. 
At this stage in the study it is necessary to give an 
indication of the design strategy employed by experts. This 
has been difficult to formulate for several reasons. Typically 
the literature gives little indication of the process of 
designing a pressure relief system, and experts themselves 
probably go about the design problem in a subconcious manner. 
For these reasons it was decided to carry out the initial 
design of a pressure relief system for a typical plant. Before 
the study itself, a description of the theory of the first 
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stages of pressure relief design must be given. In this study, 
it was not possible to have direct acces to an expert, but 
some discusions were held by Professor Lees with an expert in 
industry, and some of the discussion is used below. 
In order to reduce the problem to a manageable size, it 
is necessary to break the plant down into sub-systems, i. e. a 
decomposition is necessary. 
12.6 System Decomposition 
Often, if the problem can be formulated correctly, the 
solution becomes fairly straightforward. Therefore, if a 
decomposition is correct, the rest of the design problem will 
be simplified. It plays an important part in this particular 
aspect of design. In this case a decomposition is essential, 
and it is difficult to do without considering in detail 
various pressure sources. 
Decomposition is a recognized method of breaking down a 
plant diagram into component parts. The method used determines 
the representation ultimately obtained. Decomposition can be 
done at varying levels of detail. The main idea of decomposi- 
tion for pressure relief design is to show groups of vessels 
in well defined overpressure cause situations. 
The principle used in the pressure relief survey is that 
of pressure breaks. The sections of plant between two breaks 
are at a more or less uniform pressure. 
It is necessary at this stage to define pressure breaks. 
A pressure break is a point at which there is a large rise or 
fall in pressure. A section of plant between two breaks will 
tend to be at a more or less uniform pressure. Such a break is 
not necessarily declared at every point where pressure is let 
down, particularly if the pressure fall is trivial. Generally 
certain broad pressure bands are declared and used. 
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12.7 Example Problem - Benzene Plant Line Diagram 
A line diagram of a benzene plant was readily available, 
so it was decided to use this for our own relief survey. The 
diagram is shown in Figure 12.3. From the initial study on the 
design of a pressure relief system, an expert designer will 
first go about a plant decomposition. The aim is to decompose 
the system into manageable components for pressure relief and 
suggest some rules for decomposition together with possible 
causes of overpressure. Firstly, the plant is described by the 
line number, vessels, pressure and control valves. These are 
listed below. Our default assumption at this stage is that all 
vessels in the plant need protection against operational 
overpressure. Also assumed is that the whole plant will need 
protection against fire. 
12.7.1 List of Vessels 
There are two regions of pressure that can be identified 
for pressure breaks. These are :- 
1.1 to 2.9 bar and 
20.4 to 24 bar 
The first stage is to list and describe all vessels 
together with their inlet and outlet pressures. This is listed 
in the following table below. Some of the lines have been 
split into sub-lines, as indicated in-Figure 12.3 and shown 
with suffixes (a), (b) or (c). This makes the task of identi- 
fying pressure breaks easier, and the break can be pin-pointed 
to a particular item of equipment. 
Table 12.2 Decomposition of the Benzene Plant Line Diagram 
Line No. Control Valves Vessels Pressure 
Inlet Outlet Inlet Outlet bar 
1 (a) PCV ---1.4 
(b) - PCV TK-101 - 1.4 
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Line No. Control 
Inlet, 
Valves 
Outlet 
Vessels 
Inlet Outlet 
Pressure 
bar 
2 (a) - - P-101A/B TK-101 1.1 
(b) PCV - - P-101A/B 1.1 
(c) - PCV E-101 - 23.7 
3 - - C-101 D-101 20.4 
4 flow flow - - 24.0 
5 - - E-101 C-101 24.0 
6 - - H-101 E-101 23.7 
7 - - R-101 H-101 23.0 
8 (a) - PCV R-101 - 24.0 
(b) PCV - - C-101 24.0 
9 - - E-106 R-101 22.0 
10 - - E-101 E-106 21.2 
11 - - E-103 E-101 21.0 
12 (a) - - E-102 E-103 20.6 
(b) - - D-101 E-102 20.6 
13 - - D-102- D-101 20.6 
14 (a) PCV - - - 20.6 
(b) - PCV - - 11.4 
15 (a) -' - E-103 - 20.6 
(b) PCV - - E-103 20.6 
(c) - PCV T-101 - 2.5 
16 (a) - - E-104 T-101 2.0 
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Line No. Control Valves Vessels Pressure 
Inlet Outlet Inlet Outlet bar 
(b) -- D-103 E-104 2.0 
17 (a) -- P-101A/B D-103 2.9 
(b) -- - P-102 2.9 
18 (a) PCV - -- 2.9 
(b) - PCV T-101 - 2.9 
19 (a) PCV - -- 2.6 
(b) - PCV E-105 - 2.6 
(c) -- - E-105 2.6 
20 (a) PCV - - T-101 2.3 
(b) - PCV E-1 - 2.3 
(c) -- - E-107 2.3 
12.7.2 Pressure Breaks 
It is evident from the table that significant breaks in 
pressure occur across the pump P101A/B and the control valve 
in line 15. Therefore the following vessels can be considered 
as being at one pressure level for the purposes of pressure 
relief : - 
Distillation unit (not including E-105) - T-101, D-103 
Furnace - H-101, R -101, D-102, D-101 
Storage tank - TK- 101 -' 
The pressure differences are between about 1,1 1,18 and 24 
bar for these vessels. 
A pressure relief survey for this system would require 
the following principal overpressure scenarios to be consi- 
dered :- 
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High inlet pressure (including utility failure, reflux failure 
. etc. 
) 
Blocked outlets 
High heat input 
Loss of cooling water 
Tube bursts 
Fire 
More specifically, the distillation column, for example, 
can 'see' overpressures including reflux failure and utility 
failure. An awareness of the consequences of light hydrocar- 
bons in hot oil is also needed, and also the effects of fire. 
The archetypes of this system, i. e., those where standard 
relief will suffice are the distillation unit, the furnace and 
the storage tank. 
Due to limitations of time and lack of expertise and data 
this example problem has not proceeded further. It has shown, 
however, how an initial relief survey may proceed and the 
realization of archetypes, standard cases and overpressure 
causes. Also, various rules for decomposition have been de- 
rived. These are described in the section below. 
12.7.3 Rules for Decomposition 
These have been derived by writing down the actions taken 
during the decomposition process. 
1. If there are significant differences in pressure throughout 
the line diagram, then pressure breaks will occur 
2. If pressure-breaks exist, then they must be identified and 
the system decomposed into manageable portions for pressure 
relief design. 
3. Each line in the diagram should be examined for significant 
changes in pressure (>5 bar). 
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4. Lines of similar pressure should be coded for identifica- 
tion of pressure breaks. 
5. Lines which contain control valves, heat exchangers or 
similar should be sub-divided either side of the equipment 
using suffixes. 
6. If there is a vessel or heat exchanger or similar that can 
be physically isolated, then it must have its own pressure 
protection. 
7. If there is a group of vessels that can be isolated from 
the rest of the plant, then the group can be treated as one 
for pressure protection purposes. 
8. If a pressure break has been identified, then ensure that 
all pipes and vessels etc. either side of the break are at a 
similar pressure. 
9. Those vessels which are- at a similar pressure between two 
pressure breaks can be grouped together as a subsystem and can 
be treated as one vessel for pressure relief design. The 
designer may choose to limit this to a maximum number of 
vessels, say six. 
10. The working pressure of a vessel/subsystem should be 
slightly below the design pressure of the vessel/subsystem. 
11. If there is a distillation unit present on the plant, then 
treat it as an individual system. 
12. If there is a vessel fitted with a heating element or 
other element which might cause pressure in the vessel, then 
the protecting device should be adequate to prevent the 
increase. 
12.8 Pressure Relief Design Strategy 
The following discussion on the design of a pressure 
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relief system is a contribution towards the understanding of 
how an expert designer goes about such a design. The account 
is based on discussions with experts in the field. 
The relief survey starts with the Piping and Instrumenta- 
tion diagram. This incorporates the main design decisions. 
Essentially this is accepted, though the relief designer may 
ask for a few changes. 
A relief survey is then done. The system is decomposed 
into subsystems; this is done on the basis of what is 'mana- 
geable'. If the decomposition is too coarse or too fine, 
points may be missed, especially on interactions. Typically a 
subsystem is a functional unit such as a distillation or 
absorption/regeneration unit,. with up to half a dozen vessels. 
In the example shown in this study, decomposition has 
been done on a coarse scale on, the basis of pressure breaks in 
the system. For fire relief a different and finer subdivision 
is used. In this case it is necessary to treat as a separate 
subsystem any vessel/pipe which can be shut in by an isolation 
valve, control valve, non-return valve or an emergency shut- 
down valve. 
The designer typically starts with a listing of utility 
failures, which leads to consideration not only of cooling but 
also of control loop actions. He may use a set of standard 
utility loss cases. Next, open inlets, closed outlets and fire 
are considered. With fire, a set of standard cases may be 
used. Finally, situations such as tube burst and thermal 
relief are considered. 
12.8.1 Pipework 
The piping pressures used are a discrete set and are 
usually related to the ASA standard pressures for flanges, 
which are, 150,300,450,600,900 and 1500 pstg. In this set 
flanges are designed to withstand saturated steam at these 
pressures and the corresponding temperatures. The minimum 
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pressures used for pipework appears to vary between different 
companies. An oil company may standardise on 15 bar, whereas a 
chemical company using more expensive materials of construc- 
tion may choose a lower minimum pressure such as 6 bar. 
12.8.2 Vessels 
There are also minimum design pressures for the main 
vessels on a plant. A value of 3 bar is typical due to the 
mechanics of the system. However it is also necessary to have 
a high enough pressure for effective pressure relief, and a 
value of about 5 bar is needed for relief to a flare header. 
Design practice appears to be to design a vessel for a parti- 
cular pressure and to provide pressure relief for that 
pressure, regardless of the design pressure of the associated 
pipework. 
12.8.3 Outline of the Design Process 
The following is an outline of a possible approach to the 
design of a pressure relief system :- 
Decompose pressure system 
Select subsystems 
Identify pressure breaks 
Locate pressure reliefs (default assumption: pressure relief is 
located on each main vessel) 
Identify relief loads on each main vessel 
Utility failure 
Open outlet (connection to high pressure sources) 
Closed outlet (disconnection of low pressure sink) 
Heat input 
Cooling loss 
Operating excursions 
Equipment failure 
Fire 
Quantify relief loads on each main vessel 
-Utility failure standard cases 
Fire standard cases 
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Select relief sink 
Other part of plant 
Flare header 
Other closed system 
Atmosphere 
Determine set pressure of relief valves 
Determine capacity of relief valves 
Select type of relief valves 
The above list is fairly brief, but it does give an idea 
as to the kind of methods used by designers. One point to note 
is that there are many subsidiary topics associated with the 
topics above. These are outlined below. 
12.8.4 Subsidiary Topics and Design Expertise 
These are areas of pressure relief design that are indi- 
rectly involved, and the designer must therefore be aware of 
them when designing such a system. The list shows these, and 
also gives an indication of'the expertise involved in the 
design. 
Legal and standards requirements 
Economics and alternative solutions 
Alternatives to or mitigation of pressure relief 
Pressure containment 
Pressure limitating instrumentation 
Pressure limitation by design 
Mitigation of fire relief 
Fire proofing 
Water drench 
Ground slope 
Depressurisation 
Minimum venting pressure 
Flare header 
Atmosphere 
Selection of disposal systems 
Atmospheric disposal 
Disposal criteria 
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Safe disposal 
Pressure valve design and location 
Special conditions 
Corrosive fluids 
Cold fluids 
Unit operations and equipment 
Furnaces 
Distillation Columns 
Shell and tube heat exchangers 
Pressure storage 
Steam systems 
Pipelines 
The design therefore has many aspects and is one of great 
expertise and probably deep structure. e. g. the study of flare 
system design may form just one part of the design process for 
pressure relief design. Knowledge of codes and legislation is 
required, rules are used and expertise of different types is 
employed. The expertise is in the form of an awareness of many 
different aspects such as distinctions, alternatives, arche- 
types, overpressure scenarios, conventional solutions and 
classifications. Also required is an appreciation of special 
cases such as combustion and runaway reaction together with a 
knowledge of probability regarding the likelihood of a parti- 
cular situation arising. 
The design of a pressure relief system seems to be one of 
deeper structure than that of a flare system. This is evident 
from the fact that a decomposition of the system is needed, 
whereas it is trivial for flare systems. The study suggests 
that after the decomposition stage, a more difficult area of 
the design has to be done. We have done work on the initial 
stages in design, and also on the final aspects, i. e. relief 
valve selection. It has been difficult to work out a design 
strategy for the middle section of the design, which includes 
flow determination. If the decomposition of the system is 
correct, then it is a fairly straightforward assumption that 
one relief system is needed per grouping. The actual stages in 
the design therefore seem to be :- 
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1. Decomposition 
2. Definition of flows 
3. Choice of relief valves 
Work still needs to be done on flow definition. 
Another similarity with the flare system work is that 
there is no obvious need for iteration in the actual design 
process. It is interesting to note that although iteration is 
a characteristic of design, the need for iteration has not 
come through in this work. One reason for this is possibly the 
use of a fairly comprehensive decision procedure and set of 
rules. 
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13 Problem Characteristics 
13.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters we have discussed the design problem 
generally and specific problems -in the design of plants 
handling hazardous materials. We have attempted to show va- 
rious problem-solving strategies for these topics, and it is 
now possible to establish the characteristics of the design 
problems and propose an outline of design generally with the 
techniques of artificial intelligence in mind. This has been 
possible by studying the type of expertise and problem-solving 
strategies for each topic studied. 
In this chapter, we will start by giving a brief summary 
of the candidate topics studied, the expertise involved and 
the problem solving strategies employed or suggested. The 
study of the kind of expertise involved is an important as- 
pect, since it gives an indication as to what type of problem- 
solving strategy is the most appropriate. We can also compare 
the methodologies of design, particularly that of Simon 
(1981), given in Chapter 6 with the characteristics drawn out 
here. 
13.2 Problems Studied 
We have used various strategies for solving the topics 
studied in this work and it* is fairly evident that design 
problems as a whole need these strategies if any viable 
contribution is going to be made from expert systems in this 
field. In this section a summary of the nature of each, problem 
is given together with a description of the tools used to 
solve the problem. In this way it is possible to match the 
nature of each problem with the strategy chosen for solving 
it. 
13.2.1 Fire Protection of Storage Tanks 
This topic was the first to be studied in the work, and 
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was used as a learning excercise. It was concluded that it is 
not an area of great expertise, and that perhaps it is an 
algorithmic problem. However, we have demonstrated a Prolog 
knowledge based system which -suggests ways of protecting 
storage installations from fire. The knowledge for the program 
came largely from codes of practice, although some discussion 
with an expert did take place. The initial approach, in order 
to codify the knowledge-was to make an algorithmic logic 
diagram, which was shown in Chapter 9. The diagram makes 
distinctions and classifications on various aspects to do with 
storage installations, including material type, the type of 
tank and the size of the installation. The resulting Prolog 
program has in its knowledge base rules derived from the 
diagram. The user then enters into a consultation with the 
program, answering various questions so that the program could 
establish the type of storage being considered, and the resul- 
ting fire protection. 
The program written is not an expert system, for reasons 
outlined in Chapter 9. The problem, as we indicated, is proba- 
bly an algorithmic one, but a Prolog program is a valid option 
in order-to have the knowledge readily at hand. The program 
used forward chaining since a goal is concluded, i. e. that of 
fire protection, by considering the data available. 
Another solution strategy was tried, that of 
classification. by type of protection. It was concluded that 
fire protection for storage tanks tend have-be fairly unique 
solutions, which results in no classification of the 
traditional kind. 
The topic is therefore characterised by the use of mainly 
algorithmic expertise, although some classification is also 
evident. The knowledge used-. is straightforward, with seemingly 
few ambiguities, making for a clear-cut solution strategy. 
Forward chaining appears to be the most appropriate because 
the solution for, safe storage is reached by considering the 
data available, whether using a computer approach or by 
designing the installation manually. 
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13.2.2 Emergency Isolation Valves 
The problem of whether or not to fit an emergency 
isolation valve is dependent on various factors, as outlined 
in Chapter 10. There, it was shown that fitting such a device 
is costly, and therefore the chances and consequences of a 
leak must be carefully evaluated. Factors considered in the 
decision include past leak history, temperature of the 
material, and the probability of a leak including its conse- 
quences. 
The problem was tackled using data from an olefins plant 
and the rule induction method derived by Quinlan. The data 
available was in a format suitable for such a method, and use 
was made of the expert system building tools Expert-Ease and 
Ex-Tran7. These methods rely on examples of the domain 
together with a class distinction, which in this case was the 
binary split 'fit an EIV' or 'do not fit an EIV'. After 
running the examples through the software a rule was induced 
based on the most discriminatory attribute in the example set. 
The rule subsequently induced contained 11 nodes, with the 
attribute 'large hazard' (i. e. the item- is less likely to 
leak, but if it does so, could release a large quantity with 
no way of stopping it) as the one which gave the most 
information. 
In-order to use the rules established in a more 
comprehensive consultation system, and so that information on 
rule strength and uncertainty in attribute values could be 
included, the expert system shell Micro-Expert was used. This 
system relies on the programmer to have at hand a good set of 
rules to code into-the advice language, and since the rule 
induction method induced the best possible rule in the light 
of the data available, there was no need to derive the rules 
by hand. The method used for coding the induced rules depends 
on certain hypotheses being defined. These included HISTORY, 
HAZARD, and TEMP. Also, factors which indicate the strength of 
a rule were needed. Again, the induced rule helps here, since 
the attributes are listed in order of decreasing information 
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gain. However, the logical factors finally used in the Micro- 
Expert system were derived by defining the factors on the 
basis of the induced rule, and then refining them during 
subsequent testing of the-system. The resulting system in- 
cluded questions such as :- 
How certain are you that the hazard is large 1-5.. 0.. 51? 
The user has then to decide whether, his particular installa- 
tion definately has a large hazard, in which case he answered 
'5', or whether there was some doubt. 
The system was shown in Chapter 10 to work well through 
the use of example consultations, and the-work on emergency 
isolation valves as a whole has shown one method of building a 
consultative expert system from domain examples. 
This problem is 'one of pure classification, and in this 
work it has-been shown how expert system tools can be used to 
take the examples and use them to their full potential. 
At this stage in expert system development-as a whole, we 
have also indicated a rather unusual method of building an 
advice system by first inducing automatically the best 
possible rule. 
The expertise in this problem is limited to 
classification and some of the problems inherent in using a 
suitable tool for this type of problem have also been 
highlighted. 
13.2.3 Flare Systems 
The problem of flare system design is certainly more 
complex than the two problems described above, this being 
apparent from the-study, carried out in Chpater 11. 
The first stage in this work was to become familiar with 
current awareness in flare system design, and for this a flare 
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system awareness aid was written. From this it became apparent 
that a rule-based approach was an appropriate way forward and 
after an extensive review of the literature, rules were de- 
rived for flare system design. The knowledge came largely from 
technical papers, of which there is an abundance in this 
field., Use was also made of an expert, and a transcript of 
this appeared in Chapter 11. Care was taken in the rules 
derivation to note the author and the date of the work, as 
this is important when evaluating the strength of a rule. 
It was evident from the rules summary that certain types 
of rules exist for flare system design. These included 
prohibition rules, suggestions of alternatives, suggestions to 
a solution and typical numerical design values. It was noted 
that exceptions would occur to prohibition and alternatives 
rules. The rule types were then classified into explicit and 
elusive expertise. As a result of the study of rules and the 
literature, a design strategy and design expertise were 
extablished. 
A Prolog program was also written for the design of 
certain aspects of the flare system problem. The design 
strategy indicated that a step wise approach would be suitable 
together with a forward chaining solution strategy. The 
program written was based on Winston's BAGGER problem which 
was a forward chaining production system. The rules for flare 
system design were written in the appropriate format, which 
included the following steps :- 
check flare items 
determine flare type 
determine flare layout 
etc. 
The output from the program was a list of conditions for 
certain aspects of flaring. The program also showed conflict 
resolution at work. This is an important area of design work, 
and is likely to be used more extensively in the future. 
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The expertise established for flare system design was not 
as explicit as`in the two topics described above. This 
reflects the nature of the problem and the more comprehensive 
rules and solution strategy adopted. The expertise is in the 
form of awareness of alternatives, costs, probabilities, 
archetypes and distinctions. -The design strategy indicated a 
forward moving linear activity, with little iteration 
apparently required. 
13.2.4 Pressure Relief and Blowdown 
The design of a pressure-relief and blowdown system is 
probably the most complex area tackled in"this study. The main 
source of knowledge came from the API codes of practice 
together with technical papers relevant to this area. Due to 
factors outlined in Chapter 12, no programming was undertaken, 
but an example problem was carried out which highlighted some 
of the problems faced by the designer of a pressure relief and 
blowdown system. 
The study-began with a description of the legal 
requirements of any system, together with some definitions of 
the various types of relieving device available and generic 
terms used. It was necessary, in order to understand the 
problem, to establish the causes of overpressure and how to 
determine individual relieving rates. Like the flare systems 
work, an account of the literature was given. This showed that 
rules for pressure system design did not exist in the same way 
as that of flare systems and that design strategies as such 
were going to be difficult to formulate. One area where rules 
were shown to be appropriate was'that of relief valve 
selection and a rule induction strategy was suggested as a 
viable problem'solving tool. This aspect of pressure relief 
design is, however, the most straightforward, with the most 
difficult area that of specification of relief requirements 
and determination of flows. 
A logical design approach was suggested, which included 
alternatives such as pressure limitation by design and 
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pressure containment. Pressure relief situations included 
operational relief, emergency relief and fire relief, and 
various overpressure sources, typical to most plants were 
proposed. 
As stated above, two sets of -rules were derived, that for 
pressure relief valve selection and pressure relief design in 
general. These rules were again of various types, including 
suggestions to a solution, and rules indicating relief valve 
location. - -' - 
The example problem carried out was on ,a benzene plant 
line diagram, and the major area tackled was that of system 
decomposition. It was shown that decomposition is probably one 
of the most complex tasks in this area, and once a good decom- 
position has been established, the solution becomes better 
defined. Rules were written for the decomposition task, and a 
decomposition was proposed for the benzene plant line diagram. 
In the summing up, three major tasks were highlighted for 
the design of a pressure relief and blow down design. These 
were :- 
Decomposition 
Definition of flows 
Choice of relief device 
Of these, the first and the third have received attention in 
this work, with the definition of flows being very much depen- 
dent on the particular situation. The design strategy outlined 
in Chapter 12 indicated a forward moving approach, but was 
also apparently one of deeper structure than the other 
problems tackled. The expertise is similar to, although more 
involvedthan, that of flare system design. 
13.2.5 Hazard Identification 
Hazard identification was a study of the literature in 
order to identify expertise and problem-solving techniques. 
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The two aspects, coarse and fine scale, were found to be quite 
different in nature. 
Coarse scale hazard identification involves design exper- 
tise, and a data-driven, forward chaining strategy seems most 
appropriate for aspects such as check lists. Knowledge repre- 
sentation in the form of frames also seems to be well suited 
here. 
Fine scale hazard identification would be suited to the 
techniques of fault propagation with an expert system around 
it. Some problems exist in trying to automate a HAZOP study, 
for example, and these have been discussed in the text. 
13.3 Summary Table 
It is worthy at this stage to summarize the topics 
studied and the problem solving tools used in the form of a 
table. This is shown below. 
Table 13.1 Summary of Principal Topics Studied 
Topic Studied Type of Search Generic AI 
Problem Strategy Tool Software 
Fire protection 
of storage tanks 
Algorithmic Forward 
chaining 
Prolog 
Emergency 
isolation valves 
Flare 
systems 
Classification N/A ID3 Expert- 
Ease 
Ex-Tran7 
ßcichac. cd Advice Micro- 
System Expert 
Design with Forward Production Prolog 
linear chaining system 
structure 
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Pressure Design with ?_ 
relief and deeper structure 
blowdown 
13.4 Problem Characteristics 
In this section we discuss the characteristics of the 
problems we have studied together with some general aspects of 
the characteristics of design. 
13.4.1 Characteristics of Problems Studied 
We have looked at a'number of different topics in the 
field of the design of plants handling hazardous materials 
with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the exper- 
tise involved and of the design heuristics use by expert 
designers. - 
There is no doubt that the -topics all embody some form of 
expertise, albeit different in nature, with varying levels of 
skill. Some topics, and in particular the more straightforward 
ones, involve just one form of expertise, whereas other more 
complex topics embody many types. -The expertise has been 
identified as being either classification, algorithmic, or a 
deeper type which has become apparent by studying more complex 
design situations. In the complex cases there is the expertise 
of decomposition. More straightforward design problems tend to 
have either a classification solution or there is an algorithm 
to follow, while those requiring a. deeper level of expertise 
tend to be of the design type where decomposition plays an 
important part. 
The expertise of a problem is reflected in the type of 
solution strategy adopted. For problems involving classifica- 
tion, rule induction methods appear to be well suited. The 
rules induced can, as we have shown with the emergency isola- 
tion valve problem, be used in an advice giving system. For 
problems involving algorithms the direction of search which 
seems most appropriate is forward chaining, and this is also 
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true of some problems involving deeper levels of expertise. 
Forward chaining strategy has played an important part in this 
work, and it is interesting to recall a , comment from chapter 5 
concerning expert systems. There, it was stated that the 
majority of serious systems were forward chaining. 
13.4.2 Characteristics of Design- 
By studying various design topics and possible solutions 
to them we have been able to draw out some characteristics 
general to design. 
One of the main criteria in artifical intelligence prob- 
lem-solving is that the problem domain be represented in a 
state space, consisting of goals and known facts and that 
there be a search procedure for obtaining the goal state. We 
can see from this study that design problems are well represe- 
nted in this form and therefore require solution strategies to 
be adopted. In the state space will be alternatives to the 
problem solution and methods must be employed in order to find 
the optimal solution. Computational methods would therefore 
involve algorithms for choosing alternatives and algorithms 
and/or heuristics for choosing a satisfactory solution. The 
search for alternatives involves a search along possible paths 
storing in the system memory a tree of the paths it has ex- 
plored. At the end of each branch is a number which gives an 
indication of the expected benefit from further search. Search 
has the additional advantage that it gives useful information 
about the structure of the problem. 
By nature, any state space search will involve the satis- 
faction of goals. This is also an inherent 'nature of design 
problems, and therefore design is a goal seeking process. This 
also implies that logic will play an' important part in design. 
Simon states that standard logic is concerned with declarative 
statements and is-well suited to assertions about the enviro- 
nment and to inferences from those assertions. We have shown 
through the use of Prolog, which is about satisfying goals, 
that design can be handled in this way. Prolog has another 
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advantage that is essential to design, that is backtracking. 
Simon also indicates that there are two aspects to goal- 
seeking systems. The first is to do with gaining information 
about the world and the second is to do with acting on the 
world. Criteria necessary here are for a store to retain the 
information and for information about actions. This, in rela- 
tion to this study fits in well with a condition-action for- 
ward chaining system, firstly by gaining information to 
satisfy the conditions and then by firing the actions. These 
are characteristic of production systems and it therefore 
seems that a production system would be well suited to most 
design topics, providing that the knowledge can be represented 
in the form of production rules. This also has another advan- 
tage. Design, as we have seen, is characterized by the fact 
that there are often conflicts to resolve. Production systems 
are well suited to conflict resolution strategies, and this 
would therefore present little problem. 
13.4 Expert Systems for Design 
Design shares many of the characteristics of general 
problem-solving processes, and many characteristics shared by 
the problems that existing expert systems tackle. However, 
there are very few expert systems that are concerned with 
design, and only one, R1 is in commercial use. This reflects 
the difficulty of representing design problems in "a-state 
space and of representing the knowledge in a suitable form. It 
is hoped that the characteristics of design developed here 
will make some contribution to the problem. The following is a 
discussion'on the way expert systems could be used in design. 
The generation of a design can be achieved through the 
firing of rules to transform the initial state to a final 
state by rule-generated operations. Such a system would use a 
combination of forward chaining and backtracking in order to 
simulate the design process. By itself, however, an exhaustive 
search would take place, which is not a real world situation. 
This could be-overcome by the use of efficient heuristics. 
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14 Conclusions 
The objectives of this project were to study the 
expertise in the design of plants handling hazardous materials 
and to suggest new and improved-methods for computer aided 
design by studying expert systems, and by studying various 
design topics in relation to expert systems. 
14.1 Characteristics of Candidate-Topics 
Two of the problems studied have been identified as 
classification problems. They are emergency isolation valves 
and pressure relief valve selection. Where examples of the 
domain exist, automatic rule induction holds much promise, 
particularly when programmed into an advice system which can 
handle probabilities and uncertainty. 
A lot of the problems in design are probably classifica- 
tion type in nature. These are-sometimes straightforward, but 
it may not always be sufficient to use a classifier to com- 
plete a problem solution, as shown by the emergency isolation 
valve problem. 
Of the non-classification problems, such as that of fire 
tax 
protection of storage installations also make classifications 
and distinctions, and it has been shown that a forward chai- 
ning problem solving strategy is most appropriate. 
Of the more complex problems tackled, the design of 
a flare system is a fairly linear problem which proceeds in 
series and is probably without deep structure. The main 
characteristic to come out of this area of the work is that 
the quality of the rules -is very important. There is much 
information available, with some of-the rules conflicting. 
There is also much expertise in the literature which is not 
easy to codify into, rules. 
The program written for flare system design has a simple 
control strategy and this appears to be sufficient, although 
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there could be a problem in which rules to give priority to. 
The study carried out on the design of a pressure relief 
system has shown that the problem has structural features. The 
design of such a system is in three parts. The first decompo- 
sition phase represents a large and most difficult part of the 
process. The second phase is that of determining the relief 
flows, and although not explored in detail, it may be a 
more-complex part than those we have tackled. The final phase 
is that of valve selection, and this has been shown to be a 
classification type problem. 
14.2 Characteristics of'Design 
By studying various topics in design it has been possible 
to establish characteris tics of design. It has been shown 
that design is an area of much expertise, which comes out in 
various forms and types. Expertise can be algorithmic, classi- 
fication, or'it can be in the form of awareness and criteria 
for decision making. 
Also, it has been shown that problems in design are well 
suited to the problem-solving methods used in artificial 
intelligence. 
14.3 Expert System Tools 
Expert system tools used in this work have been classifi- 
cation systems, advice systems and production systems. All 
have shown promise in one aspect of design, although produc- 
tion systems seem to offer the most potential. Semantic nets 
and frames are a possiblity for hazard identification. This 
indicates that before any particular aspect of design is 
considered for an expert. system approach, a thorough knowledge 
of the domain, problem-solving processes and of the experts 
typical way of proceeding is necessary. 
This study has shown the potential that expert systems 
hold for computer aided design. Much work still needs to be 
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done, particularly in large and complex areas such as pressure 
relief and blowdown design. It has, however, been shown 
through the application of problem-solving methods applied to 
a wide range of design problems that such an approach is 
worthwhile. It should also be noted that not all design prob- 
lems can be solved using just one type of strategy. 
It has been shown, therefore, through the study of expert 
system techniques and various aspects of the design of plants 
handling hazardous materials, that the methods used to solve 
such problems share much in common with the problems addressed 
by the tools used in artificial intelligence. It may therefore 
be concluded that expert systems are a viable and promising 
aid to the designer of plants handling hazardous materials. 
14.4 Highlights of the Study 
1. Classification -a large part of design, but not necessari- 
ly straighforward. 
2. Classification tools - can be used to induce rules for an 
advice system which allows the use of probabilities and 
certainty factors. These are not easily handled in a 
classification system. 
3. Non-classification - design, -problems of this type can 
probably be handled by-a production system. 
4. Production systems - the priorities and the quality of the 
rules needs careful attention. 
5. Decomposition - is likely to be crucial in some design 
problems in order to reach a solution. 
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Consider the example given in section 6.2.2 after 
Quinlan. A set of objects, C were described by three attri- 
butes, each having various values :- 
Height with values 
Hair with values 
Eyes with values 
(tall, short) 
(dark, red, blond) 
(blue, brown) 
Two classes are possible, either '+' or '-'. The full set of 
examples is :- 
C= 
short, blond, b lue, + 
tall, blon d, brown, - 
tall, red, blue, + 
short, dark, blue, - 
tall, dark, blue, - 
tall, b lond, b lue, + 
tall, dark, brown, - 
short, b lond, b rown, - 
From section 6.2.2, 
Expected information, M(C) _ -pllog2pl - p21og2p2 
Consider the following diagram :- 
ATTRIBUTE 
C1 
A. 
Al A2 
C2 
0000000006 
An 
.................... Cn 
Therefore, let 
B(C)A) = (probability that value of A is Ai)*M(Ci) 
The suggested choice of attribute to test is that which gains 
most information as 
M(C) - B(C, A) -------> Maximum 
Consider the choice of the first attribute test. 'C' contains 
3 in class '+' and 5 in '-' 
Therefore, M(C) = -(3/8) 1092(3/8. ) - (5/8)1092(5/8) 
= 0.954 bits 
Now consider the 'height' attribute in terms of the following 
decision tree :- 
HEIGHT 
tall short 
tall, blond, blue, + short, blond, blue, + 
tall, blond, brown, - short, dark, blue, - 
tall, red, blue, + short, blond, brown, - 
tall, dark, brown, - 
tall, dark, blue, - 
The information still needc4for a rule for the 'tall' branch is 
-(2/5)log2(2/5) - (3/5)1og2(3/5) = 0.971 bits 
and for the 'short' branch :-, 
-(1/3)1og2(1/3) - (2/3)1og2(2/3) = 0.918 bits 
Therefore the expected information content is :- 
B(C, 'height') = 50.971 + 30.918 = 0.951 bits 
88 
Thus, the information gained by testing this attribute is :- 
0.954 - 0.951 = 0.003 bits 
For the 'hair' attribute, consider the following decision tree 
HAIR 
dark red blond 
short, dark, blue, - - tall, red, blue, + short, blond, blue, + 
tall, dark, blue, - 
tall, dark, brown, - 
tall, blond, b rown, - 
tall, blond, blue, + 
short, blond, brown, - 
The branches 'dark' and 'red' require no further information, 
but for the 'blond' attribute : - 
B(C, hair) = 3*0 + 1*0 + 4*1 = 0.5bits 
88.8 
Therefore the information gained by testing this attribute is 
0.954 - 0.5 = 0.454bits 
For the 'eyes' attribute :- 
EYES 
blue brown 
short, blond, blue, + tall, blond, brown, - 
tall, red, blue, + tall, dark, brown, - 
short, dark, blue, - short, blond, brown, - 
tall, dark, blue, - 
tall, b lond, blue, + 
The information still needed to form a rule is, for the 'brown' 
attribute, 0 and for the blue attribute :- 
-(2/8)1og2(2/8) - (3/8)1og2(3/8) = 0.971 bits 
Therefore the expected information content is :- 
B(C, 'eyes'). = 5*0.971 + 3*0 = 0.607 bits 
88 
Thus, the information gained is :- 
0.947 - 0.607 = 0.347 bits 
Therefore the principle of maximising expected information 
gain would lead ID3 to select 'hair' as the attribute to form 
the root of the decision tree. 
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* Program of Winston's BAGGER problem * 
* 
* A. R. Bunn Jan 1987 
** 
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Wins-on's BAGGER problem is a forward chaining systems using if-then rules. 
It is a grocery bagging system that bags groceries in the manner of a grocery 
store check-out clerk. It does the fundamentals of packing, not the optimal 
packing. e. g. big bottles of Pepsi go in the bottom. with not too many in one 
bag, ice cream is protected with freezer bags. etc. BAGGER involves four steps, 
as shown by the following procedure description: - 
BAGGER: 
1. Check to see what the customer has selseted. looking over the 
groceries to see if something is missing, with a view toward 
suggesting addditions to the customer. 
2. Bag the large items first, with special attention to putting big 
bottles in first. 
3. Bag the medium items, taking care to put the frozen things in freezet 
bags. 
4. Bag the small items, putting them wherever there is room. 
Rules: 
B1 If the step is check order 
there is a bag of potato chips 
there is no soft-drink bottle 
i then add one bottle of Peps to the order 
B2 IS the step is check order 
then discontinue the check order step 
start the bag large items step 
B3 If the step is bag large items 
there is a large item to be bagged 
there is a large bottle to be bagged 
there is a bag with <6 large items 
then put the bottle in the bag 
B4 If the step is bag large items 
there is a large item to be bagged 
there is a bag with <6 large items 
then put the large item in the bag 
B5 If the step is bag large items 
there is a large item to be bagged 
then start a fresh bag 
B6 If the step is bag large items 
then discontiue bag large items step 
start the bag medium items step 
B7 If the step is bag medium items 
there is a medium item to be bagged 
there is an empty bag or a bag with medium items 
the bag is not yet full 
the medium item is frozen 
the medium item is not in an insulated freezer bag 
then put the item in an insulated freezer bag 
B8 If the step is bag medium items 
there is a medium item to be bagged 
there is an empty bag or a bag with medium items 
the bag is not yet full 
then put the medium item in the bag 
B9 If the step is bag medium items 
there is a medium item to be bagged 
then start a fresh bag 
B10 If the step is bag medium items 
then discontinue the bag medium items step 
start the bag small items step 
B11 If the step is bag small items 
there is a small item to bag 
there is a bag not yet full 
the bag does not contain bottles 
then put the small item in the bag 
B12 If the step is bag small items 
there is a small item to bag 
there is a bag not yet full 
then put the small item in the bag 
B13 If the step is bag small items 
there is a small item 
then start a fresh bag 
B14 If the step is bag small items 
then discontinue the bag small items step 
stop 
grocery_item(bread, plastic_bag, medium. non_frozen). 
grocery_item(glop, jar, small, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(granola, card_box, large, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(sugar, paper_beg, large, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(ice_cream. card_carton, medium, frozen). 
grocery_item(potato_chips, plastie_bag, medium, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(pepsi, bottle, large, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(wine, bottle, medium, ion-froen). 
grocery_item(jam, jar, small, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(orange_juice, card_carton, medium, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(beer, cans, medium, non_frozen). 
grocery_item(fish_fingers, card box, medium, frozen). 
grocery_item(soup, cans, small, non_frozen). 
bagger: - 
step(check_order), 
step(bag_large_items), 
step(bag_medium_items), 
step(bag_small_items), 
!, fail. 
step(check_order): - 
item(potato_chips), 
item%pepsi). 
item(X) : - 
gr ocery_item(X, _, _, _), asserttpresent(X)), 
nl, write(X), write(' present! '). n1,!. 
item(-): - 
n1, write(X), write('item not present! '), nl, 
assert(item(X)). 
step(bag_large_items): - 
large_item(X), 
discover(bottle), 
bag(large). 
large_item(X): - 
grocery_item(A, 
_, 
large, 
_), nl. write('There are large items to bag'). nl. 
write('----------------------------') nl. 
disccver(X): - 
grocery_item(A, bottle, 
_, _), nl, 
write('Bagging '), write(X), nl, 
assert(bagged_items(X)). 
bag(X): - 
grocery_item(A, 
_, 
X, 
_), nl, write('Bagging item '), write(A), ni, 
assert(bagged_items(A)), 
bag_ffu11(A), 
bag_sull(bread): - 
nl, tab(B), 
write('******** '), 
write('Start new bag! '), nl, 
assert(new_bags(one)). 
bag_: ull(beer): - 
nl, tab(8), 
write('****** '). 
write('Start new bag! '), nl, 
assert(new_bags(two)). 
bag_full(_): - 
nl, tab(8), 
write('Bag not Iull! '), nl. 
ba8(_): - 
nl, write('Items bagged! '), nl. 
step(bag_medium_items): - 
medium_item(X), 
bagged(frozen), 
bag(medium). 
medium_item(X): - 
groce: y_item(A, _, medium, _), nl, write('There are medium items to bag'), nl, 
write( '-----------------------------'), nl. 
bagged(X): - 
grooery_item(A, _, _, 
X), nl, 
write(X), 
write(' item '), write(A), 
write(' put in insulated freezer bag'), nl, 
bag. ull(A), 
assert(freezer bag(X)), 
, 
fail. 
bagged(_): - 
nl, write('Frozen items bagged! '), n1. 
step(bag_small_items): 
small_item(X), 
bag(small). 
sma11_item(X): - 
grocery_item(A, _, small, _), nl write('There are small items to bag'). nl, 
write('------------------------------ ), nl. 
York Portable Prolog Release 2.1. 
Please pass on any comments on this Prolog 
to RSMKirkwood via'Multics Mail. 
?- bagger3 consulted. 
potato-chips present! 
pepsi present! 
There are'large items to bag 
Bagging_bottle 
Bagging item granola 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item sugar 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item pepsi 
Bag not full! 
Items bagged! 
There are medium items to bag 
----------------------------- 
frozen item ice-cream put in insulated freezer bag 
Bag not full! 
frozen item fish-fingers put in insulated freezer bag 
Bag not Pull! 
Frccen items bagged! 
Bagging item bread 
******** Start new bag! 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item ice_cream 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item potato-chips 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item wine 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item orange-juice 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item beer 
******* Start new bag! 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item fishfingers 
Bag not full! 
Items begged! 
There are small items to bag 
---------------------------- 
Bagging item glop 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item jam 
Bag not full! 
Bagging item soup 
Bag not full! 
Items bagged! 
no 
[Leaving Prolog] 
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/*------------------------------------------------------------------------a, 
/* ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE RULES 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------a, 
rule('atm', 'size', '110 per cent bunds'). 
rule('atm', 'bunds', 'fit drain valves to bunds', 'normally closed position', ' check 
weekly'). 
rule('atm', 'layout', '/5m minimum separation for tanks in one Croup from inside t 
op of bund of any adjacent Croup'). 
rule('atm', 'boundary'. '15m minimum separation for tanks to boundary or ignition 
source'). 
rule('atm', 'fixed_roof', 'no more than 60,000 cubic metres per bund'). 
rule('atm', 'floatinq_roof', 'no more than 120,000 cubic metres per bund'). 
rule('atm', 'fixed_roof', 'less_than_9m_diam', _, _). 
rule('atm', 'floating_rocf', 'less_than_9m_diam', _, _). 
rule('atm', 'less than_9mdiam', 'tanks 
may be grouped to total 8000ton water', 'ea 
ch group at a minimum of 15m separation'). 
rule('atm', 'greater_than_9m diam', _, _). 
rule ('atm', 'fixed_roof', 'Sreater_than_9m diam', 'separation 1/2diam large: tank', 
'or diam smaller tank/15m whichever is least'). 
rule('atm', 'floating_roof'. 'greater_than: 9m_diam'. 'separation 1/2diam larger tan 
k', 'or diam smaller tank/6m whichever is least'). 
rule('atm', 'fixed water or foam spray', 'water rate 0.2gal/min/sq ft', 'foam rate 
0. lgal/min/sq ft', 'mobile units available'). 
/* ------------------------PRESSURE -------------------------------------------------- STORAGE FULES 
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rule('pressure', 'ethylene', 'at least 60m from tanks to boundary and ignition 
sources'). 
rule(' pressure', 'c three', 'at least 45m from tanks to boundary and ignition sour 
ces'). 
rule('pressure', 'c_four', 'at least 30m from tanks to boundary and ignition sourc 
es'). 
rule('pressure', 'flamm', '15m from tanks to buildings containing flammable meters 
als'). 
rule('pressure', 'road', '15m from tanks to road/rail tank 
filling points'). 
rule('pressure', 'overhead', '15m to overhead powerlines and pipe bridges'). 
rule('pressure', 'pipeline', '7.5m to above ground power cables and pipelines'). 
rule ('pressure'. 'diam', '1/4 sum of diams of adjacent tanks to other pressure sto 
rage tanks'). 
rule ('pressure', 'low_press', '15m from low pressure refrigerated tank bunds and 3 
On from tank shells'). 
rule('pressure', 'spray', 'evenly applied water spray'). 
rule(' pressure', 'insulation'. 'fire proof thermal insulation-insulation to finish 
200mm above base'). 
rule ('pressure'. 'pipe-water', 'water application rate of 0.06-0.29a1/min/sq ft'). 
rule('pressure', 'water', 'water application rate of 0.2gal/min/sq ft'). 
rule('pressure', 'fire_proof', 'sufficient to provide at least 2 hours protection' 
rule('pressure', 'material', 'material vermiculite cement'). 
*1 
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/* REFRIGERATED STORAGE RULES 
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rule('refrig', 'insulation', 'fire_proof thermal insulation'). 
rule('refrig', 'material', 'material_cork or polyurethane or perlite powder'). 
rule('refrig', 'protection', 'supplemented by water and mobile water sprays'). 
rule('refrig'. 'fire_proof', 'sufficient to provide a minimum of 2 hours protectio 
n'). 
rule('refrig'. 'seal'. 'vapour seal-outside fire-proofing or between fire-proofing 
and conventional insulation'). 
rule('refrig', 'Pipewater', 'water application rate of 0.06-0.2gal/min/sq ft'). 
rule('refrig', 'water', 'water application rate of 0.2gal/min/sq ft'). 
rule('refrig', 'vessel_supports', 'vessel supports capable of withstanding a minim 
um of 4 hrs exposure to external fire'). 
rule('ref rig'. 'Supports', 'supports made of concrete or steel clad with fire-proo 
f insulation'). 
rule('refrig', 'ethylene', 'at : east 90m from tanks to boundary and ignition souro 
es'). 
rule('i-efrig', 'c_three', 'at least 45m from tanks to boundary and ignition source 
S')" 
rule('refrig', 'c_four', 'at least 15m from tanks to boundary and ignition sources 
'). 
rule('refri&', 'flammable', '15m from tanks to buildings containing flammable mats 
rials'). 
rule ('refrig'. 'road', '15m from tanks to road or rail tanker filling point'). 
rule('refrig', 'overhead', '15m from tanks to overhead powerlinas or pipebridges') 
rule('refrig', 'low-pressure', '1/2 the sum of diameters of adjacent tanks from to 
nks to low pressure refrigerated tank shells'). 
rule('refrig', 'flammable_storage', '30m from tanks to low pressure refrigerated L 
FG storage and flammable liquid tank shells'). 
rule('refrig', 'lfg', 'LFG and flammble liquids must be in separate bunds'). 
rule('refrig', 'pressure', '1/4 of sum of adjacent tanks from tanks to pressure st 
orage tanks'). 
rule('refrig', 'hydrants', 'hydrants in at least two locations near to the storage 
area', '15m from the risk'). 
ru]e('refrig', 'hydrants b', 'hydrants should conform to BS750', '-not less than 45 
Ogal/min, at 6.9bar'). 
rule('refrig', 'access', 'roads should have a minimum width of 3.75m', 'and a minim 
um clearence of 3.75m'). 
*/ 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NONHYDROCARBON STORAGE 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
rule('hydrogen', 'Pressure relief to atmosphere at a safe height'). 
rule ('hydro-gaseous', 'large', 'for sites greater than : 5000scf-at least 25 feet f 
rom ignition sources'). 
rule ('hydro-gaseous'. 'flammable', 'at least 50 feet from flammable storage sites 
containing at least 1000 US gallons'). 
rule('hydro_liquid', 'large', 'for sites greater than 15000scf-at least 50 feet 
from ignition sources'). 
rule('hydro_liquid', 'flammable', 'at least 100 feet from flammable storage site') 
rule('ammonia', 'hazard', '15m minimum separation and cooling water spray'). 
rule('ammonia', 'nohazard', 'no fire hazard'). 
rule('lfg', 'm_chloride', 'at least 23m from tanks to boundary and ignition source 
s'). 
rule('lfg', 'e_chloride', 'at least 15m from tanks to boundary and ignition source 
s'). 
rule('lfg', 'v_chloride', 'at least 15m from tanks to boundary and ignition source 
S'). 
rule('lfg', 'm_v_chloride', 'at least 15m from tanks to boundary and ignition sour 
ces'). 
rule('lfg', 'flammable', 'at least 15m from tanks to buildings containing flammabl 
e materials'). 
rule('lfg', 'road', 'at least 15m from tanks to road/rail car filling points'). 
rule('lfg', 'overhead'. 'at least 15m from tanks to overhead power lines and pipe 
bridges'). 
rule('lfg', 'power'. 'at least 7.5m to above ground power cables and important pip 
elines'). 
rule('lfg', 'pressure'. 'one quarter the sum of the diameters of adjacent tanks be 
tween tanks and other pressure storage tanks'). 
rule('lfg', 'low-pressure', 'at least 15m from tanks to bund wall of other low pro 
ssure tanks'). 
rule('lfg', 'm_amines', 'at least 15m from tanks to boundary and ignition sources' 
/* standard print clause */ 
prt([]) :- nl. 
prt(H: T]) : - 
write(H), tab(1), prt(T). 
/*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
START CONSULTATION 
/*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
startup : - 
nl, 
write('KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION'), nl, 
write(' OF A STORAGE TANK '), nl, nl. 
write(' PRE-CONSULTATION OPTIONS '), nl. 
write(' ------------------------ '), nl. 
write('start a consultation (s)'), nl. 
write('list help (h)'), nl, 
write('exit from the program (e)'), nl. nl, nl, 
nl, nl, 
write('Option... 4'), nl, nl, 
read(C), 
do_command(C), 
nl. 
do-command(C) :- dc(C), t. 
dc(s) start consultation. 
dc(h) :- go_help. 
dc(e) abort. 
dc(_) write('Not a valid option! '), n1. 
start-consultation : - 
readknowledge base, 
material_i d, 
retractall(material(_)), 
retractall(conds(_)), 
retractall(diam(_)), 
retractall(roof(_)). 
retractall(nonhydrocarbon(_)), 
retractall(area(_)) 
), 
fail. 
read_knowledge_base 
nl, nl. 
consult(rules), nl. 
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
PROCEDURE FOR HYDROCARBON IDENTIFICATION 
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
material_i_d : - 
nl, 
write('Is the material stored a hydrocarbon ? '), nl, 
write('Answer yes(y) or no(n)... 
nl, nl, 
read(M), 
material_check(M). 
material check(yes) : - 
assert(material(hydrocarbon)), 
storage_conds, 
fail. 
material-check(y) : - 
material_check(yes), 
fail. 
material-check(no) : - 
assert(material(nonhydrocarbon)), 
material coeds, 
Pail. 
material-check(n) : - 
material_check(no), 
fail. 
material_check(_) 
mistake, 
II 
fail. 
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PROCEDURE FOR CHECKING THE CONDITIONS OF STORAGE 
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
storage_conds 
nl. 
write('What are the conditions of storage ? '), nl, nl, 
write('Type atm. pressure, or refrigerated... '), nl, nl, 
read(C), 
type_check(C). 
type_cheek(atm) : - 
assert(conds(atm)), 
tank-diameter, 
fail. 
type_check(pressure) : - 
assert(conds(pressure)), 
which_hydrocarbon, 
fail. 
type-check(refrigerated) : - 
assert(conds(refrig)), 
refrigeration, 
fail. 
type check(_) . - 
mistake 
fail. 
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------WI 
PROCEDURE FOR ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE 
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
tank_diameter /* diameter of tank ? 
nl, nl, 
write('Is the tank diameter 9m or less ? '), nl, nl, 
write('Answer yes or no'), nl, 
read(D). 
diam_check(D). 
diam_check(yes) : - 
assert(diam(less than_9m diam)), 
storage_roof, 
!, fail. 
diam_check(no) : - 
assert(diam(greater_than_9m diem)), 
storage_roof, 
!, fail. 
storage_roof :- /* fixed or floating roof ? */ 
nl, nl, 
write('Is the tank roof fixed or floating ? '), nl, nl, 
write('Type fixed or floating... '), nl, 
read(R), 
roof_check(R), 
fail. 
rcof_check(fixed) : - 
assert(roof(fixed_roof)), 
rule-match, 
:, fail. 
roof_check(floating) : - 
assert(roof(floating_roof)), 
rule match, 
!, fail. 
rule-match: - /* search rule base */ 
conds(C), 
diam(D), 
roof(R), 
rule(C. size, Fpa), 
rule(C, layout, Fpb), 
rsle(C, boundary, Fpc), 
rule(C, bunds. Fpn, Fpo. Fpq), 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
prt(tFpb]), nl, 
prt([Fpc]), nl, 
prt([Fpn]), nl, 
prt([Fpo]), nl, 
prt([Fpq]). nl, 
print_main_rules, 
fail. 
print main_rules 
diam(D), 
oonds(C), 
roof (R), 
rule(C, D. Fpd, Fpe), 
rule(C, R. Fpf), 
rule(C. R, D, Fpg, Fpz), 
rule(C, Fph, Fpi, Fpj, Fpk), 
prt([Fpd. Fpe]), n1, n1, 
prt([Fpf]), nl, nl, 
prt([Fpg]), nl, 
prt([Fpz]), nl, nl, 
prt([Fph]), nl, 
prt([Fpi]), nl, 
prt([Fpj]), nl, 
prt([Fpk]), ni, 
go_remove, 
fail. 
go-remove : - 
retract(roof(_)), 
retract(diam(_)), 
go_again. 
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PROCEDURE FOR PRESURE STORAGE 
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
which hydrocarbon : - 
write('Is the material ethylene, C_3 or C_4 ? '), nl, nl, 
write('Answer by typing ethylene, c- three, c_four.... '), nl, 
read(E), 
material(E), 
fail. 
material(ethylene) 
conds(C), 
rule(C, ethylene, Fpa), nl, 
write('If pressurized ethylene storage, then : -'), nl, 
write('-------------------------------------- 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
next, 
fail. 
material(c_three) : - 
conds(C), 
rule(C, c= hree, Fpa), nl, 
write('If pressurized C_3 storage, then : -'), nl, 
write('---------------------------------- nl 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
)ý 
next, 
!, 
fail. 
material(c_four) : - 
rule(pressure, c_four, Fpa), nl, 
write('If pressurized C_4 storage, then :- '), nj, 
write('----------------------------------- -), nl, 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
next, 
!, 
fail. 
material(_) 
nl, 
mistake, 
fail. 
next :- 
all_rules, 
1, 
fail. 
all-rules : - 
conds(C), 
write('Other separation requirements are 
read(S), 
if 
-S 
(S), 
II 
fail. 
if-s(yes) : - 
nl. 
write('Is the pipework carried beyond the vertical projection'), nl, 
write('of the vessel, with no pipe fittings, beneath the vessel ? '), nl, 
write('Answer yes(y) or no(n)... '), nl, 
read(V), 
if_v(V), 
fail. 
if_s(y) - 
if_s(yes), 
fail. 
if-s(no) : - 
nl, 
conds(C), 
rule(C, water, Fpj), 
prt([Fpj]), nl, 
go_again, 
!, 
fail. 
if-s(n) - 
if_s(no), 
fail. 
"- mistake, 
Sail. 
if-v(yes) - 
conds(C), 
rule(C, pipe_water, Fpj), 
prt([Fpj]), 
go_again, 
fail. 
if v(y) :- 
if-e(yes), 
fail. 
if-v(no) - 
if_s(no), 
fail. 
if-v(n) - 
if_v(no), 
fail. 
if 
_v(_) mistake. 
fail. 
option(b) 
nl, 
conds(C), 
rule(C, fire-proof, Fpk), 
rule(C, material, Fpl), 
nl, 
prt([Fpk]), nl, 
prt([Fp1]), nl, 
go_again, 
fail. 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
PROCEDURE FOR REFRIGERATED STORAGE 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
refrigeration 
nl, 
conds(C), 
rule(C, insulation, Fpa), 
rule(C, protection, Fpb), 
rule(C, material, Fpc), 
rule(C, fire_proof, Fpd), 
rule(C, seal, Fpe), 
rule(C, vessel_supports, Fpf), 
rule(C, supports, Fpg), 
rule(C, hydrants, Fpq, Fpr), 
rule(C, hydrants b, Fps, Fpt), 
rule(C, access, Fpu, Fpv), 
write('For refrigerated storage, then : -'), nl, 
write( --------------------------------- '). nl, nl. 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
prt([Fpb]), nl, 
prt([Fpc]), nl, 
prt([Fpd]), ni, 
prt(CFpe]), nl, 
prt([Fpf]), nl, 
prt([Fp8]), nl, 
prt([Fpq]), nl, 
prt([Fpr]), nl, 
prt([Fps]), nl, 
prt([Fpt]), nl, 
pr. ([Fpu]), nl, 
prt([Fpv]), nl 
separation_requirements, 
fail. 
separatior. _requirements: - conds(C), 
write('Is the material ethylene, C-3 or C-4 ? '), nl, 
write('Type ethylene, c_three or c_four... '), nl, 
read(E), 
substance(E), 
fail. 
substance(ethylene) 
rule(C, ethylene, Fph), n1, 
write('If refrigerated ethylene storage, then : -'), nl, 
write( -------------------------------------------- )'nl. 
prt([Fphj), nl, 
refrig_distances, 
fail. 
substance(c_three) 
rule(C, c_three, Fph), 
write('If refrigerated c_three storage, then : -'), nl, 
write( '------------------------------------------), nl, 
prt([rph]), n1, 
reuig distances, 
I, 
fail. 
substance(c_four) 
rule(C, c_four, Fph), 
write('If refrigerated c_four storage, then : -'), nl, prt((Fph]), nl, 
refriC_distances, 
!, 
fail. 
substance(_) : - 
mistake, 
fail. 
re frig distances 
conds(C), 
write('Other separation requirements are : -'), nl, 
write( '--------------------------------------), nl. 
rule(C, flammable, Fpi), 
rule(C, road, Fpj). 
rule(C, overhead, Fpk), 
rule(C, lowj ressure, Fp1), 
rule(C, flammable_storage, Fpm), 
rule(C, lfg, Fpn), 
rule (C, pressure, Fpo), 
prt([Fpi]), nl, 
prt([Fpj]), n1, 
prt([Fpk]), n1, 
prt([Fpl]), nl, 
prt([Fpm]), nl, 
prt([Fpn]). nl, 
prt([Fpo]), nl 
water_spray_refrig, 
fail. 
water_spray_refrig : - 
write('Is the ground beneath the vessel sloped away') nl, 
write('to a catchment area ? '), nl, 
write('Answer yes(y) or no(n)... '), nl, nl, 
read(S), 
if_answer(S), 
!, 
fail. 
if_answer(yes) : - 
nl, 
write('Is the pipework carried beyond the vertical projection'), nl, 
write('of the vessel, with no pipe fittinis beneath the vessel ? '), 
nl, 
write('Answer yes(y), or (no)... '), nl, 
read(V), 
if_reply(V),, 
fail. 
if-answer(y) : - 
if_answer(yes) 
fail. 
if-answer(no) 
nl. 
conds(C), 
rule(C, water, Fpp), 
prt([Fpp)), nl, 
go -again, 
fa11. 
if-answer(n) : - 
if_answer(no), 
II 
Pail. 
if_answer(_) : - 
mistake, 
!, 
fail. 
if-reply(yes) : - 
conds(C), 
nl, 
rule(C, pipewater, Fpp), 
prt([FPp]), 
go_again, 
fail. 
if-reply(y) : - 
if_reply(yes), 
I, 
fail. 
if_reply(no) : - 
if-answer(no) 
1, 
fail. 
if_reply(_) 
fail. 
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NONHYDROCARBON PROCEDURE 
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
material conds : - 
nl, 
write('Is the material stored as LFG ? '), n1, 
write('Answer yes(y) or no(n). '), nl, 
read(A), 
check_LFG(A), 
tail. 
check_LFG(no) : - 
write('Ammonia, chlorine and hydrogen are covered in this program"'), nl, 
write('Type in one of the above for information about its storsge'), 
nl. nl. 
read(Chemical). 
chemical(Chemical), ml, 
fail. 
check_LFG(n) : - 
check-LFG(no) 
fail. 
chemical(hydrogen) : - 
assert(nonhydrocarbon(hydrogen)), 
nonhydrocarbon(H), 
write('Is hydrogen storage gaseous or liquid ? '), nl, 
write('Type gaseous or liquid... '), nl, 
read(State), nl. 
hydro-protection(State). 
fail. 
hydro-protection(gaseous) . - 
assert(conds(hydro-gaseous)), 
conds(G), 
nl, 
rule(hydrogen, Fpa), 
rule(G, large, Fpb), 
rule(G, flammable, Fpo), 
write('For gaseous hydrogen, then : -'), nl, 
write( ------------------------------ ), nl. 
prt([Fpa)), nl, 
prt([Fpb7), nl, 
prt([Fpc)), nl 
go_again, 
fail. 
hydro-protection(liquid) 
assert(conds(hydro_liquid)), 
nl, 
conds(G),, 
rule(hydrogen, Fpa), 
rule(G, large, Fpb), 
rule(G, flammable, Fpo), 
write('For liquid hydrogen storage, then : -'), nl, 
write( -------------------------------------- )'nl' 
nl, nl. 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
prt([Fpb]). nl, 
Frt([Fpc]), nl 
go_again, 
fail. 
chemical(ammonia) : - 
assert(conds(ammonia)), 
nl, 
write('Is there a tank containing flammable liquid'), n1. 
write('near enough to cause a knock on effect ? '), nl, 
write('Answer yes(y) or no(n)... '), nl, nl, 
read(R), 
act_on(R), 
I. 
fail. 
act-on(yes) : - 
nl, nl, 
assert(area(hazard)), 
area(H), 
conds(C), 
rule(C, hazard. Fpa), 
write('For ammonia storage in a 
write('------------------------- 
prt([Fpa7). 
go_again, 
1, 
fail. 
act-on(y) : - 
act_on(yes), 
fail. 
act_on(no) 
hazardous area, then : -'), nl, 
nl, nl, 
a ssert(area(nohazard)), 
area(H), 
conds(C), 
rule( C, nohazard, Fpa), 
write('For ammonia storage, in a safe area, then . -'), nl, 
write( ---------------------------------------------- ), nl, 
prt([Fpa)), nl,!. 
go -again, 
fail. 
act-on(n) : - 
act_on(no), 
Pail. 
chemical(chlorine) : - 
chemical(ammonia), 
!. 
fail. 
check_LF3(Yes) 
nl, 
write('Is the nonhydrocarbon soluble in water ? '), nl, 
w: ite('Answer yes(y) or no(n)'), nl, 
read(Answer), 
soluble(Answer), 
!, 
fail. 
check_LFG(y) : - 
checkL FG(yes), 
tail. 
soluble(yes) 
nl, 
write('If the material is one of the following'), nl. 
write('then type in the name of the material... '), nl, 
write('if not, then type no(n)'), nl, nl, 
write('methyl chloride'), nl, 
write('viny_chloride'), nl, 
write('methyl viryl_ether'), nl, 
write('ethyl_chloride... '), nl, nl, 
read(Lfg), 
get_rule(Lfg), 
fail. 
soluble(y) : - 
soluble(yes). 
Pail. 
soluble(no) : - 
write('Does the substance come under the category of methylamines ? '), nl 
write('Answer yes(y) or no(n)'). nl, 
read(Reply). 
go_rule(Reply), 
fail. 
soluble(n) : - 
soluble(no), 
: ail. 
soluble(_) :- 
mistake. 
fail. 
get_rule(methyl_chloride) : - 
nl, 
assert(conds(lfg)), 
conds(C), 
rule(C, m chloride, Fpa), nl, 
write('For the storage of methyl chloride, then : -'), nl. 
write( -------------------------------------------- #), nl, nl, 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
get-other-rules. 
fail. 
get_rule(vinyl_chloride) 
nl, 
assert(conds(lfg)), 
conds(C), 
rule(C, v_chloride, Fpa), nl, 
write('For the storage of vinyl-chloride, then 
write( nl 
prt([Fpa)), nl, 
get-other-rules, 
fail. 
get_rule(methl vinyl_ether) : - 
nl, 
a3sert(conds(1fg)), 
conds(C), 
rule (C, m v_ether, Fpa), 
write('For the storage 
write( '--------------- 
prt([Fpa]). nl, 
get_other_rules, 
fail. 
of methyl vinyl ether, then : -'), nl, 
-------------------------------'). nl, nl, 
get_rule(ethyl_ohloride) 
nl, 
assert(conds(1fg)), 
conds(C), 
rule(C, e_chioride, Fpa), nl, 
write('For the storage of ethyl chloride, then : -'), nl, 
write( '--------------------------------------------). nl, nl, 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
get_other_rules, 
fail. 
get-rule(no) 
nl, 
assert(conds(lfg)), 
write('For nonhydrocarbons soluble in water, then : -'), nl, 
write( '----------------------------------------------'), nl, nl, 
get other_rules; 
fail. 
get-rule(n) : - 
get_rule(no), 
!, 
fail. 
get_rule(_) : - 
mistake, 
fail. 
get other_rules : - 
nl, 
conds(C), 
rule(C, flammable, Fpb), 
rule(C, road, Fpc), 
rule(C, overhead, Fpd), 
rule(C, power, Fpe), 
rule( C, pressure, Fpf), 
rule(C, loworessure, Fpg). 
prt([Fpb]), nl, 
prt([Fpc]), nl, 
prt([Fpd]), nl, 
prt([Fpe]), nl, 
prt([Fpf]), nl, 
prt([FFB]), nl 
fire-protection, 
fail. 
go-rule(no) : - 
get_other_rules, 
fail. 
g _rule(n) : - go_rule(no), 
fail. 
go_rule(yes) 
nl, 
assert(conds(lfg)), 
conds(C), 
rule(C, m_amines, Fpa), 
write('For nonhydrocarbons soluble in water, then : -'), nl, 
write('-----------------------------------------------), n1, 
prt([Fpa]), nl, 
get_other_rules, 
tail. 
go-rule(y) . - go_rule(yes ), 
fail. 
go_rule(_) . - 
mistake, 
fail. 
fire_proteotion : - 
nl, nl, 
assert(conds(pressure)), 
conds(C), 
rule(C, spray, Fph), 
rule(C, insulation, Fpi), 
write('The two fire protection options are : -'), nl, 
---------------------------------------- 
prt([Fph]), nl, 
prt([Fpi]), nl, 
option_choice, 
fail. 
go-again - 
n1, 
write('Do you want another consultation ? '), nl, 
write('Answer yes (y), or no (n) '), nl. 
read(Answer), 
check_up(Answer), 
tail. 
check-up(yes) : - 
start_up. 
check-up(y) : - 
start _up. 
check up(no) : - 
abort. 
check up(n) : - 
abort. 
check-up(-) : - 
mistake, 
fail. 
mistake :- nl, 
write('Not a valid option 
go_again, 
fail. 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
HELP PROCEDURE 
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
go_nelp :- nl, 
write('This program will help you decide the fire protection'), n1, 
write('requirements needed for storage tanks. '), nl. 
write(' Those tanks covered are atmospheric storage, pressure'), nl. 
write('storage, pressure refrigerated storage, and fully refrig-'), nl, 
write('erated storage for both hydrocarbons and nonhydrocarbons. '), nl, 
write(' Answer each question followed by a full-stop, followed'), nl. 
write('by a <carriage-return>. '), nl. 
startup. 
;* Automatic entry into program */ 
? -seeing(F). see(user), startup, see(F). 
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xeiv 
**** section 2 
! This e:: Pert swstem will help you decide whether or not a particular 
! piece of Process Plant needs an emergency isolation valve. It considers 
! things such as temperature, leak historw and alternatives. 
! 
eiv 
! That was the end of the expert swstem on emersencw isolation valves 
**** section 3 
eiv 
! EmerSencw Isolation Valves 
Chistorw other tautois hitmrump larsehaz alternat fluidcom Proconv 
Cf: teiv noeiv] 
**** section 4 
C 
tautois logical 
? Is the material above its autoisnition temperature 7 
! 
Wes the material is above its autoianition temperature 
no the material is below its autoisnition temperature 
C 
alternat logical 
? Is there an alternative waw of stopping a leak 7 
7 
Wes there is an alternative 
no there is no alternative 
C 
fluidcom logical 
Is the fluid as in a compressor 7 
yes the fluid is gas in a compressor 
no the fluid is not gas in a compressor 
C 
history logical 
? Is there a history of leaks on the item of Plant 7 
Yes there is a history of leaks 
no there is no historw of leaks 
C 
hitmpump logical 
71s the material being Pumped at extremes of temperature (>-30 or <180 des C)? 
Yes the material is at an extreme of temperature 
no the material is not at an extreme of temperature 
C 
larsehaz logical 
71s the Plant item not likelw to leaks but if it doest a large oantitw will 
? escape with no way of stopping it 7 
Yes the hazard is large 
no the hazard is not large 
C 
other logical 
? Is the Plant item otherwise likely to leak ? 
7 
yes the plant item is otherwise likely to leak 
no the Plant item is not otherwise likely to leak 
C 
Proconv lozical 
? Is it convenient to the rºrocess to install an EIV"? 
7 
wes It is convenient 
no it is not convenient 
**** section 5 
fiteiv « The decision is install an EIV ?> 
noeiv « The decision is do not install an EIV ?? 
subroutine eiv 
character*8 av, ansl, atfile*51 
inteser nrºar, ansi, atn 
commoniuserin/nrar, ansi, atn 
common/userre/ans r 
common/userch/anslrstfile 
external Zeiv rextsub 
call inform (0 . S, Zeiv re>; tsub, *l, *2) 
IF(ansl. EQ. av(atn, i, 0))THEN 
call inv(0 v 5" 1.00, Z, 1.00,2r 
ELSE IF(ansl. EQ. av(atn, 2,0))THEN 
1rZaiv rQ>: tsubr*ir*2) 
call inv(0 r 5s 2.00r 2r 1.00r 4r99, Zeiv rextsub+*1r*2) 
IF(ansl. EQ. av(atnr 1r0))THEN 
call inv(0 r 2r 1.00r 2r 1.00r 5r 1, Zeiv re>: tsubº*1º*2) 
ELSE IF(ansl. EQ. av(atnr 2r0))THEN 
call inv(0 " 2r 2.00, Ir 1.00r 7r99, Zeiv rextsub+*1. *2) 
IF(ansl. EQ. av(atnr 1r0))THEN 
call inv(0 r it 1.00r b. 1.00, 8r99ºZeiv re:: tsubr*lº*2) 
2 
IF(ansl. EQ. av(atnº 1,0))THEN 
call inv(0 s 6, 1.00 , 6: 1.00, 9, 
ELSE IF(ansl . EQ. av(atn, 2,0))THEN 
call inv(0 , 6, 2.00 , 6, 2.00, 11, 
END IF 
ELSE IF(ansl . EQ. av(atn, 2,0))THEN 
call inv(0 , i, 2.00 º IF 2.00, 13, 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
END 
subr outine Z eiv 
call rulfil ( IF 0, IF 0, sir 1.00, It 
call rulfil ( OF Of 2, OF 5. 2.00, 997 
call rulfil ( OF It It OF 2, 1.009 It 
call rulfil ( Or i, 2º OF 2, 2.00. 99, 
call rulfil ( Or 2º i, OF IF 1.00. 99v 
call rulfil ( Or 3, It OF 6, 1.00, 2, 
call rulfil ( 0. 3,2º OF 6º 2.00. 1, 
call rulfil C 2º 2,2, OF i, 2.00. 2, 
END 
2, Zeiv re>stsub+*: r*2) 
1, Zeiv rextsub" it*ý> 
2, Zeiv . extsubr*17*2) 
0) 
o) 
o) 
o) 
o> 
o) 
o) 
o) 
I. 
PROGRAM XFERT 
CALL xeiv 
STOP 
END 
SUBROUTINE USES 
END 
SUBROUTINE USR2 
END 
SUBROUTINE USR3 
END 
SUBROUTINE USR4 
END 
subroutine :: eiv 
external srxeiv 
character*51 tname. mssaisrau:; ti1 
tnamea'eiv. rtf' 
mssass='mes. dat' 
auxfil=': <eiv. AUX' 
call driver(srxeiv. tnanie. mssaasrau: stil) 
end 
subroutine sr: ceiv 
e: sternal eiv 
-carl finder(nodesiProb) 
if(irrob. ea. i)call sorter(mode" 17eiv 
end 
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The following is a listing of the advice langauage 
compilation from Micro-Expert for the emergency isolation 
valve problem. 
1 
2 
3 
4 GOAL Fiteiv 'An eiv is needed' 
5 
6 BAYESIAN HAZARD LS 100 LN 0.01 
7 OTHER LS 20 LN 0.01 
8 HISTORY LS 10 LN 0.1 
9 TEMP LS 10 LN 0.1 
10 ALTER LS 0.01 LN 50 
11 PRIOR 0.5 
12 
13 RULE OTHER 'The item is otherwise' 
14 ' likely to leak' 
15 AND ALTER TEMP 
16 
17 QUESTION HISTORY 'The item has a history' 
18 ' of leaks' 
19 BLOCKED HAZARD 0.0 5.0 
20 
21 CERT 
22 
23 
24 QUESTION ALTER 'There is an alternative' 
25 ' way to stop a leak' 
26 
27 YESNO 
28 
29 QUESTION HAZARD 'The hazard is large' 
30 
31 
32 
33 CERT 
34 
35 QUESTION TEMP 'The item is pumping at' 
36 ' extremes of temperature' 
37 
38 YESNO 
39 
40 
0 
LIST OF GOALS 
1 Fiteiv ................. 4 
LIST OF HYPOTHESES 
1 Fiteiv .................. 4 
2 HAZARD .................. 29 
3 OTHER ................... 13 
4 HISTORY ................. 17 
5 TEMP .................... 35 
6 ALTER ................... 24 
This model does not use externals 
Cross-Referencing Listing 
Line No Name Used By 
24 6 ALTER Fiteiv OTHER 
4 1 Fiteiv TOP LEVEL GOAL 
29 2 HAZARD HISTORY Fiteiv 
17 3 HISTORY Fiteiv 
13 4 OTHER Fiteiv 
35 5 TEMP Fiteiv OTHER 
NO ERRORS 
Advice Language Compilation NO ERRORS 
Explanation 
First the a priori probability is turned into odds. Then 
for each antecedant hypothesisthe odds are multiplied by a 
factor. If the ceratainty of the antecedant hypothesis is -5 
then this factor is equal to the LN value. If the certainty of 
the antecedant hypothesis is 5 then the factor is equal to the 
LS value. 
The following section discusses some of the clauses in detail 
RULE OTHER 'The item is otherwise' 
' likely to leak' 
AND ALTER TEMP 
Meaning: The current probablility of OTHER 
is the lowest of the current probablilites 
of ALTER and TEMP. 
GOAL Fiteiv 'An eiv is needed' 
BAYESIAN HAZARD 
OTHER 
HISTORY 
TEMP 
ALTER 
PRIOR 0.5 
LS 100 LN 0.01 
LS 20 LN 0.01 
LS 10 LN 0.1 
LS 10 LN 0.1 
LS 0.001 LN 50 
Meaning: Let us look at the prior probability first. 
The value given is 0.5 which means that the 
probablility of fitting an emergency isolation 
valve before any of the antecedant hypothese 
have been resolved is estinated to be 0.5. For 
the purposes of the Bayesian calculation the a 
priori probability is turned into an a priori 
odds of 0.5/0.5 = 1.00. If the antecedant 
hypotheses HAZARD has a certainty factor of 5 
then these odds are multiplied by the LS factor 
for HAZARD. 
i. e. 1.00*100 = 100 
If HAZARD has a certainty factor of -5.00 then 
these a priori odds are multiplied by the LN factor 
for HAZARD. 
i. e. 1.00*0.01 = 0.01 
If HAZARD has a certainty factor of 0 then the a 
priori odds are left alone. 
For intermediate values of HAZARD's certainty 
factor an appropriate multiplier is calculated 
by linear interpolation. 
This multiplication is repeated for each antecedent 
in turn as follows :- 
Let us assume that 
HAZARD has a certainty factor of 5 
OTHER has a certainty factor of 2.5 
HISTORY has a certainty factor of -1 
TEMP has a certainty factor of 5 
ALTER has a certanity factor of 0 
The multiplication factors are therefore 
HAZARD 1+ (100 - 1)*5/5 = 100 
OTHER 1+ (20 - 1)2.5/5 = 10 
HISTORY 1+ ((1-0.1)*(-1/-5)) = 0.82 
TEMP 1+ (10 - 1)*5/5 = 10 
ALTER 1+ (0.01 - 1)*0 =0 
Therefore the current odds of Fiteiv are :- 
0.5*100*10*0.82 = 410 
Therefore current probability = 410/411 = 0.997 
QUESTION HISTORY 'The item has a history' 
' of leaks' 
BLOCKED HAZARD 0.0 5.0 
C ERT 
Here the resvered word 'BLOCKED' is used. It is used when 
some control over the order in which questions are asked is 
needed, and to be able to skip irrelevant questions. 
In this case, we have assumed that 'large hazard' is more 
relevant, and that there is no point in asking about 'history' 
unless there is a possibility of a large hazard occurring. 
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/+ Flare program, based on Winston's BAGGER */ 
Rules, based on BAGGER for flare system design 
F1 If the step is chack flares 
there are ground flares present 
Then add elevated flares to system 
F2 If the step is check flares 
then discontinue check flares 
start flare type step 
F3 If the step is flare type 
there is an item to flare 
the material is a hydrocarbon 
, the flow is low 
the flow is continuous 
Then use a ground flare 
F4 If the step is flare type 
there is an item for flare type 
the material is a hydrocarbon 
the flow is low 
the gas is in excess 
Then use a ground flare 
F5 If the step is flare type 
there is an item to flare 
the material is a hydrocarbon 
the flow is high 
the gas is not recoverable 
Then use an elevated flare 
FG If the step is flare type 
there is an item for flare type 
the material is a hydrocarbon 
the flow is low 
the flow is not continuous 
Then use an elevated flare 
F7 If the step is flare type 
then disc ontinue the flare type step 
start the flare layout step 
F8 If the step is flare layout 
there is a ground flare 
there are process units 
Then +300 fe et separation 
F9 If the step is flare layout 
there is an elevated flare stack 
there is an oil-water separator 
Then +200 fe et separation 
F10 If the step is flare layour3t 
there is an elevated flare stack 
there is a floating roof tank 
Then +200 feet separation 
F11 If the step is flare layout 
there is an elevated flare stack 
there are other process units 
Then +200 feet separation 
F12 If the step is flare layout 
then discontinue flare layout step 
start the flare tip choice step 
F13 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
the flow is high 
a smokeless flame is required 
Then use a steam ring flare tip 
F14 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
there is an unsaturated hydrocarbon 
the flow is high 
a smokeless flame is required 
Then use a steam ring flare tip 
F15 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
the material is hydrogen sulphide 
a smokeless flame is not required 
Then use a utility flare tip 
F16 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
the material is methane 
a smokeless flame is not -required 
Then use a utility flare tip 
F17 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
the material is carbon monoxide 
a smokeless flame is not required 
Then use a utility flare tip 
F18 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
there is a saturated hydrocarbon 
the flow is low 
a smokleless flame is required 
Then use a centre steam flare tip 
F19 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
there is an unsaturated hydrocarbon 
the flow is low 
a smokeless flame is required 
Then use a centre steam flare tip 
F20 If the step is flare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
there is a saturated hydrocarbon 
the flow is high 
a smokeless : lame is not required 
Then use a centre steam flare tip 
F21 If the step is glare tip choice 
there is an item for flare tip choice 
there is an unsaturated hydrocarbon 
the flow is high 
a smokeless flame is required 
then use a centre steam flare tip 
F22 IS the step is flare tip choice 
then discontinue flare tip choice step 
start alternatives step 
F23 If the step is alternatives 
there is an item to flare 
the flow is low 
the gas is toxic 
Then do not flare 
F24 If the step is alternatives 
there is an item to flare 
the material is hydrogen 
the flow is high 
Then vent to atmosphere 
F25 If the step is alternatives 
there is an item to flare 
the material is hydrogen 
discharge frequency is low 
Then vent to atmosphere 
F26 If the step is alternatives 
there is an item to flare 
the material is hydrogen 
Then use a separate vent 
F27 If the step is alternatives 
there is an item to flare 
the material is methane 
Then use a separate vent 
F28 It the step is alternatives 
then discontinue alternatives step 
start safety step 
F29 If the step is safety 
there is an item for safety 
the material is gas + hydrogen 
the flow is high 
the stack is large 
Then fit oxygen alarm for 5% 
F30 If the step is safety 
there is an item for safety 
the material is any gas 
the flow is high 
the stack is large 
Then fit oxygen alarm for 2% 
F31 If the step is safety 
there is an item for safety 
the system is under maintenance 
Then purge with nitrogen before use 
F32 If the step is safety 
there is an item for safety 
the gas can decompose with air 
Then fit a flame arrestor 
F33 If the step is safety 
then discen: inue safety step 
start general flare rules step 
F34 If the step is general flare rules 
there are general flare items 
the material Is hydrogen 
Then vent at least 10 feet above buildings 
F35 if the step is general flare rules 
there are general flare items 
the material is ammonia 
Then complete burning required 
F36 If the step is general flare rules 
there are general flare items 
the material contains phosgene 
Then complete burning required 
F37 If the step is general flare rules 
there are general flare items 
the material contains hydrogen sulphide 
Then complete burning required 
*/ 
/* Knowledge - type of flare system */ 
flare_item(hydrocarbon, lo_flow, flare_type, continuous). 
flare_item(hydrocarbon, lo= low, flare_type, excess). 
flare_item(hydrocarbon, hi__flow, flare type, non_recoverable). 
flare_item(gas_mixture, lo_flow, flare_type, containstoxics). 
flare_item(hydrocarbons, lo_flow, flare type, non_continuous). 
flare_item(gas, hi_flow, aternative_to_flaring, corrosive). 
flare_item(gas, hi_flow, alternative to_flaring, reacts_explosively). 
flare item(gas, hi_flow, alternativet o_flaring, decomposes). 
/* Knowledge - type of flare tip */ 
flare_item(saturated_hydroc, hi_flow, flare_tip, smokeless_flame). 
flare 
-f 
lame). 
flare_item(methare, any_flow, flare_tip, smokey_flame). 
flare_item(hydrogen_sulphide, any_flow, flare_tip, smokey_flame). 
flare_item(carbon_monoxide, any_flow, flare_tip, smokey_flame). 
flare_item(saturated_hydroc, lo_flow, flare_tip, smokeless_flame). 
flare_item(unsaturated hydroc, lo_flow, flare_tip, smokeless_flame). 
flare_item(saturated_hvdroc, hi_flow, flare_tip, smokey_flame). 
flare_item(unsaturated_hydroc, hi_flow, flare_tip, smokey_flame). 
/* Knowledge - layout of flare */ 
flare_item(stack, any_flow, plant_layout, oil water_separator). 
flare_item(stack, any_flow, plant_layout, floating_roof_tank). 
flare_item(stack, any_flow, plant_lryout, process_units). 
flare_item(stack, hi_flow, plant_layout, space_short). 
flare_item(ground_flare, any_flow, plant_layout, process_units). 
/* Knowledge for alternatives */ 
flare_item(gas, lo_flow, alternative, toxic). 
flare_item(_, hi_flow, alternative, hydrogen). 
flare_item(_, discharge_ req_lo, alternative. hydrogen). 
flare_item(_, generaldischarge, alternative, hydrogen). 
flare_item(_, general_discharge, alternative, methane). 
/* Knowledge - safety in flare systems 
flare_item(gas+hydrogen, hi_flow, safety, large_stack). 
flare_item(gas, hi_flow, safety, large stack). 
flare_item(stack, any_flow, safety, maintenance), 
flare_item(gas, any_flow, safety, decompose_in_air). 
/* Knowledge - general flaring */ 
flare_item(hydrogen, any_flow, gerersl, venting). 
f: are_item(ammouia, any_flow. general. burning). 
flare_item(gas+phosgene, any_flow, general, burning). 
flare_item(gas+hydrogen sulphide, any_flow, general, burning). 
/* \ 
*1 
start :- 
nl, 
chec}: (flares), 
step(flare_type), 
step(plant_layout), 
step(flare_tip), 
step(alternatives), 
step(safety), 
step(general), 
!, fail. 
check(flares) : - 
item(ground_flares), 
item(stack). 
item(X) 
flare_item(X, 
_, _, _), nl, write(X), tab(2), write('present ! '), r1. 
item(_) - 
nl, write(X), tab(2), write('not present ! '), nl, 
!, fail. 
step(flare_ ype) : - 
write('***'), tab(2), write('step 
write('flare_type'), tab(2), 
write('***'), nl, 
item_to_flare(flare_type), 
and( lo_flow, continuous), 
and(lo_flow, excess), 
conclusion(6round_flare), 
go(elevated_flare). 
go(elevated_: lare) . - 
and(hi_: low, non_reaoverable), 
and(lo_flow, non_oontinuous), 
conclusion(eievated_flare). 
go(two_hundred_feet) : - 
item to_: lare(stack), 
and(_, oil water_separator), 
and(-, floating-roof-tank), 
conflict( stack, process units), 
ccnalusion(two hundred_feet). 
go(smokey_:: ame) 
con: lict(byd: ogen_sulpnide, _, smokey_f1ame), con. 1ict; methane. _, spor: ey_f 
lame), 
ccr.: lict(carbon monc:: ide, _, smokey_°lame), conclusicn(utility_: lare ip). 
go(other) 
con_lict(satu: atea hydroc, lo_°low, smokeless_lame), 
conflict(unsaturated hydroC, b _flow, smol: eless_älame), conPliet(saturated_hydroo. hi_tlow, smokey_flame), 
coaflict(unsaturated ^ydroo, hi__flow, smokey_tlame), 
conclusion(centre_steam_ i; ). 
go(complete_burning) 
cnf1ict(ammonia, - 
burning), 
conflict(gas+phosgene, _, 
burning), 
conflict(gas+hydregen_sulphide, _, 
burning), 
conclusion(complete_burning_required). 
item to_flare(flare_type) : - f lare_item(A, 
_, 
flaretype, 
_) , nl, write('There is an item to flare ! '), nl, 
write(A), nl, nl, 
assert(material(A)), 
assert(step_is(flare_type)). 
items o_flare(ground_flare) : - 
flare_item(ground_flare, 
_, 
A, 
_), nl, write('There is a ground flare ! '), nl, 
write(A), nl. 
item_to_flare(elevated_flare_type) 
flare_item(A, 
_, 
flare_type, 
_), nl, write('There is an item to flare ! '), nl, 
w: ite(A), nl, nl. 
item-to-flare(stack) : - 
flare_item( stack, _, 
A, 
_)., nl, write('There is a stack ! ')nl 
write(A), nl, nl. 
itemto_flare(flaretip) - 
flare_item(A, 
_, 
flare tip, 
_), nl, wr: te('There is an item for flare tip ! '), nl. 
item-to-flare(alternatives) 
flare_item(A, 
_, alternative, _), nl, write('There is an item for alternatives ! '), nl, 
write(A), nl, nl. 
itemto_flare(safety) . - flare_item(A, 
_, safety, _), nl, write('There are safety items ! '), nl, 
write(A), nl, nl. 
item to_flare(safety_one) 
flare_item(gas, 
_, safety, _), nl, write(gas), nl. 
itemto_ lare(general) 
flare_item(A, 
_, general, _), n1, write('There are general flare items ! '), nl, 
write(A), nl, nl. 
and (X. Y) 
fIare_item(A, X, 
_, 
Y), nl, 
write('Conditic^s are'), 
tab(2), write(X), tab(2), 
write('and'), tab(2), 
write(Y), ni, 
assert(conditions(X, Y)). 
conflict(X, Y) : - 
flare_item(X, 
_, _, 
Y), nl, 
write('Conditions are'), 
tab(2), write(Y), tab(2), 
write('and'), tab(2), 
write(X), 
ni. 
conflict(X, Y, Z) : - 
flare_item(X, Y, 
_, 
Z), nl, 
write('Conditions are'), 
tab ('11), writeM. 
tab(2), write('and'), tab(2), 
tab(2), write(Y), tab(2), 
write('and'), tab(2), 
write(Z), 
nl. 
conclucion(X) : - 
nl, 
write('*** therefore'), tab(2), 
write(X), tab(2), 
write('***'), nl, nl, nl. 
step(plant_layout) : - 
write('***'), tab(2), write('step is'), tab(2), 
write('plant_layout'), tab(2), 
write('***'j, nl, 
item to_flare(ground_flare), 
and(-, process units), 
conclusion(three hundred_: eet_separation), 
go( two_hundred_feet). 
step(flare_tip) : - 
write('***'). tab(2), write('step is'), tab(2), 
write('flaretip'), tab(2), 
write('***'), nl, 
items o_flare(flare tip), 
and(hi_flow, smokeless_flame), 
conflict(unsaturated hydroc, hi_: low, smokeless_flame), 
conclusion(steam_ring_flare_tip), 
go(smokey_flame), 
go(other). 
step(alternatives) : - 
wr: te('***'), tab(2), write('step_is'), tab(2), 
write('alternatives'), tab(2), 
write('***'), nl, 
item_to_flare(alternatives), 
and (lo-'. 11 ow, toxio). 
conclusion(do_not_flare), 
sub_step_one(alternatives), 
sub_step_two(alternatives). 
step(safety) : - 
write('***'), write('step is'), tab(2), 
write('safety'), tab(2). 
write('***'), nl, 
item. o_flare(safety), 
and(hi_flow, Iarge_stack), 
conclusion(o)vgen_alarm_five_per_cent), 
sub_step_one(safety), 
sub_step_two(3afety), 
sub_steF_ hree(safety). 
step(general) : - 
write ), write ('step is'), tab(2), 
write('general flaring rules'), tab(2), 
write('***'), nl, 
item_to_f1are(general), 
and (any_f 1 ow, venting), 
conclusion(vent_at_least_ten_feet_above buildings), 
go(complete_burning). 
sub-step-one(alternatives) - 
and(hi_flow, hydrogen), 
and(discharge_freq_lo, hydrogen), 
conclusion(vent to_atm). 
sub-step-two(alternatives) . - 
end(general_discharge, hydrogen), 
end(general discharge, methane), 
conclusion(use_separatevent). 
sub_step_one(safety) : - 
item_to_'lare(safety_one), 
and(hi_: low, large stack), 
ecnclusion(o: ygen alarm_two_per cent). 
sub_steptwo(sa'ety) 
and(any_: low, maintenanoe), 
conclusion(purge_with_nitrogen). 
sub step three(safety) . - 
and(any_"low, decompose_in_air), 
conclusion( fit_flamearrestor). 
